Croft Michaelson

The applicant applied for judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to order her surrender to the United States under s. 57 of the Extradition Act.

She argued that the Minister failed to balance the effect of surrender against the regulatory nature of the offences, erred in treating the US prosecutor's position as irrelevant, misapplied the test for security of the person under s. 7 of the Charter, and provided inadequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the offences serious, the Minister's treatment of the prosecutor's position proper, the s. 7 analysis reasonable, and the reasons adequate.

The appellant appealed from a committal order.

The appellant subsequently abandoned her appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The appellants were charged with trafficking marijuana.

The information failed to specify the quantity of drugs, which affected whether the provincial court had absolute jurisdiction or if the appellants had an election.

The trial judge initially proceeded with a trial but later ruled he had exceeded his jurisdiction and converted the proceeding into a preliminary inquiry under s. 555(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellants applied for certiorari to quash the order, arguing the proceedings were a nullity.

The Superior Court dismissed the application.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the trial judge had jurisdiction to convert the trial into a preliminary inquiry and that the defective information did not render the proceedings void ab initio.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition to the United States on charges related to a large-scale lottery fraud scheme, and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender decision.

The appellant argued that the requirement of double criminality was not met because his alleged conduct predated the relevant Criminal Code amendments, and challenged the admissibility and sufficiency of the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under s. 29(4) of the Extradition Act, double criminality is assessed at the date of the Authority to Proceed.

The Court also found the evidence admissible and sufficient to justify committal, and upheld the Minister's surrender decision as reasonable.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of selling imported liquor, smuggling spirits, possession of property obtained by crime, and trafficking in cocaine following an undercover investigation.

He appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by discharging a juror for internal strife, giving a Browne v. Dunn instruction, excluding him from an in camera stay proceeding, failing to properly instruct on reasonable doubt, and failing to leave an 'agent for the purchaser' defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised her discretion under s. 644 of the Criminal Code to discharge the juror and made no reversible errors in her instructions or procedural rulings.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 12-month custodial sentence was fit for the offences.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice, seeking to have charges quashed or a new preliminary inquiry ordered.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, noting that the provincial court judge had already decided to convert the proceedings into a preliminary inquiry, a decision not subject to the current appeal.

The appellant previously appealed his committal for extradition and applied for judicial review of the surrender decision.

The appeal was dismissed, but the judicial review was adjourned pending reconsideration of the surrender decision.

The Minister of Justice subsequently vacated the surrender order and discharged the appellant.

The parties agreed the matter was moot, and the application for judicial review was dismissed.

Following the release of its judgment regarding a sealing order on search warrant materials, the Court of Appeal was informed that the redacted names were not the subjects of the search warrants, but rather two other individuals mentioned in the materials.

The Attorney General of Canada requested a revised judgment, while the appellant media organization requested an addendum.

The Court agreed with the appellant, releasing an addendum to note the new information and varying the formal order to permit media access to the redacted names.

The appellants, a media organization and a reporter, sought access to the names of individuals whose premises were searched under warrants related to a national security investigation.

The initial judge maintained a sealing order over the names to protect the privacy of innocent persons.

The reviewing judge dismissed an application for certiorari.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found an error of law on the face of the record because the initial judge failed to consider reasonably alternative measures, specifically allowing media access to the names while imposing a publication ban.

The appeal was allowed, and an order was made granting media access to the names subject to a non-publication order.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking in cocaine, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the appellant's prior cocaine use and the second step of the Carter analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the instruction that prior drug use could be considered for credibility, as the appellant introduced the evidence in chief and the judge cautioned against propensity reasoning.

The court also found the Carter analysis instruction, while not a model charge, was sufficient when viewed as a whole.

The United States sought the respondent's extradition to New York and later to Ohio on drug charges.

The Minister ordered the respondent's surrender to New York but delayed conveying him to consider the Ohio request, citing the rule of specialty.

The respondent applied for a discharge under s. 69 of the Extradition Act because he was not conveyed within 45 days of the surrender order.

The application judge granted the discharge, finding the Minister failed to show sufficient cause for the delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Minister's appeal, holding that the delay was unjustified and that s. 69 mandates discharge when sufficient cause is not shown.

The appellants were charged with illegal hunting practices on an Indian reserve under the Migratory Birds Convention Act.

They argued that a 1955 band council by-law passed under the Indian Act constituted a comprehensive code that ousted the application of the federal Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the two regulatory regimes did not conflict, as compliance with one did not require breach of the other.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming that the appellants could be charged under either the Act or the by-law.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition to the United States on charges of conspiracy to distribute MDMA, and sought judicial review of the Minister's surrender order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from the committal order, finding the Authority to Proceed sufficiently particularized the conspiracy.

On the judicial review, the Court rejected arguments regarding jurisdiction, disclosure, and adequacy of reasons.

However, based on fresh evidence that the main prosecution witness had been returned to Canada and was on parole, the Court adjourned the judicial review application to allow the appellant to request the Minister to amend the surrender order.

The appellant sought to appeal a decision on an interlocutory application in a criminal proceeding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that there is no provision in the Criminal Code that permits appellate review of such a decision.

The appellant appealed her conviction for importing cocaine.

She was arrested after customs officers in St. Lucia observed her checking a suitcase that was later found to contain 14 kilograms of cocaine.

On appeal, she argued that the trial judge erred by admitting intelligence hearsay, admitting the baggage tag for the truth of its contents, failing to adequately warn the jury about photo lineup identification, and admitting evidence of her demeanour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while some evidence was inadmissible, it caused no prejudice, and the other evidentiary rulings and jury instructions did not constitute reversible error.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on charges related to marihuana cultivation.

The trial judge had excluded evidence of a light bulb and fertilizer found in the respondent's possession, reasoning that they lacked a specific connection to the particular operation.

The Court of Appeal held that this was an error, as the items were probative of knowledge when considered in context with the respondent's possession of keys to the basement where the marihuana was growing.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for holding out, arguing the trial judge erred by relying on a police officer's testimony regarding slang terms as expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the testimony was properly admitted as the officer's lay understanding of a conversation to which he was a party.

This evidence, combined with the packaging and neighbourhood context, was sufficient to prove the charge.

The appellant appealed his conviction by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown conceded that the appeal must be allowed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and entered an acquittal.

The appeals concerned whether the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations created a constitutionally adequate medical exemption to the criminal prohibition on marihuana possession for persons with serious medical needs.

The court held that the scheme violated s. 7 because it forced authorized users to rely on the black market for supply and because the requirement of a second specialist for category 3 applicants was an arbitrary barrier.

Those defects were not justified under s. 1.

Rather than invalidate the entire regime, the court struck down only the second specialist requirement and three production restrictions, thereby preserving a constitutionally valid medical exemption and restoring the validity of the possession prohibition.

The separate appeals seeking broader relief were dismissed.

The appellant appealed an endorsement of a Superior Court judge that set aside a previous order.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding that the order appealed from was interlocutory and therefore not properly before the court.

The Court also noted that the motion judge reached the correct result, as the initial order had been made without proper service.