Daniella Murynka

The moving parties, six limited partners holding 54.5% of the shares in a family limited partnership, sought leave to commence a derivative action on behalf of the limited partnership and related corporate entities against the general partner, its sole director, and other parties.

The court held that while there is no statutory right for limited partners to bring a derivative action under the Limited Partnerships Act, the common law fraud exception to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle permits such an action where the general partner is the alleged wrongdoer.

Leave was granted to bring the derivative action on behalf of the limited partnership against the general partner and its director, but denied against third parties and on behalf of the underlying corporate entities.

The applicants sought a declaration that they had fully repaid a commercial loan to the respondent and an order preventing the respondent from exercising its right to convert the debt into shares.

The applicants had attempted to repay the loan via a wire transfer to the personal account of the respondent's principal, as the respondent had refused to provide wire instructions and insisted on strict compliance with the loan agreement.

The court found that the applicants failed to repay the loan in accordance with the strict terms of the agreement.

Consequently, the applicants' application was dismissed, and the respondent's cross-application to enforce its conversion rights was granted.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing its action for breach of a licensing agreement and patent infringement.

The trial judge found that the respondent's accused products did not infringe the appellant's U.S. patent for a self-ligating orthodontic bracket because the accused products' locking shutter moved primarily through rotation rather than the purely sliding motion required by the patent claims.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding no error in the trial judge's construction of the patent claims within the context of the specification.

The court also upheld the costs award against the appellant.

An accounting firm filed a corporate client's tax returns after the due date, resulting in the denial of approximately $550,000 in tax credits by the Canada Revenue Agency.

The client received notices of assessment in April 2010 and pursued administrative remedies through the CRA appeal process, with the accountant's assistance, until May 2011 when the CRA advised it intended to confirm the assessments.

The client commenced a negligence action in August 2012.

The motion judge dismissed the action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, finding the claim was discoverable in April 2010.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the claim was not discovered until May 2011 when the CRA appeal process concluded, as it would not have been appropriate to commence proceedings while alternative remedies remained available.

The defendants, an accounting firm and an individual accountant, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's professional negligence claim based on the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendants' failure to timely file tax returns resulted in the loss of refundable dividend tax on hand (RDTOH) and associated penalties and interest.

The court considered whether the plaintiff's claim was discoverable more than two years prior to its commencement on August 1, 2012.

The court found that the plaintiff had sufficient knowledge of the injury, its cause, and the identity of the wrongdoers by June 2010 at the latest, and that a proceeding would have been a legally appropriate means to seek a remedy at that time, despite ongoing mitigation efforts and the defendants' failure to advise of a potential claim against them.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's arguments regarding prematurity, fraudulent concealment, and estoppel.

The appellant appealed a Master's order dismissing its motion for a litigation timeline, including documentary disclosure, examinations for discovery, and mandatory mediation.

The Master had found the motion premature because pleadings in the counterclaim had not yet closed, the respondent was not in breach of any court order or rule deadline, and no proper discovery plan had been presented.

The Superior Court upheld the Master's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The court affirmed that for a comprehensive discovery plan, all pleadings (main action and counterclaim) must be closed to define the issues, and that a "limited discovery plan" not complying with Rule 29.1.03(3) was insufficient.