Scott C. Hutchison

The plaintiffs brought a contempt motion alleging that the defendants, the City of Windsor and the Town of Tecumseh, breached a January 29, 2016 order regarding an opt-out campaign in a class proceeding.

The alleged breaches involved new radio advertisements and a live interview by the Mayor of Windsor.

The court found that the order's terms were arguably subject to more than one interpretation and that the defendants did not deliberately and willfully breach the order.

The contempt motion was dismissed, and the plaintiffs' request for further disclosure was denied.

The applicant, a small craft distillery, applied for a declaration that the markup imposed by the LCBO on spirits sold at its on-site retail store was an unconstitutional tax under the Constitution Act, 1867.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the markup was a proprietary charge levied by the LCBO as the owner and commercial supplier of the spirits.

Alternatively, the court held that the markup was a contractual term freely agreed to by the applicant in exchange for the authorization to sell its products.

The plaintiffs in two certified class actions regarding allegedly illegal bingo licence fees brought a motion to restrict the defendants' multi-media opt-out campaign.

The defendants, the City of Windsor and the Town of Tecumseh, launched an extensive campaign including newspaper ads, websites, and direct mailings, urging potential class members to opt out to save taxpayers from a potential $70 million uninsured damages award.

The court found that while defendants have a right to communicate with class members, the campaign went too far by pitting taxpayers and organizations against each other, creating undue influence.

The court ordered the defendants to add hyperlinks to the class action websites on their materials and directed that class members who had already opted out be given an opportunity to reconsider, but declined to impose broader communication restrictions.

The accused brought a Charter application under s. 8 and s. 24(2) to exclude all evidence obtained from two search warrants executed on May 7, 2014.

The accused was charged with uttering threats to cause death, possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, and possession of prohibited weapons.

The court found that police officers conducting the search exceeded the scope of the warrant by searching in containers too small to hold a shotgun while looking for gun parts, thereby violating the accused's s. 8 rights.

The court also found that the officers improperly seized cell phones and medical information without reasonable grounds, and that misleading reports were filed with the justice.

Applying the Grant analysis, the court excluded all evidence obtained from the searches due to the serious and deliberate nature of the Charter breaches and the importance of maintaining judicial oversight through accurate reporting.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a motions judge's order certifying two class proceedings seeking restitution of lottery licensing fees, including claims that were prima facie time-barred.

The court granted leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4)(b), finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's analysis regarding whether a class proceeding was the preferable procedure and whether a sub-class should have been created for the time-barred claims.

The court also found the issues raised were of general importance to the development of class action law.

The appellant telecommunications company challenged a general warrant and related assistance order requiring it to produce stored text messages of two subscribers on a prospective, daily basis over a two-week period.

The majority held the general warrant invalid, with two concurring opinions reaching that result by different routes.

One plurality held that the prospective daily production of future text messages constituted an interception of private communications requiring authorization under Part VI of the Criminal Code, making the general warrant unavailable under s. 487.01(1)(c).

The other concurring opinion held that even if not strictly an interception, the technique was substantively equivalent to one, precluding resort to the general warrant.

The dissent would have upheld the general warrant, finding the technique was disclosure of previously intercepted communications rather than an interception itself.

The Attorney General of Canada sought a sending order under s. 15 of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act to provide U.S. authorities with mirror-image copies of thirty-two seized computer servers as part of an international criminal investigation into alleged copyright infringement, conspiracy, money laundering, and racketeering.

The responding party argued the request was overly broad given the enormous volume of data on the servers and the limited evidence linking them to the alleged offences, and sought either refusal of the order or an independent forensic examination report.

The court held that although there were reasonable grounds supporting the initial warrant, privacy interests in the informational contents of computers required careful limits on the scope of disclosure.

Relying on appellate authority emphasizing that computer searches must not provide unfettered access to all stored data, the court concluded that further judicial supervision was required.

The application for a sending order was adjourned and the servers were ordered to be brought before the court so that the scope of material to be sent could be refined.

The court considered whether a former estate trustee who had previously been imprisoned for civil contempt had purged that contempt by accounting for missing estate assets.

Forensic accounting reports revealed extensive unexplained withdrawals, questionable transactions, and missing securities from an estate once valued at approximately $30 million.

The responding party failed to provide a full explanation for the disappearance of assets and demonstrated little effort to comply with prior court orders requiring disclosure.

Although the court concluded the contempt had not been purged, it determined that further imprisonment would not serve the public interest and that additional accounting would be futile.

The order requiring the passing of accounts was withdrawn and the contempt issue brought to an end.