Scott C. Hutchison

The appellant sought to certify a class proceeding against the Crown for failure to hold timely bail hearings, alleging negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and Charter rights violations.

The motion judge dismissed certification.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no cause of action in negligence (claims attacked core policy decisions), the fiduciary duty claim abandoned, and the Charter claims lacking common issues and not being a preferable procedure due to the need for individualized assessments.

This decision addresses competing carriage motions in proposed class actions concerning business interruption insurance claims related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court considered an "omnibus" action against 16 insurers and several focused actions against Aviva.

The court ruled that the Aviva-specific actions should proceed expeditiously, carved out from the omnibus action, with the Nordik Consortium and Lerners LLP appointed as carriage counsel for the Aviva claims.

The Workman Consortium was appointed carriage counsel for the omnibus action, excluding the Aviva defendants.

The decision prioritized the best interests of the class, fairness to defendants, and the objectives of the Class Proceedings Act, particularly access to justice and expeditious determination.

The applicant, an Ontario corporation, sought declarations that certain provisions of British Columbia's Provincial Sales Tax Act were unconstitutional and did not have legal force in Ontario.

The respondent British Columbia Crown brought a motion to dismiss the application for lack of jurisdiction.

The court granted the motion, finding that interprovincial Crown immunity applied and that the British Columbia Crown could only be sued in the courts of British Columbia pursuant to the British Columbia Crown Proceeding Act.

The appellant, a former ward of the Children's Aid Society (CAS), appealed the dismissal of her action for damages and a contempt motion.

Her action alleged negligence, defamation, breach of privacy, and wrongful disclosure of her youth criminal proceedings and a pre-disposition report by the CAS to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the contempt appeal, finding no court orders were disobeyed.

However, it partially allowed the summary judgment appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in dismissing the claim regarding the wrongful disclosure of youth criminal proceedings records under the Young Offenders Act and Youth Criminal Justice Act, stating that a legislative offence does not preclude a civil action for damages.

The issue of the Society's liability for damages related to this disclosure was remitted for further proceedings.

This endorsement addresses costs following the dismissal of a contempt motion brought by the plaintiffs against the Children's Aid Society of Toronto (CAST), its counsel, and legal assistant.

The court found the motion to be without merit and the defendants wholly successful.

Despite the plaintiff being self-represented and having been warned about costs, the court determined that costs should follow the event due to the serious nature of the allegations.

Applying the factors under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and balancing the indemnity principle with access to justice, the court awarded the defendants $7,500 in costs, inclusive of HST and disbursements, a reduction from their requested $10,000.

The plaintiff, Vrancor Development Group Inc., brought a motion for leave to issue a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) against a property in Burlington, Ontario.

Vrancor alleged an oral joint venture agreement with the defendants, Marko Juricic, Brooklyn Contracting Inc., and Laurentian Business Centre Ltd., for the property's development, claiming breach of trust and fiduciary duty when the defendants closed on the property without Vrancor and transferred title to a company controlled by Juricic.

The defendants contended that discussions never materialized into a binding agreement.

Applying the test for CPLs, the court found a triable issue regarding Vrancor's claimed interest in the land, noting that the CPL would preserve the status quo given Vrancor's claim for a proprietary interest rather than monetary damages.

Two appellants were convicted of murder arising from a shooting in Toronto allegedly motivated by street gang rivalries.

The appellants appealed their convictions on four grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in admitting expert opinion evidence on street gangs from a Toronto Police Service detective; (2) the trial judge erred in admitting handwritten rap lyrics seized from an apartment; (3) the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on eyewitness identification evidence; and (4) the trial judge's conduct gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all conviction appeals and the sentence appeal, finding that while the trial judge committed an error in principle regarding expert evidence bias analysis, the evidence was properly admitted.

The court also found the jury instructions on eyewitness identification were adequate and fair, and that the trial judge's conduct, though at times harsh, did not demonstrate bias when viewed contextually.

The moving parties, a company and its CEO, commenced a private prosecution against a court-appointed receiver under the Environmental Protection Act, alleging the receiver stored excess organic waste.

The receiver brought a motion to stay the prosecution, arguing the moving parties failed to obtain leave of the court as required by the receivership order and that the prosecution was an abuse of process.

The Superior Court of Justice held that a private prosecution is a 'proceeding' requiring leave under the receivership order.

The court refused to grant leave and stayed the prosecution, finding it was an abuse of process because the moving parties were attempting to relitigate the exact same allegations that had previously been dismissed by the Superior Court and the Court of Appeal in a prior motion for leave to sue the receiver.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on drug and firearm charges following a trial judge's finding that police violated the accused's s. 8 Charter right by obtaining a search warrant based on insufficient information, and the subsequent exclusion of evidence.

A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown appeal, affirming the acquittals.

The Supreme Court of Canada, by majority, allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, adopting the dissenting reasons of the Court of Appeal judge who found there was no breach of s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown brought an application to unseal documents held by an accounting firm (PWC) that were subject to a production order in a fraud investigation.

The respondent claimed blanket solicitor-client and litigation privilege over the entire PWC file, arguing the accountants were retained by his law firm to assist with a CRA voluntary disclosure application.

The court rejected the blanket privilege claim, finding that the accountants were primarily performing independent accounting functions (preparing tax returns) rather than acting solely as a conduit for legal advice.

The court ordered a document-by-document review by appointed referees to identify any specific privileged communications.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion for contempt against the Children's Aid Society of Toronto, its counsel, and a legal assistant.

The plaintiff alleged contempt based on the transmission of a Pre-disposition Report to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, the service of a statement of defence referencing youth court proceedings, and counsel's failure to attend court.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion, finding that no court order had been breached, the disclosure was made at the plaintiff's request, and the pleadings were privileged and filed under seal.

The Registrar of Alcohol, Gaming and Racing appealed from a Superior Court declaration that the GotSkill gaming system is not a game as defined under s. 197(1) of the Criminal Code.

The application judge had concluded that GotSkill was not a game of mixed chance and skill because a sufficiently skilled player could ultimately beat the machine.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that GotSkill is a game of mixed chance and skill.

The court clarified that under the Criminal Code, any game containing both elements of chance and skill—regardless of which predominates—falls within the definition of a game.

The presence of a systematic resort to chance when the game is played multiple times, combined with the skill element required in the game task, was sufficient to classify GotSkill as a game of mixed chance and skill.

Following a successful motion by the plaintiff for an interlocutory injunction to prevent interference with the completion of a transmission project, the court determined the issue of costs.

The court rejected the defendants' argument that costs should be reserved to the trial judge, finding that the injunction effectively resolved the main issue in dispute.

Costs were awarded forthwith on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $50,000 jointly against the institutional defendants and $15,000 against each of the two individual leaders of the blockade.

No costs were awarded against the remaining individual defendants.

The appellant, a property developer, appealed the dismissal of its application to quash an Interim Control By-Law (ICBL) enacted by the Township of Muskoka Lakes.

The ICBL restricted permitted uses within a designated area to those lawfully existing on the date of enactment and required such uses to be conducted entirely within existing buildings.

The appellant had obtained 11 building permits for a 43-unit condominium development with recreational amenities, had commenced construction, and had undertaken extensive site servicing work, all with Township approval.

The application judge dismissed the appeal, finding the property was not exempt under the Planning Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the development should be viewed as an integrated whole and that the issuance of 11 building permits for constituent elements of the development provided protection under section 34(9)(b) of the Planning Act.

The court found no genuine planning justification for the ICBL and noted it appeared designed to appease local opposition rather than serve legitimate planning purposes.

The Law Society of Ontario applied under s. 49.13 of the Law Society Act for an order to disclose confidential financial records of Rasik Behari Mehta to the Ontario Securities Commission's Joint Serious Offences Team (JSOT) for an investigation into alleged frauds by David Singh.

The court considered whether the s. 49.13(2) restrictions on disclosure applied, finding that the financial records were not "oral or written statements" and were not subject to solicitor-client privilege.

Applying a three-part test from Deloitte & Touche LLP, the court balanced the public interest in disclosure against confidentiality concerns, concluding that the public interest in investigating and prosecuting serious fraud outweighed any remaining confidentiality issues.

The application was granted.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on drug and firearms charges.

The trial judge found that police violated the respondent's Charter rights under section 8 by obtaining a search warrant based on stale information.

The warrant was issued on February 26, 2016, to search the respondent's vehicle for cocaine and related items, based on information that the respondent had allegedly delivered drugs to a target of investigation on February 3, 2016, and possibly on December 18, 2015.

The trial judge concluded that the 23-day delay between the last alleged transaction and the warrant execution rendered the information insufficient to establish reasonable grounds to believe evidence would be found in the vehicle.

The trial judge excluded the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal (majority) dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's analysis of the staleness of the information or the application of the section 24(2) factors.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the victim fine surcharge totalling $900 (comprised of 7 fines).

All other aspects of the appeal were dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed a sentence of 18 months imposed on June 2, 2018 by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the 18-month sentence, finding that the trial judge did not err in imposing it on top of pre-trial custody, as this was a joint submission clearly understood by all parties during extensive pre-trial discussions.

The court rejected the appellant's request for additional credit for pre-trial custody.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part to remove the victim fine surcharge, which the Crown conceded should be set aside.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault against a friend of his and his long-time girlfriend.

The case rested largely on the complainant's recognition of the appellant as a man she saw standing in a doorway for several seconds immediately after waking up in a dark room, and on the appellant's equivocal responses when confronted by his girlfriend about the allegations.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by instructing the jury that recognition evidence of a known person is different from identification evidence of a stranger, when in fact recognition evidence is subject to the same frailties and risks.

The trial judge also erred by failing to instruct the jury on the dangers of relying on reaction evidence, particularly where the accused was confronted with vague allegations and given no details of the specific conduct alleged.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence from the Ontario Court of Justice.

The conviction appeal was dismissed as the information amendment during trial was proper.

The sentence appeal was partially allowed.

While the trial judge erred in treating lack of remorse as an aggravating factor, the appellate court upheld the one-year imprisonment sentence as fit given the appellant's abuse of trust and planned fraud against a vulnerable family member.

The court extended the time to pay the fine in lieu of forfeiture from six months to two years and set aside the victim fine surcharge.