ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
SHAUN KRAWIEC
Before Justice S. Darroch
Heard on December 16, 2025
Reasons for Judgment released on February 11, 2026
Emma Divito................................................................ counsel for the Crown/Respondent
Adam Newman.......................................................... counsel for the Defendant/Applicant
Ruling on Charter Application
Background:
1On May 5, 2025, a warrant was issued in Hamilton for the arrest of Shaun Krawiec for uttering threats and disobeying court orders. These charges are now before the court and the subject of this Charter application.
2On May 15, 2025, Mr. Krawiec was arrested in the City of Toronto on the strength of four outstanding warrants – two from the Niagara Region and two from Hamilton including the warrant issued May 5, 2025, related to the charges now before the court.
3At the time of his arrest Mr. Krawiec was in possession of a prohibited firearm and was accordingly charged with various firearm offences in the City of Toronto.
4Mr. Krawiec was brought before a Justice of the Peace in Toronto the following day, May 16, 2025. The charges now before the court and the subject of this application were not addressed at Mr. Krawiec’s brief court appearance on May 16, 2025.
5Mr. Krawiec remained in custody and was brought before a Justice of the Peace in Hamilton on August 13, 2025, whereupon the charges now before the court were addressed for the first time, some three months following his arrest.
Issues for Consideration:
6Mr. Krawiec argues his rights under sections 7 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms were breached given the delay in bringing him before the court to be dealt with according to law following the execution of the warrant. Mr. Krawiec applies to the court for a stay of proceedings given length of the delay and corresponding Charter breaches.
7The Crown argues the warrant in question was not executed on May 15, 2025 (the date of the arrest), but was in fact executed on August 13, 2025, the date of his attendance in the bail court in Hamilton. As a result, the Crown argues, there was no delay in bringing Mr. Krawiec before the court to be dealt with according to law and no corresponding breach to his s. 7 and s. 9 rights under the Charter .
8The key issue for determination is the timing of the execution of the warrant in question.
9If the warrant was executed when Mr. Krawiec was arrested, then a 3-month delay in bringing him before the court to be dealt with according to law would fall afoul of the police obligations under the Criminal Code and would be beyond the scope of any statutory authority to hold Mr. Krawiec. The result would be an unauthorized arbitrary detention. The overhold would also infringe Mr. Krawiec’s s. 7 rights to life liberty and security of the person.
When was the Warrant Executed?:
10For the reasons that follow I find the warrant in question, issued May 5, 2025, was executed upon Mr. Krawiec’s arrest on May 15, 2025.
11First, Mr. Krawiec was arrested pursuant to the warrant in question. There is really no dispute the officers involved arrested Mr. Krawiec on the strength of four outstanding warrants, including the warrant in question. Detective-Constable Bolduc confirmed the basis of the arrest during his testimony on the application.
12The officer’s testimony is consistent with what is said on the Exhibit #1 arrest video, including the caution which was expressly stated to be in relation to the charges underlying each of the four warrants. The basis for the arrest was again said to be on the strength of four warrants during the booking process as shown on the Exhibit #2 booking video.
13Second, the Criminal Code allows for and in my view mandates that a warrant is executed upon arrest.
14Section 514 of the Criminal Code states:
514 (1) A warrant in accordance with this Part may be executed by arresting the accused
(a) wherever he is found within the territorial jurisdiction of the justice, judge or court by whom or by which the warrant was issued; or
(b) wherever he is found in Canada, in the case of fresh pursuit.
(2) A warrant in accordance with this Part may be executed by a person who is one of the peace officers to whom it is directed, whether or not the place in which the warrant is to be executed is within the territory for which the person is a peace officer.
15The wording of the Criminal Code expressly allows for the completion of the execution process upon arrest without requiring the arrestee be brought before a court to complete the execution process. Further, the execution process is completed by the officer or officers, and not by the court process or attendance at court.
16While the section is permissive and allows for alternatives for the execution of a warrant apart from arrest, the plain meaning of the text necessarily requires the execution process be completed upon the arrest by an authorized officer.
17Section 511(4) of the Criminal Code is consistent with this interpretation, as it allows for the execution, or deemed execution of a warrant, in the absence of an arrest. The section deems a warrant executed upon the voluntary appearance of an accused before the court – i.e. in the absence of an arrest. Ultimately the Criminal Code does not require an arrest for a warrant to be executed, but it does direct that a warrant can be executed by arresting the person subject to the warrant.
18Further, there is no other method of executing a warrant contemplated by the Criminal Code apart from an arrest or the voluntary appearance of the accused before a court wherein the warrant is deemed executed.
19Similarly, there is no provision allowing an arrest pursuant to a warrant that would not result in the execution of the said warrant. In other words, there is no process allowing the arresting officers to opt out of the execution when making an arrest. Such a process would allow for the repeated arrest and release of a person subject to the same warrant. For instance, if a warrant was not executed upon arrest, the police could lawfully arrest pursuant to a valid warrant, search the person incident to the lawful arrest pursuant to the warrant, release the person unconditionally, monitor them for any length of time they want, and then arrest and search them again on the strength of the same warrant.
20Such an interpretation is not only contrary to the plain meaning of the Criminal Code , and the plain meaning of the actual warrant document, but also contrary to the rules of natural justice and the values enshrined in and recognized by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms .
21A finding that an arrest warrant is executed upon arrest is also consistent with how other warrants are executed. For instance, search warrants are executed upon the search of a designated place; DNA warrants are executed upon the collection of the required sample of bodily substance. If a search warrant was not executed upon completion of the authorized search or a DNA warrant was not executed upon the collection of the sample, then the same absurd and illegal repetition of the process authorized by the warrant could result.
22To avoid such an absurdity, it must be the case that warrants are in fact executed upon the arrest of the person pursuant to the warrant.
23Finally, even if the warrant was not executed May 15, 2025, when Mr. Krawiec was arrested on the strength of the warrant, the officers involved nevertheless did not act in accordance with the legal requirements of the Criminal Code and the express directions set out on the face of the warrant.
24The warrant in question, like all valid arrest warrants, is worded in accordance with s. 511(1) (c) of the Criminal Code and directs the accused be forthwith arrested and brought before the judge or justice to be dealt with according to law.
25The warrant does not permit a stand-alone arrest. In other words, once arrested pursuant to the warrant, the arrest must be followed by the bringing of the person before the court to be dealt with according to law. The police do not have an option to hold off bringing the person to court by simply saying or deciding they have not executed the warrant.
26In addition, s. 503(1) of the Criminal Code states:
503 (1) Subject to the other provisions of this section, a peace officer who arrests a person with or without warrant and who has not released the person under any other provision under this Part shall, in accordance with the following paragraphs, cause the person to be taken before a justice to be dealt with according to law:
(a) if a justice is available within a period of 24 hours after the person has been arrested by the peace officer, the person shall be taken before a justice without unreasonable delay and in any event within that period; and
(b) if a justice is not available within a period of 24 hours after the person has been arrested by the peace officer, the person shall be taken before a justice as soon as possible.
27As it happened, Mr. Krawiec was arrested May 15, 2025, and was not released. He was also arrested on three other warrants at the same time. He was brought to court the following day but the charges underlying the warrant in question were not addressed. In fact, the charges before the court, on which he was arrested May 15, 2025, where not dealt with in any way until August 13, 2025, when he appeared at the Ontario Court of Justice in Hamilton.
28I accept the testimony of the officers involved that they believed the warrant was not executed and the corresponding duties did not attach. Their testimony was clear in this regard, and I accept it as a genuine belief on their part. However, their position is not determinative of the issue. While their testimony was sincere as it related to their own understanding and belief, they were nevertheless mistaken about their obligations that resulted the moment Mr. Krawiec was arrested.
29For these reasons, I find the applicant has established a breach if rights under sections 7 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms .
Is a Stay The Appropriate Remedy?
30Given that no evidence was obtained in a manner that has any nexus to the breaches (temporal, contextual or causal), the applicant seeks a stay of proceedings.
31A stay of proceedings is the most drastic remedy a criminal court can order: R. v. Regan , 2002 SCC 12 , [2002] 1 S.C.R. 297, at para. 53 . It permanently halts the prosecution of an accused. In doing so, the truth-seeking function of the trial is frustrated, and the public is deprived of the opportunity to see justice done on the merits. In this way, a stay of proceedings is an exceptional remedy to be employed as a last resort and only after canvassing other available remedies.
32The applicant argues that a stay is necessary and the remedy most likely to effect positive change in the various police services when dealing with detainees who have been arrested on multiple warrants from various jurisdictions.
33While a stay may advance the potential for a positive prospective effect on the police in accommodating or managing detainees in these circumstances, this is but one factor to consider in assessing whether the test articulated by the Supreme Court has been satisfied.
34Ultimately, I must assess the specific circumstances of this case and not speculate on how some other detainee in similar circumstances may or may not be accommodated in the future.
35In R v Babos 2014 SCC 16 , [2014] 1 S.C.R. 309 para 31-32 , the Supreme Court of Canada explained the types of misconduct that may warrant a stay:
31… These cases generally fall into two categories: (1) where state conduct compromises the fairness of an accused’s trial (the “main” category); and (2) where state conduct creates no threat to trial fairness but risks undermining the integrity of the judicial process (the “residual” category) (O’Connor, at para. 73). The impugned conduct in this case does not implicate the main category. Rather, it falls squarely within the latter category.
32The test used to determine whether a stay of proceedings is warranted is the same for both categories and consists of three requirements:
(1) There must be prejudice to the accused’s right to a fair trial or the integrity of the justice system that “will be manifested, perpetuated or aggravated through the conduct of the trial, or by its outcome” (Regan, at para. 54 );
(2) There must be no alternative remedy capable of redressing the prejudice; and
(3) Where there is still uncertainty over whether a stay is warranted after steps (1) and (2), the court is required to balance the interests in favour of granting a stay, such as denouncing misconduct and preserving the integrity of the justice system, against “the interest that society has in having a final decision on the merits” (ibid., at para. 57).
36Having considered the totality of the circumstances including the 3-month delay in bringing Mr. Krawiec to court, in light of the test articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada, as set out above, I find this is not one of the clearest cases and a stay is not warranted.
37While at first glance the delay of 3-months seems extraordinary, in fact, the delay in bringing Mr. Krawiec to court had little meaningful impact on is liberty interests as he was lawfully detained in another jurisdiction on separate charges. As a result, any arbitrary detention or unlawful detention on the matter now before the court was parallel to a lawful detention on other charges.
38Ultimately, Mr. Krawiec has not established to any degree that his position would be any different or in any way improved had he been brought to court sooner or had the charges been addressed in another jurisdiction within the time stipulated.
39While bringing him to court in Hamilton sooner, or simply having the charges addressed in some meaningful fashion in the neighbouring jurisdiction would have been far preferrable and in accordance with the statutory requirements, Mr. Krawiec’s fair trial interests have not been compromised by the state conduct, nor did the state’s conduct in these circumstances compromise the integrity of the justice system.
40The breach that occurred in this case was technical in nature and given the nominal real impact, I find no prejudice to Mr. Krawiec’s right to a fair trial and no prejudice to the integrity of the justice system that will be “manifested, perpetrated or aggravated through the conduct of the trial, or by its outcome.” ( Babos at paragraph 32 quoting from Regan at paragraph 54 ).
41As the test for a stay has not been met, a stay of proceedings is not granted.
Released: February 11, 2026
Signed: Justice Stephen Darroch