Daniel Sheppard

The applicant applied for judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to maintain an order surrendering her for extradition to the United States on drug trafficking charges.

The applicant argued that the Minister failed to adequately consider her role as the sole caregiver to her young child, the differences in sentencing regimes between Canada and the US (such as the Mother-Child Program), and international human rights jurisprudence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the Minister had fully considered the applicant's personal circumstances, the potential impact on her child, and the relevant legal principles, and that his decision was not unreasonable.

The applicants sought to set aside an international commercial arbitration award arising from a failed commercial real estate relationship.

The court held that the arbitration agreement did not bar recourse under Article 34 of the Model Law where mandatory procedural protections and public policy were engaged.

The arbitral tribunal's undisclosed meeting with a prior adjudicator without notice to the parties breached the parties' arbitration agreement and met the threshold for potential relief under Article 34(2)(a)(iv).

However, weighing the seriousness of the breach against prejudice, waiver-related conduct, and the practical consequences of setting aside the award, the court exercised its discretion not to disturb the award.

The two accused were charged with drugging and sexually assaulting two different complainants.

The first complainant alleged she was drugged and assaulted by one of the accused in 2003, but the court found reasonable doubt due to inconsistencies in the timeline and lack of corroborating evidence.

The second complainant alleged she was drugged and assaulted by both accused in 2011 after a night of heavy drinking.

The court found reasonable doubt that she was drugged, noting her ability to walk and send text messages during the alleged timeframe.

The court also found reasonable doubt regarding her lack of consent, or alternatively, that the accused had an honest but mistaken belief in her consent.

Both accused were found not guilty on all charges.

The Crown sought to introduce similar fact evidence between two separate sexual assault allegations involving different complainants.

The Crown argued that similarities between the incidents demonstrated that the accused administered a drug to each complainant to facilitate sexual assault and supported credibility findings.

The court reviewed the governing test for similar fact evidence, including the requirement that its probative value outweigh its prejudicial effect and that the similarities render coincidence objectively improbable.

Despite some overlapping circumstances, the court found significant differences between the incidents, including the nature of the relationships, the circumstances of the encounters, the symptoms described, and an eight‑year gap between the events.

The court concluded the similarities were not sufficiently distinctive to overcome the highly prejudicial effect of the proposed evidence.

The Republic of France sought the appellant's extradition for his alleged role in a 1980 terrorist bombing in Paris.

The extradition judge committed the appellant for surrender based primarily on a French handwriting analysis linking him to the bombing, finding the report was not manifestly unreliable despite methodological criticisms.

The Minister of Justice subsequently ordered the appellant's surrender, rejecting arguments that France had not yet decided to put him on trial and that the case relied on intelligence reports potentially derived from torture.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal from the committal order and his application for judicial review of the surrender order, upholding the extradition judge's application of the test for committal and finding the Minister's surrender decision reasonable.

The appellant appealed from sentence and challenged a s. 109 weapons prohibition order.

The Crown conceded that the order had been made without jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal to that limited extent and quashed the s. 109 order.

A publication ban remained in effect under the Criminal Code.

Current and former sex workers challenged three Criminal Code provisions prohibiting bawdy-houses, living on avails, and public communication for prostitution purposes.

The Court held the provisions deprived security of the person by materially increasing risks of violence and preventing safety-enhancing measures, and that the deprivations were not in accordance with fundamental justice due to gross disproportionality and overbreadth.

The Court affirmed that lower courts may revisit precedent when a new legal issue or significant evidentiary change is shown, and confirmed deference to trial findings on social and legislative facts absent palpable and overriding error.

Section 210 (as related to prostitution), section 212(1)(j), and section 213(1)(c) were declared unconstitutional.

Invalidity was suspended for one year to permit legislative response.

This appeal and cross-appeal addressed whether Ontario’s SIU framework permits police officers involved in fatal incidents to consult counsel before completing duty notes.

The majority held the regulatory scheme does not permit consultation with counsel at the note-making stage, emphasizing transparency, public confidence, legislative history, and the duty to prepare independent, complete notes.

It rejected even limited pre-note legal consultation as inconsistent with the scheme’s objectives, while confirming officers may consult counsel after filing notes.

The cross-appeal was allowed, overturning the Court of Appeal’s allowance of basic legal advice prior to notes.

Dissenting reasons on cross-appeal would have preserved a narrow right to basic legal advice that excluded drafting assistance.

The respondents challenged the constitutionality of three Criminal Code provisions relating to prostitution: operating a common bawdy-house, living on the avails of prostitution, and communicating for the purpose of prostitution.

The application judge struck down all three provisions as violating section 7 of the Charter.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the striking down of the bawdy-house provision (suspended for 12 months) and read in an exploitation requirement to the living on the avails provision.

However, the Court of Appeal reversed the application judge's decision on the communicating provision, finding it did not violate the principles of fundamental justice and was a justified limit on freedom of expression, binding the lower court to the Supreme Court's previous decision in the Prostitution Reference.

The moving party, Maggie's: The Toronto Sex Workers' Action Project, brought a motion to intervene in an appeal concerning the constitutionality of prostitution-related offences.

The moving party sought to raise a new challenge under s. 15 of the Charter and to argue that the legislation was impermissibly driven by moral views.

The court dismissed the motion to intervene on the s. 15 issue, finding that the evidentiary record was not developed for such a challenge and that allowing it would be unfair to the parties and delay the appeal.

The court also declined to grant separate intervener status on the morality issue, as it was already being raised by others, but permitted the moving party to join an existing intervener group.