Croft Michaelson

The appellant appealed his conviction for holding out, arguing the trial judge erred by relying on a police officer's testimony regarding slang terms as expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the testimony was properly admitted as the officer's lay understanding of a conversation to which he was a party.

This evidence, combined with the packaging and neighbourhood context, was sufficient to prove the charge.

The appellant appealed his conviction by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown conceded that the appeal must be allowed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and entered an acquittal.

The appeals concerned whether the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations created a constitutionally adequate medical exemption to the criminal prohibition on marihuana possession for persons with serious medical needs.

The court held that the scheme violated s. 7 because it forced authorized users to rely on the black market for supply and because the requirement of a second specialist for category 3 applicants was an arbitrary barrier.

Those defects were not justified under s. 1.

Rather than invalidate the entire regime, the court struck down only the second specialist requirement and three production restrictions, thereby preserving a constitutionally valid medical exemption and restoring the validity of the possession prohibition.

The separate appeals seeking broader relief were dismissed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application dated February 10, 2003.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge correctly dismissed the application because it sought the exact same relief as prior applications disposed of by another judge, and all issues were or could have been raised in those prior proceedings.

The appellant appealed an endorsement of a Superior Court judge that set aside a previous order.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding that the order appealed from was interlocutory and therefore not properly before the court.

The Court also noted that the motion judge reached the correct result, as the initial order had been made without proper service.

The appellant was charged with possession of marihuana for the purpose of trafficking.

He brought a motion to stay the charge, arguing that the declaration of invalidity in R. v. Parker deleted marihuana from Schedule II of the CDSA for all purposes, meaning the charge no longer existed.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that a declaration of invalidity does not delete a provision from a statute, but renders it of no force or effect to the extent of its inconsistency.

The Parker declaration only applied to the simple possession charge under s. 4, not the trafficking charge under s. 5(2).

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that an informant's evidence was necessary for his defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even at its best, the informant's testimony that the appellant was not present at an apartment on a specific day would not have materially assisted the appellant in meeting the Crown's case, nor was it necessary to ensure a fair trial.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding stolen vehicles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that information retrieved by a U.S. customs officer from a computer system was not gathered in Canada merely because it referred to Canadian auto thefts.

The Court also found ample evidence of identification and that the vehicles were stolen, noting the appellant had placed false VIN numbers over the original ones.

The Crown requested a stay of the order of Lederman J. pending the release of the Court of Appeal's reasons on the main appeal.

The Court of Appeal declined to grant the stay, finding that the Crown had not demonstrated sufficient potential prejudice to warrant it.

The Court relied on the Crown's stated intention to operate under its interim policy pending the decision, with leave for any party to apply for interim relief if circumstances change.

The Crown brought a motion for a stay pending appeal of a judgment declaring the medical use of marijuana regulations invalid.

The lower court had suspended the declaration of invalidity for six months.

The Crown sought to extend this suspension by staying the judgment until the appeal could be heard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the Crown provided no evidence or rationale to support extending the suspension period or to show prejudice if the judgment took effect.

The accused was charged with importing heroin and using a false passport after being threatened by a man in Belgrade who said he would harm her mother if she did not comply.

She raised the common law defence of duress, successfully arguing that the strict immediacy and presence requirements of section 17 of the Criminal Code violated section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that it is a principle of fundamental justice that only voluntary conduct should attract criminal liability.

The Court found that section 17's requirements were too restrictive, infringed section 7, and could not be justified under section 1.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed and the acquittal upheld.

The appellant was a trespasser growing marijuana in abandoned fields.

The police seized the plants pursuant to a warrant issued after receiving a tip.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the fields, applying R. v. Edwards and R. v. Belnavis.

Consequently, it was unnecessary to consider section 24(2) of the Charter, and arguments under sections 7 and 11(d) were also rejected.

The United States requested the extradition of the respondent, a Canadian citizen, on charges of attempting to launder money and conspiracy to launder money following a failed FBI sting operation.

The respondent argued his conduct would not constitute an offence in Canada because the money was not actually the proceeds of crime, making the offence impossible.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondent's conduct would amount to a criminal attempt and a criminal conspiracy under Canadian law, as factual impossibility is not a defence to these inchoate offences.

The Court also dismissed the respondent's cross-appeal regarding disclosure, finding that the limited disclosure provided was adequate for an extradition hearing.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine after selling crack cocaine to an undercover officer.

At trial, the appellant raised an alibi defence, claiming he was at home with his mother at the time of the offence.

The trial judge found that the alibi had not been adequately disclosed to the police, as the mother's statements at the police station were disjointed and focused on the time of arrest rather than the time of the offence.

Consequently, the trial judge drew an adverse inference against the alibi evidence and convicted the appellant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that proper disclosure of an alibi requires adequacy and timeliness to permit meaningful police investigation.

The majority found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the mother's statements lacked sufficient detail and coherence to constitute adequate disclosure.