Shannon McDunnough

The appellant lawyer appealed an interlocutory order suspending his licence to practise law.

The suspension was based on serious findings by the Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories that he had knowingly breached a Mareva order and misappropriated trust funds.

On appeal, the lawyer brought motions to admit fresh evidence and stay the suspension, and raised numerous grounds alleging procedural unfairness, reasonable apprehension of bias, and improper conduct by Law Society counsel.

The Appeal Division dismissed the motions, finding the fresh evidence test was not met and a stay was unwarranted.

The appeal was dismissed, with the Tribunal concluding the hearing was fair, the panel's interventions were appropriate case management, and the reasons for suspension were justifiable and intelligible.

The respondent lawyer brought a motion to dismiss conduct and capacity applications issued against her by the Law Society, alleging abuse of process, bias, discrimination, and prosecutorial misconduct.

She claimed that the Law Society, its investigators, counsel, and Tribunal adjudicators discriminated against her as an Indigenous Christian woman and infringed her Charter right to freedom of religion.

The Tribunal reviewed the extensive evidentiary record and found no evidence to support the allegations of bias, discrimination, or improper motives.

The Tribunal concluded that the respondent failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or any conduct amounting to an abuse of process, and dismissed the motion.

The Law Society brought a capacity application alleging the respondent lawyer was incapacitated between 2014 and 2019 due to a mental illness.

The respondent, an Indigenous woman and registered nurse, contested the application, arguing she was never incapacitated, her religious expressions were misinterpreted as delusions, and the psychiatric assessments were tainted by systemic racism.

The Tribunal accepted the expert psychiatric evidence that the respondent suffered from a lifelong mental illness that rendered her incapacitated during the relevant period, but found she has been in remission since 2019 due to adherence to a treatment plan.

The Tribunal ordered a three-year return-to-practice plan under s. 40 of the Law Society Act, requiring the respondent to remain under the care of a treating regulated professional and provide annual compliance reports, finding this to be the least restrictive accommodation necessary to protect the public.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division, which upheld a finding of professional misconduct and a one-month suspension.

The misconduct involved sexual harassment of employees and uncivil correspondence to clients and a client's father.

The appellant argued procedural unfairness and that the rules of professional conduct regarding incivility did not apply to communications with a client's family member.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness, confirming that the incivility rule applies to communications with 'any other person', and upholding the penalty and costs awards.

The appellant, a cocaine dealer, was arrested in possession of a loaded semi-automatic Ruger pistol, cocaine, and cash.

He was convicted of firearm and drug-related offences after a trial by judge alone.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his convictions on Charter grounds, arguing that police violated his rights to be free from arbitrary detention and unreasonable search when they entered a private backyard without permission.

The majority (Doherty and Brown JJ.A.) upheld the convictions, finding the police entry lawful under the implied licence doctrine and the detention justified by reasonable suspicion.

Lauwers J.A. dissented, finding the police entry unlawful and the detention arbitrary, and would have excluded the evidence and acquitted the appellant.

The accused applied for a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code to vacate a detention order made by a Justice of the Peace following alleged breaches of a prior release.

The accused argued the Justice of the Peace erred in law regarding the presumption of innocence and that the detention was clearly inappropriate.

The Superior Court found no error of law but concluded the detention was clearly inappropriate because the Justice of the Peace gave insufficient weight to the accused's proposed release plan.

The plan to reside in a supportive housing facility in a different city, combined with the remote fly-in nature of the victim's community, adequately addressed secondary ground concerns.

The detention order was vacated and the accused was released on strict conditions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching involving his former common-law stepson, as well as assault and breach of recognizance.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility and reliability of the complainant's evidence, specifically regarding inconsistencies, motive to fabricate, collusion, and implausibility.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment or application of the burden of proof, concluding that the trial judge adequately addressed the defence's arguments and properly applied the W.(D.) framework.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and touching a complainant for a sexual purpose allegedly occurring when the complainant was a child between 1999 and 2004.

The trial judge applied the credibility and reasonable doubt framework requiring consideration of the accused’s evidence, whether it raised a reasonable doubt, and whether the Crown’s case proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Although the complainant testified sincerely, the court identified significant reliability concerns arising from inconsistencies, contextual improbabilities, and uncertainty in the complainant’s recollection of key events and locations.

The accused provided clear denials and supporting evidence that was not rejected.

The court concluded that the Crown had not proven the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.