T. Frederick Baxter

The moving party brought a motion to change seeking to terminate spousal support and vacate all arrears.

The parties were married for 15 years, and the moving party had been paying support since 2002.

The court applied the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines and determined that the maximum duration for support had been reached.

Spousal support was terminated effective October 31, 2017.

The court also ordered the moving party to make temporary monthly payments of $350 towards the outstanding arrears owed to the responding party and the Ministry, pending a final determination of the arrears.

Following the dismissal of the applicant father's motion to change child support for his adult daughter, the court determined the issue of costs.

The respondent mother was entirely successful and had made an offer to settle that was more favourable than the final outcome.

The court noted the applicant's unreasonable behaviour and history of avoiding child support obligations.

The court awarded the respondent costs fixed at $18,410 on a partial recovery basis, payable within 30 days.

The applicant father brought a motion to change a child support order, seeking to retroactively vary arrears and ongoing support for his 21-year-old daughter.

He argued that new evidence regarding Metis Nation educational funding was available and that she was no longer a child of the marriage.

The court declined to go behind previous appellate orders regarding the funding.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the daughter's enrollment in a new post-secondary program in London, Ontario, but concluded she remained a child of the marriage.

The father was ordered to continue paying the previously fixed guideline support of $641.19 per month until the completion of her program.

This document contains reasons for a motion brought by the Children's Aid Society of Algoma (Respondent) to admit fresh evidence on an appeal filed by the mother (Appellant), S.S., against a Crown Wardship order with no access.

The court adjourned the main appeal to allow for a full transcript of the original summary judgment motion.

The court granted the Respondent's motion to admit fresh evidence, specifically an affidavit, finding that it met the flexible test for fresh evidence in child protection cases, being relevant and potentially decisive to the children's best interests.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision granting Crown wardship of his child, J.F., to the Children's Aid Society (CAS) with no access.

The child, J.F., had high special needs and required stability.

The appellant had no involvement in the child's life for years and was uncooperative with the CAS.

The motion judge found no triable issues regarding wardship and placement with the maternal grandparents, who required CAS supports.

The appeal court upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the application of summary judgment principles or the determination of the child's best interests, even though Crown wardship is a last resort.

The appellant mother appealed a summary judgment order making her child a Crown ward with no access, and placing her other child with a paternal aunt.

The mother argued that her recovery from substance abuse and stabilization of her mental health created a genuine issue for trial regarding her fitness to parent.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge correctly applied the test for summary judgment and that the evidence, including parental capacity assessments and the mother's inconsistent progress, supported the conclusion that there was no genuine issue for trial.

Motion to vary a custody and access order made on January 11, 2013, whereby custody of two minor daughters was awarded to the mother with biweekly and summer access to the father.

The father brought a motion to vary seeking to reverse the order and obtain custody, alleging material change in circumstances based on the mother's alleged non-compliance with 21 conditions of the original order.

The mother opposed the motion and denied the allegations.

The court found that while there were some instances of non-compliance, they did not constitute a material change in circumstances sufficient to warrant variation of the order.

The court dismissed the motion and imposed restrictions on future proceedings to prevent abuse of the judicial system.

The mother brought a motion to vary a temporary care and custody order made in November 2011, seeking return of her two older children to her care, or alternatively, expanded maternal access including overnight visits.

The children had been in continuous foster care for over two years following apprehension in May 2011.

The father, who was the primary protection concern, died in February 2013.

The court found that while the father's death constituted a material change in circumstances, the mother failed to demonstrate that returning the children to her care was in their best interests.

The court dismissed both the motion for return of custody and the alternative claim for expanded access, finding that the mother had not adequately addressed ongoing protection concerns including substance abuse, inadequate parenting skills, and inability to manage the children's complex behavioral and developmental needs.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that two children were in need of protection under section 37(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Child and Family Services Act, and an order that no further child protection orders be made.

The mother opposed the finding, contending the Society should never have been involved.

The court found that while the children were at risk of physical harm due to a culmination of factors including the mother's physical health issues, mental health decline, and custody and access conflicts between the parents, there was no pattern of neglect.

The court granted the motion, finding the children in need of protection under section 37(2)(b)(i) only, and ordered that no further child protection orders be necessary.

Following a lengthy civil trial concerning whether disputed land constituted a public road, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The plaintiffs had succeeded on all substantive issues and had made multiple written offers to settle that were closer to the final judgment than the defendants’ proposals.

Applying s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court considered the parties’ offers to settle and the plaintiffs’ overall success.

The court reduced portions of the plaintiffs’ claimed preparation costs but found the hourly rates, daily trial fees, and disbursements generally reasonable.

Costs were fixed at $90,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST payable by the defendants jointly and severally.

The parties brought cross-motions to determine which school their four-year-old child should attend for junior kindergarten.

The applicant father sought to enroll the child in a French immersion and Aboriginal education program, supported by an Office of the Children's Lawyer recommendation.

The respondent mother sought to enroll the child in a neighbourhood school closer to her home, where the child's siblings attended.

The court declined to follow the OCL recommendation, finding that the lengthy bus commute required for the applicant's choice was too onerous for a four-year-old, and ordered the child to attend the neighbourhood school on an interim basis.

The plaintiffs sought a declaration that a portion of the Eagle Mine Road traversing the defendants' property was a public road, while the defendants applied to close the road under the Road Access Act.

After a lengthy trial involving historical evidence of road use dating back to the 1930s, the court found that the road had been dedicated to and accepted by the public through long-standing, open, and unobstructed use.

The court dismissed the defendants' application to close the road, declared it a public road within the jurisdiction of the local roads board, and granted an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with its public use and maintenance.

The respondent father brought a motion seeking specified interim parenting time with the parties’ children, including alternating weekends, summer access, and telephone contact.

The applicant mother opposed the request and sought supervised access based on allegations of abusive behaviour during the marriage.

The court found that the evidence, including Children’s Aid Society records and prior unsupervised parenting time, did not establish a risk of harm to the children warranting supervision.

Interim unsupervised access was granted with respect to the younger child, while the older child’s participation was not compelled due to her expressed reluctance.

The court also directed involvement of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer and imposed conduct conditions on both parents.