Moiz Rahman

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the Crown's case formidable and the guilty verdict entirely reasonable.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that the sentence was within the appropriate range and that the fresh evidence offered on appeal did not constitute the rare circumstances required to justify a conditional sentence for this type of offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for smuggling heroin into a correctional facility.

The sole issue on the conviction appeal was the alleged lack of proof of continuity of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that continuity was established by direct and circumstantial evidence, and refused leave to appeal the sentence, holding that it was fit for the serious offence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking offences and his six-year sentence.

He argued that errors by the Vietnamese interpreter deprived him of his right to make full answer and defence, and that the trial judge erred in applying the parity principle given his co-accused's four-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the translation errors minor.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the court found no error in the trial judge's application of the parity principle, noting the co-accused had pleaded guilty.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their applications for certiorari to quash their committals for trial on charges of making false and fraudulent claims for GST refunds.

The preliminary inquiry judge found evidence supporting a reasonable inference that the appellants were not involved in commercial activity and generated paperwork solely to defraud the government of GST refunds.

The appellants argued that under a literal interpretation of the Excise Tax Act, they were entitled to claim GST credits even if the transactions were constructed solely to obtain public money.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding no jurisdictional error by the preliminary inquiry judge, and dismissed the appeals.

The appellant was convicted of returning to Canada without the written consent of the Minister after being deported, contrary to s. 55(1) of the Immigration Act.

The trial judge placed an evidentiary burden on the appellant to adduce some evidence of permission to return.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the lack of written consent is an element of the offence, and the burden of proof lies entirely on the Crown.

The common law rule placing the burden on the accused for certain exceptions did not apply.

As the Crown failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt, the appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appellant was convicted of producing marijuana after police found a grow operation in a house.

When the appellant pulled into the driveway, an officer detained him and asked if he lived there without first informing him of the reasons for his detention or his right to counsel.

The appellant admitted he lived there.

The trial judge found a Charter breach but admitted the statement.

The Court of Appeal held that the failure to promptly inform the appellant of the reasons for his detention violated s. 10(a) of the Charter.

The admission of the conscriptive statement rendered the trial unfair.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge should have conducted an inquiry into whether the triers in the jury selection process understood their role or were biased.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding there was no obligation for such an inquiry and that a 'Yes' response during a challenge for cause does not automatically disqualify a potential juror.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking conspiracy, criminal organization offences, and possession of a prohibited weapon.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence from a cooperating witness, failed to consider the mens rea for the criminal organization counts, and erred in finding possession of a punch dagger.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these grounds, finding sufficient corroboration for the witness's testimony and that the conspiracy findings established the requisite mens rea.

However, the appeal was allowed in part to stay three counts based on the Kienapple principle, as conceded by the Crown.

The appellant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking after police stopped his car for erratic driving, smelled marijuana, and found 197 grams of marijuana during a search.

On appeal, the appellant argued the evidence should have been excluded under the Charter and that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the search was justified as a valid search incident to arrest and the record supported the trial judge's inferences regarding possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The applicant sought bail pending the determination of his judicial review of the Minister of Justice's refusal to reconsider a surrender order in extradition proceedings.

The Crown opposed bail, arguing the judicial review was frivolous and citing the public interest in enforcing the surrender order after seven and a half years of delay, and alternatively sought to expedite the hearing.

The court granted bail, finding the judicial review raised new issues and the applicant's detention was not necessary in the public interest.

However, the court also granted the Crown's motion to expedite the judicial review hearing to mitigate prejudice to the extradition partner.

The appellant appealed his convictions following a jury trial.

The Court of Appeal identified two fundamental errors of law: the trial judge failed to take the verdict from the jury on both counts after the appellant was placed in their charge, and failed to direct the jury on the included offence of simple possession.

Applying the principle from R. v. Haughton, the Court found that the failure to leave the included offence with the jury may have affected the verdict.

As the Crown did not seek a new trial on the full offence and the appellant conceded guilt for simple possession, the Court substituted a conviction for simple possession with a sentence of time served, and quashed the conviction on the second count.

The appellant appealed his conviction by Justice Albert J. Roy of the Superior Court of Justice.

The conviction appeal was abandoned.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in finding the necessary mens rea based on wilful blindness.

The trial judge found the appellant should have suspected there was more to a parcel he delivered to a jail than clothing.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by applying an objective standard ('should have alerted') rather than a subjective one, and by finding a level of suspicion ('may be more') that fell short of the 'probability' required for wilful blindness as defined in R. v. Jorgensen.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in his Charter analysis under ss. 9, 10(a), 10(b), and 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the detention was appropriate until the scene was secured, and that despite breaches of ss. 10(a) and 10(b), the violations were not sufficiently serious to merit the exclusion of the drug evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence that contradicted her explanation for using cash to purchase airline tickets to Jamaica.

The appellant claimed she used cash because she lacked a credit card due to unpaid student loans.

The Crown introduced evidence proving this explanation false, which the Court of Appeal held was not collateral as it provided circumstantial evidence of guilty knowledge.

The court also found no error in the trial judge raising an irregularity in the appellant's diploma.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was abandoned.

The Crown appealed the disposition of a conditional discharge imposed on a young person.

The Court of Appeal noted it did not agree with all of the trial judge's reasons or disposition, but refused leave to appeal the sentence because a year had passed and the young person had complied with all terms of the conditional discharge.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing his guilty plea was involuntary because it was entered as a result of death threats against him and his wife.

The appellant filed fresh evidence, including an email containing a death threat.

The Court of Appeal found that the record raised a serious issue about the voluntariness of the plea and that the appellant had satisfied the burden of proving the plea was involuntary on a balance of probabilities.

The appeal was allowed, the guilty pleas struck out, the convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine and sentenced to eight years in prison.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge misapplied the Carter analysis for co-conspirator hearsay by assessing his credibility at the second step and failing to scrutinize the reliability of the hearsay evidence.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence, arguing it was manifestly unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding ample direct evidence of the appellant's participation in the conspiracy, no error in the trial judge's application of the Carter framework, and that the eight-year sentence was fit given the appellant's active role and personal circumstances.

The appellants appealed their convictions and four-year sentences for importing cocaine.

On the conviction appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's ruling that if an exculpatory utterance was admitted, its entire context had to be put before the jury.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found the four-year terms were within the appropriate range and that positive fresh evidence did not justify reducing the demonstrably fit sentences.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the trial judge erred in using evidence of prior trafficking and that the Crown's cross-examination was oppressive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the prior trafficking evidence was relevant to intention and the improper cross-examination did not render the trial unfair.