Scott C. Hutchison

The proposed intervenor brought a motion to reconsider a decision denying him leave to intervene as a party in a pending application for judicial review.

The Divisional Court found no error in the conclusion or reasoning of the motion judge and dismissed the motion to reconsider.

Case management endorsement scheduling a motion to determine whether a motion for leave to appeal a carriage decision in a proposed securities class action is stayed by an initial order under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.

The court directed the responding party to bring a motion to stay the leave application, to be heard by a single judge of the Divisional Court.

Following an appeal where the appellant had mixed success on a summary judgment motion and was unsuccessful on a contempt motion, the court determined the appropriate costs awards.

The court reduced the costs awarded to the respondents on the summary judgment motion from $35,000 to $10,000 due to the appellant's partial success.

The court also awarded the respondents partial indemnity costs of $3,500 for the contempt appeal and $1,500 for the summary judgment appeal.

A case management conference was held to schedule a review of a single judge's decision denying a proposed intervener's motion for leave to intervene as a party.

The parties agreed that the review would be heard in writing by a panel of the Divisional Court, and a schedule for the exchange of materials was established.

The appellant, a former ward of the Children's Aid Society (CAS), appealed the dismissal of her action for damages and a contempt motion.

Her action alleged negligence, defamation, breach of privacy, and wrongful disclosure of her youth criminal proceedings and a pre-disposition report by the CAS to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the contempt appeal, finding no court orders were disobeyed.

However, it partially allowed the summary judgment appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in dismissing the claim regarding the wrongful disclosure of youth criminal proceedings records under the Young Offenders Act and Youth Criminal Justice Act, stating that a legislative offence does not preclude a civil action for damages.

The issue of the Society's liability for damages related to this disclosure was remitted for further proceedings.

The moving party, former counsel for the applicant, sought leave to intervene as an added party in a judicial review application.

He claimed a pecuniary interest in being paid for his legal services and a reputational interest in defending himself against negative comments made by the hearing panel.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party's interests were entirely aligned with those of the applicant, who was already advancing the same arguments.

Furthermore, the court held that granting intervention would dramatically expand the issues and record, causing undue delay, and that the motion was brought too late in the proceedings.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' motions for a stay of a Ministerial Directive, the court determined the costs of the motions.

The intervenor's request for costs was denied, as the opposition to the stay was already mounted by the respondents.

The respondent Tikinagan sought partial indemnity costs of approximately $108,000.

The court found this amount excessive, noting the public interest nature of the case, the overlap of work with the main applications, and the principle of proportionality.

Costs were fixed at $50,000 payable to Tikinagan, with each applicant responsible for $25,000.

The applicants, two Indigenous representative groups, brought motions for a stay of a Minister's Directive and Designations that authorized three children's aid societies to provide child and family services in Thunder Bay.

The applicants argued the Directive interfered with their inherent right to self-government and was issued without proper consultation or statutory compliance.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the applicants failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The motions for a stay were dismissed.

The applicants, Dilico Anishinabek Family Care and Fort William First Nation, brought a motion for a stay of a Minister's Directive and Designation pending their applications for judicial review.

The Directive designated Tikinagan Child and Family Services to provide child and family services to certain Indigenous children in Thunder Bay.

The court applied the three-part test for a stay.

While finding a serious issue to be tried, the court concluded the applicants failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured granting the stay.

The motion was dismissed, with written reasons to follow.

This endorsement addresses costs following the dismissal of a contempt motion brought by the plaintiffs against the Children's Aid Society of Toronto (CAST), its counsel, and legal assistant.

The court found the motion to be without merit and the defendants wholly successful.

Despite the plaintiff being self-represented and having been warned about costs, the court determined that costs should follow the event due to the serious nature of the allegations.

Applying the factors under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and balancing the indemnity principle with access to justice, the court awarded the defendants $7,500 in costs, inclusive of HST and disbursements, a reduction from their requested $10,000.

The plaintiff, Vrancor Development Group Inc., brought a motion for leave to issue a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) against a property in Burlington, Ontario.

Vrancor alleged an oral joint venture agreement with the defendants, Marko Juricic, Brooklyn Contracting Inc., and Laurentian Business Centre Ltd., for the property's development, claiming breach of trust and fiduciary duty when the defendants closed on the property without Vrancor and transferred title to a company controlled by Juricic.

The defendants contended that discussions never materialized into a binding agreement.

Applying the test for CPLs, the court found a triable issue regarding Vrancor's claimed interest in the land, noting that the CPL would preserve the status quo given Vrancor's claim for a proprietary interest rather than monetary damages.

Two appellants were convicted of murder arising from a shooting in Toronto allegedly motivated by street gang rivalries.

The appellants appealed their convictions on four grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in admitting expert opinion evidence on street gangs from a Toronto Police Service detective; (2) the trial judge erred in admitting handwritten rap lyrics seized from an apartment; (3) the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on eyewitness identification evidence; and (4) the trial judge's conduct gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all conviction appeals and the sentence appeal, finding that while the trial judge committed an error in principle regarding expert evidence bias analysis, the evidence was properly admitted.

The court also found the jury instructions on eyewitness identification were adequate and fair, and that the trial judge's conduct, though at times harsh, did not demonstrate bias when viewed contextually.

The moving parties, a company and its CEO, commenced a private prosecution against a court-appointed receiver under the Environmental Protection Act, alleging the receiver stored excess organic waste.

The receiver brought a motion to stay the prosecution, arguing the moving parties failed to obtain leave of the court as required by the receivership order and that the prosecution was an abuse of process.

The Superior Court of Justice held that a private prosecution is a 'proceeding' requiring leave under the receivership order.

The court refused to grant leave and stayed the prosecution, finding it was an abuse of process because the moving parties were attempting to relitigate the exact same allegations that had previously been dismissed by the Superior Court and the Court of Appeal in a prior motion for leave to sue the receiver.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on drug and firearm charges following a trial judge's finding that police violated the accused's s. 8 Charter right by obtaining a search warrant based on insufficient information, and the subsequent exclusion of evidence.

A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown appeal, affirming the acquittals.

The Supreme Court of Canada, by majority, allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, adopting the dissenting reasons of the Court of Appeal judge who found there was no breach of s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown brought an application to unseal documents held by an accounting firm (PWC) that were subject to a production order in a fraud investigation.

The respondent claimed blanket solicitor-client and litigation privilege over the entire PWC file, arguing the accountants were retained by his law firm to assist with a CRA voluntary disclosure application.

The court rejected the blanket privilege claim, finding that the accountants were primarily performing independent accounting functions (preparing tax returns) rather than acting solely as a conduit for legal advice.

The court ordered a document-by-document review by appointed referees to identify any specific privileged communications.

The plaintiff brought actions claiming ownership of a 1973 Dino Ferrari and interests in his parents' motel business, alleging improper conversion of assets by his mother's attorneys for property.

The defendants moved for summary judgment.

The court found that the motel was a partnership between the parents, the plaintiff was merely an employee, and the Ferrari was an asset of the motel business despite being registered in the plaintiff's name.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's claims for unjust enrichment, oppression under the Business Corporations Act, and conversion of personal property, granting summary judgment in favour of the defendants.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion for contempt against the Children's Aid Society of Toronto, its counsel, and a legal assistant.

The plaintiff alleged contempt based on the transmission of a Pre-disposition Report to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, the service of a statement of defence referencing youth court proceedings, and counsel's failure to attend court.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion, finding that no court order had been breached, the disclosure was made at the plaintiff's request, and the pleadings were privileged and filed under seal.

The plaintiffs brought motions to certify three proposed class actions for settlement purposes against three immigration lawyers.

The plaintiffs alleged professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty in the defendants' representation of Roma refugee claimants from Hungary.

The court found that the criteria for certification under section 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 were met, noting that compliance is not as strictly required for settlement purposes.

The motions for certification were granted.

The Registrar of Alcohol, Gaming and Racing appealed from a Superior Court declaration that the GotSkill gaming system is not a game as defined under s. 197(1) of the Criminal Code.

The application judge had concluded that GotSkill was not a game of mixed chance and skill because a sufficiently skilled player could ultimately beat the machine.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that GotSkill is a game of mixed chance and skill.

The court clarified that under the Criminal Code, any game containing both elements of chance and skill—regardless of which predominates—falls within the definition of a game.

The presence of a systematic resort to chance when the game is played multiple times, combined with the skill element required in the game task, was sufficient to classify GotSkill as a game of mixed chance and skill.

Following a successful motion by the plaintiff for an interlocutory injunction to prevent interference with the completion of a transmission project, the court determined the issue of costs.

The court rejected the defendants' argument that costs should be reserved to the trial judge, finding that the injunction effectively resolved the main issue in dispute.

Costs were awarded forthwith on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $50,000 jointly against the institutional defendants and $15,000 against each of the two individual leaders of the blockade.

No costs were awarded against the remaining individual defendants.