Jennifer Stanton

The Crown sought to admit evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct, including violent sexual images, search terms, and viva voce evidence of consensual choking sex, in a first-degree murder trial.

The defence intended to assert an alternate suspect (James Gardiner) and an inadequate police investigation defence.

The court ruled that the discreditable conduct evidence was not admissible generally, as its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, not being sufficiently distinctive to constitute a signature.

However, the evidence would become admissible if the defence adduced evidence of the alternate suspect's bad character or raised an inadequate investigation/tunnel vision defence, to prevent a distorted picture for the jury.

Certain highly prejudicial evidence, such as a specific video, would need to be excised or altered if admitted.

The defendant, Tekle Tamzean Ogbamichael, was charged with sexual interference and sexual assault.

The central issue was the identification of the defendant as the perpetrator from poor-quality video evidence and recognition testimony from his probation officer.

The court found the identification evidence, including the probation officer's testimony, to be unreliable due to concerns about overstatement, confirmation bias, and the poor quality of the visual evidence.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove identification beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal on all charges.

The Crown brought two applications: a Leaney application to admit lay opinion recognition evidence from the accused's probation officer, and a Similar Fact application to introduce evidence from two other complainants (N.T. and A.B.) to prove identity and propensity.

The court granted the Leaney application, finding the probation officer's long-standing familiarity with the accused put her in a better position to identify him on video, and that concerns about tainting went to weight, not admissibility.

However, the court denied the Similar Fact application for N.T. due to issue estoppel, as the accused had been acquitted of sexual assault (though convicted of assault) in that case, precluding relitigation of the sexual nature of the touching.

The application for A.B. was also denied, as its probative value was outweighed by the prejudice of forcing the accused to testify on untried charges, raising the spectre of inconsistent verdicts and compromising his right to silence in an upcoming trial.

Sentencing for convictions for possession of child pornography, five counts of making child pornography available through a peer-to-peer file-sharing network, and making child pornography through preserved online chat transcripts.

The court held that denunciation and general deterrence are the primary sentencing principles for child pornography offences, emphasizing the role of internet-based sharing in perpetuating abuse, expanding offender communities, and causing permanent harm to victims.

The court treated the offender's lack of record, career damage, lengthy delay short of a Charter breach, and likely deportation as mitigating factors, but found the breadth of sharing activity, repeated conduct, curation of the collection, and the presence of highly depraved material to be significant aggravating features.

A global sentence of three years' imprisonment was imposed, with ancillary DNA, lifetime SOIRA, section 161, and forfeiture orders.

The accused, Henning Jonat, faced charges related to child pornography.

A blended voir dire was held to consider applications to exclude evidence based on alleged Charter breaches, including an s. 8 breach for obtaining subscriber information without a warrant (admitted by the Crown) and an s. 10(b) breach for questioning the accused after he expressed a desire to consult counsel.

The court found the s. 8 breach was in good faith pre-Spencer, and the s. 10(b) breach had minor impact, with the Crown not seeking to use the statements.

Other alleged breaches regarding chat logs, search warrant validity, and strip search were rejected.

All applications to exclude evidence were dismissed.

The Crown applied for an order to cease the cross-examination of a vulnerable adult complainant with significant intellectual disabilities during a preliminary inquiry.

The complainant had suffered a brain injury in childhood resulting in cognitive abilities comparable to a four or five-year-old child.

After approximately 30-45 minutes of cross-examination, the complainant experienced an emotional breakdown and subsequently threatened self-harm and to run away.

The court ordered the immediate cessation of cross-examination, finding that the complainant was no longer an appropriate witness to be cross-examined and that continued questioning posed risks to her safety and security.

The accused was charged with manslaughter of his mother and assault causing bodily harm to his aunt after he pushed his aunt out of the house, causing her to fall into his mother, who then fell down concrete stairs and later died.

The Crown abandoned the manslaughter charge and sought a conviction for aggravated assault based on transferred intent.

The court found that aggravated assault and assault causing bodily harm were not lesser included offences of manslaughter, but unlawfully causing bodily harm was.

The court rejected the accused's defences of consensual fight, self-defence, and defence of property, finding them lacking an air of reality.

The accused was found guilty of assault causing bodily harm against the aunt and unlawfully causing bodily harm against the mother.

The accused was charged with manslaughter in relation to the death of his 82-year-old mother and assault causing bodily harm in relation to his aunt.

During an argument at the front door of the family home, the accused pushed his aunt, which caused her to fall into his mother, resulting in his mother falling down concrete stairs.

His mother died in hospital several days later.

The Crown initially pursued a manslaughter charge based on transferred intent but later withdrew this charge after the pathologist's testimony.

The court found the accused guilty of assault causing bodily harm against his aunt and unlawfully causing bodily harm against his mother, rejecting defences of consensual fight, self-defence, and defence of property.

Following a lengthy criminal trial, the court considered warrant validity, Charter exclusion, and the sufficiency of extensive digital forensic evidence arising from a laptop seizure after concerned bystanders observed troubling images and messages in a restaurant.

The court upheld the search warrant on both facial and subfacial review, finding the authorization reasonably included forensic searches for images and videos as part of a child-luring investigation, and further held the evidence would in any event be admitted under s. 24(2).

On the merits, the court found the digital artefacts, browsing history, saved files, search terms, website visits, and Facebook activity proved possession of child pornography and intentional access to multiple child pornography images and videos beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court nevertheless dismissed the luring count, holding that although the communications with the youth and the fabricated social media personas came very close to proving the offence, a reasonable doubt remained as to specific intent to facilitate a listed secondary sexual offence.

The defendant, charged with child luring via Facebook Messenger, sought to exclude Facebook communications as evidence, alleging a Section 8 Charter violation.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine if the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the seized Facebook records, which included public profile information, private messages with the victim, and communications within a child exploitation group.

Applying the Marakah framework, the court found no reasonable expectation of privacy, citing the public nature of Facebook, the defendant's lack of control over the data, the victim's age, and the illegal nature of the communications.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The Crown brought an application for certiorari with mandamus in aid to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's order discharging the accused on charges related to human trafficking.

The accused had booked hotel rooms used by co-accused to exploit a 16-year-old complainant.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional errors by failing to consider the totality of the circumstantial evidence and failing to draw reasonable inferences favourable to the Crown regarding the accused's knowledge of the exploitation.

The application was granted, the discharge was set aside, and mandamus was issued directing committal for trial.

The offender was sentenced after trial for four counts of sexual interference arising from prolonged sexual abuse of four child complainants within the family, in circumstances involving a marked breach of trust.

The court held that denunciation, deterrence, and separation from society were the dominant sentencing objectives for persistent sexual abuse of vulnerable children by an adult in a position of trust.

After reviewing appellate authorities on historical and intrafamilial child sexual abuse, the court fixed a fit range at two to three years given the absence of intercourse or threats of violence, but the presence of multiple victims, one instance of digital penetration, and profound long-term harm.

A sentence of two years and six months concurrent was imposed, with DNA, lifetime SOIRA, and lifetime s. 161 prohibitions.

The offenders participated in a group assault on the victim following an altercation at a rave.

Triolo stabbed the victim in the chest, committing second-degree murder.

Lozada and Ramos participated in the group assault, making the victim vulnerable to the stabbing, and were convicted of manslaughter.

Triolo was sentenced to life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 12 years.

Lozada and Ramos were each sentenced to three years imprisonment, less credit for pre-trial custody.

During a trial for second-degree murder and manslaughter, the Crown sought to introduce twenty-two post-mortem photographs of the deceased through a forensic pathologist.

The defence objected, arguing the photographs were highly prejudicial and of limited probative value.

The court balanced the probative value against the risk of reasoning prejudice, finding the photographs were relevant to the nature of the injuries and corroboration of eyewitnesses.

The court admitted twenty-one of the photographs, directing that three be presented in black and white to minimize any potential prejudice.

The defendant was charged with common assault and failing to comply with a probation order after allegedly pushing an elderly woman down stairs at a shopping mall.

The Crown presented testimony from the complainant and two independent witnesses who claimed the defendant pushed the complainant down the stairs.

The defendant testified that he made only incidental contact with the complainant's arm while gesturing to allow her to pass.

The court reviewed CCTV footage of the incident and found that the video evidence supported the defendant's account of accidental contact rather than an intentional assault.

The defendant was acquitted on both counts.

During a first degree murder trial, the Crown sought a publication ban under s. 486.5 of the Criminal Code to prevent publication of information identifying the deceased victim, primarily to shield an elderly relative from learning distressing details of the death through media reporting.

The court held that the Dagenais/Mentuck framework governs discretionary publication bans even when sought under a statutory provision.

The Crown failed to establish that the order was necessary to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice or that a significant public interest justified limiting openness.

The concern raised was characterized as a private interest unsupported by medical evidence demonstrating likely harm.

The interim publication ban was therefore set aside.

The applicant sought costs against the Crown following delays in disclosure and non-compliance with undertakings made at a Judicial Pre-Trial.

The applicant alleged that the Crown's failure to respond to six disclosure request letters, delayed notification to Legal Aid regarding appointment of independent counsel, and inconsistent information about occurrence reports and criminal records constituted conduct warranting a costs award.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the Crown's conduct was unsatisfactory, it did not rise to the level of recklessness, conscious indifference to duty, or a marked and unacceptable departure from reasonable prosecution standards required to justify costs in criminal proceedings.