COURT FILE NO.: 21377/A2-05
DATE: 2018-06-14
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
MARILYN SHARPE
Applicant
– and –
IAN SHARPE
Respondent
E. McCooeye, for the Applicant
T. Frederick Baxter, for the Respondent
M. Walz, for the Ministry of Community and Social Services
HEARD: January 17 and June 11, 2018
Rasaiah J.
REASONS ON MOTION TO CHANGE
OVERVIEW
[1] A motion to change located at Tab 2 of the continuing record, Volume 1, extension 5, was brought by the moving party, respondent Ian Sharpe. He sought to change the order of McMillan J. dated October 28, 2011, to “reduce current and future spousal support to nil and vacate all and any arrears of spousal support and child support; in short to “eliminate all financial obligations resulting from his marriage” to the responding party applicant, Marilyn Sharpe.
[2] The Ministry of Community and Social Services (“Ministry”) is an assignee pursuant to an assignment for the period March 1, 2009 to December 31, 2016 made under the Ontario Disability Support Program Act, 1997. The assignment attaches to a portion of the support that had accrued under the support orders made during the assignment time period, during which time the applicant was a recipient of Ontario disability support plan benefits (“ODSP”). Counsel for the Ministry was participating in this motion to change solely in respect of this particular assignment.
[3] The Director, Family Responsibility Office’s, (“FRO”) Director’s Statement of Arrears filed in this case (“DSOA”) refers to two other assignments made in earlier years, namely two assignments made between 2002-2004; an assignment under the General Welfare Assistance Act (“GWA”) and the Family Benefits Act (“FBA”). It does not appear that these assignees were served. It is not clear as to what if anything is still owed to these assignees.
[4] The parties relied on affidavits and the documents filed in extension 5. In addition, the respondent prepared a record of documents. FRO documents received on the date before the first day of the hearing of this motion were also filed. Finally, the parties consented to all of the available endorsements/decisions being reviewed and considered by me, involving these parties back to the original application.
[5] After the first day of the hearing January 17, 2018, the hearing was adjourned to provide the parties an opportunity to consider the new information received from FRO, and as a term of adjournment, I made an order on a temporary without prejudice basis, based on the positions of the parties, terminating the spousal support effective December 1, 2017.
[6] A case conference was to be set to determine what if any further submissions would be made on this motion related to the FRO documents filed. This conference was originally set for March 2, 2018. However, due to one counsel being involved in a criminal jury trial, the date was vacated and a new date set, namely June 11, 2018.
[7] The June 11, 2018 conference was held. Due to the issue in determining what was paid to whom and when in terms of support payments made as asserted in the DSOA, and due to the further time that is required to answer this issue, counsel asked that I issue my decision on the issue of termination of spousal support and make an order on a without prejudice temporary basis on the issue of payment on arrears, which all agree that I have authority to make and agree that I do so on the submissions made at the hearing for the final order. It was further agreed that I would make a time line on the production of information related to determination of arrears and that we have a further case conference on that issue. On behalf of Mr. Sharpe, on consent, Ms. Jackie Brown attended the conference.
POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES ON THE ENTIRE MOTION
The Respondent
[8] The respondent seeks an order ending payment of spousal support effective February 1, 2017 or earlier if the court sees fit to end the obligation earlier (as far back as May 1, 2014 if the court sees fit); an order vacating all arrears of child support arising from the order of Pardu J. (as she then was) dated December 10, 2007; an order cancelling or vacating the arrears of spousal support owed to the applicant personally; and an order setting support arrears owed to the Ministry and making them payable at a range rate of $1 to no more than $100 per month.
[9] Regarding termination of spousal support, the respondent states he has paid support for over 15 years exceeding the length of his relationship/cohabitation with the applicant, and his position is “enough is enough”. He has paid support longer than suggested duration (7.5 to 15 years) in the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 2008) (“Guidelines”).
[10] As for arrears owed to the Ministry, the respondent believes they are all in the nature of spousal support arrears and they could/should be rescinded in part or at the very least be ordered payable in monthly installments that the respondent can afford to pay.
[11] As for arrears owed to the applicant herself, the respondent argues that there should be no arrears because the amount ordered exceeded what he ought to have paid. He states he had the care of the parties’ child during which time he received no support and the applicant continued to receive the child tax benefit, not him, which was not considered at the time. He claims he has an equitable set off.
The Applicant
[12] The applicant submitted that she does not oppose an order terminating her spousal support as of December 1, 2017 having regard to the Guidelines – while she can make other arguments, she acknowledges for purposes of this motion that it would not be unreasonable for it to end on this date on the basis that support as of this date would have been paid for a duration representing the full length of the parties’ relationship. The applicant agreed that there is an arguable material change on that basis; that terminating support effective December 1, 2017 arguably satisfies the purposes and considerations set by the applicable spousal support laws having regard for those purposes and considerations and the Guidelines. She does not formally consent given the obligations she has, to pursue support, as a recipient of ODSP; she believes she must exhaust this claim so as not to jeopardize her ODSP.
[13] Further, she seeks an order declaring the arrears owed to her personally are $6,000; an order declaring the arrears owed to the Ministry be as found by the court, requiring the respondent to repay the arrears at the rate of $250 per month, with a provision that requires that the arrears of the applicant be paid first until paid in full.
[14] The applicant opposes rescission of arrears owed to her. The accumulated arrears she submits constitutes support not paid that is payable; the respondent delayed in seeking relief; and the respondent failed to make complete disclosure. The applicant’s support was deducted from her ODSP. In addition, she asserts remaining arrears that represent those arrears arising from the Pardu J. order cannot be rescinded, the issue having already been adjudicated on and there having been no appeal brought by the respondent in respect of same; the doctrine of res judicata applies.
The Ministry
[15] The Ministry seeks an order dismissing the respondent’s claim in respect of arrears owed to the Ministry; an order providing that in addition to any monthly amount ordered payable to the applicant on arrears owed to the applicant personally, that the respondent make payments on the arrears owed to the Ministry in the amount of $100 per month until the arrears owed to the applicant personally are paid in full, and thereafter $350 per month until the arrears owed to the Ministry are paid in full; and finally, seeks an order for costs in the amount of $2,000.
[16] The Ministry submits that all arrears owing ought to be paid and there should be no change made to them. The Ministry takes the position that there was no material change in circumstances, that the respondent’s history demonstrates little effort in payment and failure to provide notification of his income source to the Director, Family Responsibility Office (“FRO”), and that the respondent failed to bring a motion to change having regard for his submission that his income changed in 2011.
MAIN ISSUES BASED ON THE POSITIONS TAKEN TO BE DETERMINED
Duration/termination of spousal support;
Identifying what the support arrears are and to whom they are owed;
Rescission of arrears of child support;
Rescission of spousal support arrears;
Set-off, if any;
The rate and priority of payment of the arrears owed to the applicant personally, which the court determines payable;
The rate and priority of payment of the arrears owed to the Ministry, which the court determines payable; and
Costs.
ANALYSIS ON TERMINATION OF SUPPORT AND INTERIM ARREARS PAYMENT
INTRODUCTION
[17] I find that spousal support should be terminated effective October 31, 2017.
[18] I find that on a without prejudice temporary basis, it is within the means of the respondent to make payments on the current outstanding arrears in the total amount of $350 per month until determined.
[19] I order that this payment on a without prejudice temporary basis, based on the submissions, will be split among the applicant and the Ministry, the applicant in the amount of $100 per month, and the Ministry in the amount of $250 per month.
[20] The particulars of my reasons for my findings and considerations are set out/based on the following below.
BACKGROUND RELATING TO THE PARTIES
[21] The respondent is 58; born March 6, 1960.
[22] The applicant is 54; born January 6, 1964.
[23] The parties were married August 1, 1987 and separated in May of 2002.
[24] The parties have two children, their son, Jason and their daughter, Tracy who are now independent adults.
[25] Commencing on or about some time before September 2003, Jason started to live with the respondent.
[26] Tracy lived with the applicant until September 13, 2009, at which time she commenced living with the respondent.
[27] After the parties’ separation, a number of support orders were made. The history and particulars of the support orders are as follows:
Order of Lang J. (as she then was): dated July 11, 2002: temporary order: providing that the respondent pay to the applicant child support (for both children) in the amount of $645 per month commencing July 1, 2002: entered July 18, 2002.
Order of Stortini J.: dated October 31, 2002: temporary order: providing that the respondent pay spousal support to the applicant in the amount of $1,000 commencing November 1, 2002: entered November 6, 2002. The applicant presented herself as essentially having been a stay-at-home mother (not denied by the respondent at that time) who had sporadic employment throughout the relationship, and that if she was to return to work, that she needed to be retrained.
Order of Noble J.: dated October 2, 2003: temporary order: providing that the respondent pay child support in the amount of $293 per month for the child Tracy, commencing September 1, 2003: entered October 3, 2003. At this time, this was a consent adjustment to account for the fact that the child Jason was residing with the respondent.
Order of Stortini J.: dated December 5, 2003: final order: providing that the respondent pay child support of $300 per month commencing December 1, 2003 and spousal support of $900 per month commencing January 1, 2004; and fixing arrears at $3,500 payable at the rate of $50 per month commencing January 1, 2004: entered December 15, 2003. Stortini J. in his reasons finds that the applicant qualified as a dependent spouse and noted her learning disability and inability to obtain regular employment. In addition, he reduced arrears to account for money received by the applicant and the fact that at that time the child Jason was residing with the respondent for which child she was not able to pay support. He reduced all support arrears to $3,500 on this date. He did not distinguish between child and spousal support or note an assignee.
Order of Whalen J.: dated August 30, 2007: temporary change order: providing that the respondent pay child support of $575 per month commencing September 1, 2007: entered September 28, 2007.
Order of Pardu J. (as she then was): dated December 10, 2007: final change order: fixing retroactive child support at $10,257 (for 2004-2007); and providing that the respondent pay child support in the amount of $540 per month commencing January 1, 2008 and spousal support in the amount of $1,050 commencing January 1, 2008: entered April 14, 2008. It is clear from her reasons that Pardu J. analyzed retroactive support and adjudicated that issue in arriving at these arrears. It is clear that Pardu J. found that the applicant at that time was still suffering from difficulties that led to the original support order. This order was not appealed. Payment of arrears was set at $50 per month and arrears payment thereafter when support was concluded for Tracy, to increase $500 per month.
Order of Whalen J.: dated February 5, 2009: temporary change order: requiring respondent to pay child support of $325 per month commencing February 1, 2009 and spousal support of $500 per month commencing February 1, 2009: entered February 5, 2009.
Order of McMillan J.: dated November 26, 2009: final change order: terminating child support: entered December 9, 2009.
Order of McMillan J.: dated December 24, 2009: temporary order: providing that the termination of child support is effective December 1, 2009 and that payment of Pardu J. order arrears shall remain payable at rate of $50 per month: entered January 21, 2010.
Order of McMillan J.: dated April 1, 2010: temporary order: restricting the collection of arrears to $100 per month: entered April 7, 2010.
Order of McMillan J.: dated February 15, 2011: temporary order providing that the respondent pay spousal support of $700 per month, effective March 1, 2011: entered February 18, 2011.
Order of McMillan J.: dated October 28, 2011: final change order: changing spousal support to $500 per month effective May 1, 2011. This order on its face indicates that the change reflects a change in the respondent’s circumstances at the time; namely a transfer to long-term disability, from which he would receive annual income of $28,542. In addition, the support arrears per the Pardu J. order were ordered to be paid at the rate of $50 per month commencing November 1, 2011. This order was entered November 21, 2011.
Order of Rasaiah J.: dated January 17, 2018: temporary without prejudice change order: terminating spousal support effective December 1, 2017.
ASSIGNMENT
[28] The applicant, as an ODSP recipient, assigned all support orders to the Ministry commencing March 1, 2009. FRO enforcement per the DSOA ended December 31, 2016 due to legislative changes.
INFORMATION FROM FRO AND THE MINISTRY
[29] The court received a copy of a letter dated January 15, 2018 sent to respondent’s counsel by FRO senior Counsel, Ron Hurren. A schedule and the DSOA were attached to the letter. About the attachments Hurren wrote:
Please see attached Schedule “A” records of payments attached which includes handwritten confirmation of who and how much was paid by FRO to Recipient (SR) or Assignee (Assignee), as applicable, based on statutory provisions. Please note where indicated by a “+” that the payment collected that date from payor was allocated between Recipient (SR) and Assignee (Assignee) based on entitlement arising under the above noted statutory provisions.
Pursuant to s. 57(1) of the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act (FRSAEA) money paid to the Director is credited and allocated in accordance with the manner prescribed in the regulations.
As provided in s. 19(1) of Ontario Regulation 167-97 under FRSAEA (Application of Payments) any monies received are paid to the most recent (i.e. last) support accrual due and then to prior accruals in receding order in like manner – i.e. “last in first out” (LIFO).
Determination of who FRO pays the monies to, where an Assignment has been filed with the Director’s Office under s. 14(1) of FRSAEA, is based on who the accrual being paid is owed to (i.e. Assignee for those accruals which fall within the chronological period the Assignment is in effect as indicated in the Assignment form filed by an Assignee and subsequent cancellation).
[30] The DSOA attached to Hurren’s letter shows arrears at January 10, 2018 to be $30,050.26.
[31] There are unquestionably based on my review of the DSOA, arrears owed to both the applicant and the Ministry which can be safely without yet determining them on a final basis to be stated to be in the range of $15,000 to $18,000.00. This is not to be taken as this issue being decided and that is still up for determination. This finding is without prejudice for purposes of addressing the without prejudice temporary order for payment.
RESPONDENT’S FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
[32] There was no material change in the respondent’s income since McMillan J.’s October 28, 2011 order.
[33] The relevant history and details of the respondent’s financial circumstances are as follows.
[34] The respondent received short term disability benefits (“STD”) from November 2009 to May 9, 2010 at 100 percent of his regular employment income, and from May 10, 2010 to May 9, 2011 at 55 percent. Before STD, the respondent worked full time at Essar Steel.
[35] From May 10, 2011 the respondent received long-term disability benefits (“LTD”) to and including January 31, 2014.
[36] The respondent did not provide proof of his income information for 2011. McMillan J. used $28,542 in the October 28, 2011 order. In 2012, the respondent’s income was $35,341. In 2013, the respondent’s income was $31,239.
[37] The respondent retired February 1, 2014.
[38] On March 1, 2014 the respondent started to receive his pension from Essar. In 2014, the respondent’s income was $35,142. In 2015, the respondent’s income was $33,731. In 2016, the respondent’s income was $33,811.08. He received a refund on his 2016 tax return in the amount of $1,432. In 2017, the respondent, in his financial statement, sworn March 24, 2017, claims income of $33,996; $2,833 per month.
[39] The respondent is not remarried or in a relationship and lives alone.
[40] The respondent asserts that his cost of living has increased. His only source of income is his pension income.
[41] The respondent claims monthly expenses of $3,717.66.
[42] He owns a truck worth $2,000.
[43] He has one bank account with a balance of $5.00
[44] He lists no debts or other property.
[45] The parties’ daughter has had to support him by way of providing him with food and meals.
[46] His cost of living has increased he states.
[47] He has managed to pay consistently for some time to date the sum of $550 to $500 (or it is collected by FRO).
APPLICANT’S FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
[48] The applicant filed a financial statement sworn February 14, 2017. In it she claimed she was employed by the Sault Star as an independent contractor delivering newspapers. She stated she earned $55 biweekly with no benefits, retirement plan or pension.
[49] The applicant lives alone in geared to income housing.
[50] In 2009 the applicant received other employment income of $1,042, family support payments of $9,900, alimony of $16,000; and social assistance of $2,481. In 2010 she earned other income of $893 but total income of $9,535. In 2011 she earned employment income of $2,527 and social assistance of $3,986. In 2013, the applicant had employment income of $2,400 and social assistance of $9,170; in 2014, employment income of $2,449 and social assistance of $5,305: reassessed to total income of $7,754; in 2015, total income of $4,722; and in 2016, she earned total income of $4,462.
[51] The applicant filed a further financial statement sworn April 24, 2017. In it she claims employment income of $120 monthly and $788 monthly ODSP.
[52] The applicant has a cognitive disability. Her employment is limited to being a part-time newspaper carrier.
TERMINATION OF SPOUSAL SUPPORT
[53] Neither party had ever made application for a divorce and agree the order in question is one made pursuant to the Family Law Act, 1990 R.S.O., c. F3, as am.
[54] Section 37(2) of the Family Law Act provides that in the case of an order for support of a spouse, if the court is satisfied that there has been a material change in the dependant's or respondent's circumstances or that evidence not available on the previous hearing has become available, the court may,
(a) discharge, vary or suspend a term of the order, prospectively or retroactively;
(b) relieve the respondent from the payment of part or all of the arrears or any interest due on them; and
(c) make any other order under section 34 that the court considers appropriate in the circumstances referred to in section 33.
[55] The onus is on the respondent, who is the one seeking the termination.
[56] The respondent seeks an order ending payment of spousal support effective February 1, 2017 or earlier if the court sees fit to end the obligation earlier (as far back as May 1, 2014 if the court sees fit). He relies on delay in hearing this matter also for an earlier termination date.
[57] The applicant submitted that she does not oppose an order terminating her spousal support as of December 1, 2017 having regard to the Guidelines – while she can make other arguments, she acknowledges for purposes of this motion that it would not be unreasonable for it to end on this date on the basis that support as of this date would have been paid for a duration representing the full length of the parties’ relationship. The applicant agreed that there is an arguable material change on that basis; that terminating support effective December 1, 2017 arguably satisfies the purposes and considerations set by the applicable spousal support laws having regard for those purposes and considerations and the Guidelines.
[58] I noted that the trial judge, Stortini J., did not make a limited-term spousal support order. No variation judge has done so since Stortini J.’s final order; a duration period is not provided for nor does it seem to have been considered in previous orders or commented on that I could see.
[59] That being said, it was conceded by the applicant that the passage of time and the length of time that the respondent has paid spousal support in this case constitute facts that the court could consider on this motion.
[60] Section 33(9) of the Family Law Act sets out the considerations for the court in determining the amount and duration of support for a spouse. There are many considerations.
[61] The Guidelines were designed to be used under the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), as am. ss. 1 to 35.1, but are in fact used as a useful tool by federal, provincial and territorial courts in the determination of spousal support and variation. I recognize that the Guidelines are neither legislated nor binding but note that it seems that use of the Guidelines has evolved from a “cross-check” or “starting point” to the Guidelines being a useful tool that should not be deviated from lightly: See Fisher v. Fisher, 2008 ONCA 11, and Slongo v. Slongo, 2017 ONCA 272.
[62] I do note that the Guidelines have been assessed as providing a duration that reflects the current law: Fisher v. Fisher, 2008 ONCA 11, para. 98.
[63] Duration is the period of and end of entitlement. The Guidelines provide a range for duration using a formula that sets a minimum duration of half of the length of the relationship and a maximum duration of the length of the marriage. Periods of interim support are included in the duration range.
[64] This is not a case where the Guidelines formula suggests indefinite support for the applicant. In this case, based on the Guidelines, the marriage is neither a long marriage nor short marriage. It falls in the category of a medium-term marriage (which represents one of 5 to 19 years in length). As such, time limits are generated for relationships of less than 20 years, reflecting achievement of self-sufficiency and eventual termination.
[65] The parties’ relationship was approximately 15 years in duration. They married August 1, 1987 and separated in May of 2002. In this case, the Guidelines suggest a duration period of 7.5 to 15 years. Interim support commenced November 1, 2002. The termination date seven and a half years post November 1, 2002 is April 1, 2010, and for 15 years post November 1, 2002, is October 31, 2017.
[66] While illness and disability can create an exception in the analysis, or alter the analysis, and the treatment of this exception is not uniform in the cases, in some cases of medium-term marriages, the support amounts are increased and duration extended; or the amount is decreased and duration extended; or no exception is made at all.
[67] In this case, while disabilities were recognized, the history reflects that the court has not viewed the applicant as never being able to achieve a source of income to support herself. The quantum of support has been more than the low range suggested quantum, and in this case the maximum duration has been paid.
[68] October 31, 2017 is an as an adequate termination date in this case to address the purposes and considerations for spousal support in this case.
[69] The applicant’s disability is a factor to take the durational range to the longer-end.
[70] I acknowledge that this is a case, where at one time, spousal support was overlapped with child support and also primary care and custody of children. In such circumstances, such facts can take the obligation to the longer-end of the durational range related to the role in childcare post-separation: Tadayon v. Mohtashami, 2015 ONCA 777 and Bosanac v. Bosanac, 2015 ONSC 7467.
[71] I noted that although the child Tracy went to live with the respondent in 2009, there was a period after separation, during which the child Tracy was not seeing the respondent at all and the applicant had full care and responsibility for her during that time, referred to by Pardu J. in her December 10, 2007 reasons.
[72] I also find that the file reflects that the spousal support was a combination of compensatory support (the applicant was a stay-at-home mother at the time of the separation; in fact from 1987 to 2002, having worked very little outside of the home) and non-compensatory support (the applicant had learning disabilities and issues with employability at the date of separation, requiring retraining efforts).
[73] None of the reasons for the orders that I reviewed in this case referred to the applicant as being highly employable, in fact she was only ever referred to as possessing ability to earn some type of modest income.
[74] It appears that the applicant has tried and continues to work to her capacity however the evidence does not establish that the reason for the income disparity now is related to having devoted herself to the children and/or the home.
[75] The written reasons for some of the support orders reflect that the applicant intended to and/or made some attempts at retraining. I have not been provided with the full extent of the attempts. I note that in 2007, she was starting her retraining with a level of grade 7 math. I acknowledge that she has learning disabilities but I was not made aware of any measures that may have been available to the applicant in such circumstances related to retraining to achieve more than she has.
[76] The applicant has not been enjoying a high standard of living and in fact, it has been lower, which fact has not been strongly disputed by the respondent.
[77] The applicant has not accumulated significant assets or achieved significant means since the separation. The applicant has always had limited capacity to contribute to her support. She still has learning issues as well as health issues. But she has achieved from time to time part-time work.
[78] While the applicant was 38 at the date of separation, she has been and continues to be a person who has had difficulty achieving full economic self-sufficiency related to disabilities.
[79] The above being said, in terms of the applicant’s request to terminate as at December 1, 2017, I find that this is not such an unusual or exceptional case to depart from the formula range and extend past it, and that it is not so unusual for there still to remain a disparity in income at the end of entitlement.
[80] In my view for reasons stated, a duration that ends October 31, 2017 adequately addresses the purposes and considerations for spousal support on these facts.
INTERIM PAYMENT OF ARREARS
[81] The Ministry’s arrears are what would be paid first on a LIFO basis, but at the conference there was no real argument by anyone against some payment being made at the same time to the applicant on an interim without prejudice basis (nor did the Ministry argue any priority at the hearing or in its factum over the applicant). The applicant asserted that she cannot consent and chose not to make specific submissions on this issue but left the issue to the authority of the court to decide. The respondent was looking for the payment to be the $50 argued on the motion. The Ministry did not argue strongly for specific allocations but did reiterate its hearing position, namely that the payments total up to the amount of $350; and the Ministry would not object to $250 to the Ministry and $100 to the applicant for the interim payment on the arrears for a total of $350 per month until the issue is decided, if the court was to order same, when that was put to it.
[82] Based on financial statements filed, the respondent’s calculated monthly deficit is $884.66. There was no explanation provided to me for the high vehicle expenses of $1,193 monthly; he is retired. It makes no sense to me and I suspect it is highly likely that he could put himself into another vehicle that would cost him far less than what he is spending monthly, but he presented no evidence on that either. I find these expenses unreasonable. The respondent also claimed that he wasn’t spending $475 per month on groceries and was receiving “handouts”. The respondent states that the parties’ daughter has had to support him by way of providing him with food and meals. His evidence was confusing.
[83] The respondent claims debts of tax arrears of $475 per month. During submissions however, his counsel indicated that the respondent’s tax returns may not have been completed correctly to claim credit for having paid for spousal support and as such, I am uncertain at this date, that the respondent will even have tax arrears after he files amended returns.
[84] I have trouble accepting the figures of the respondent based on the evidence filed for the foregoing expressed reasons.
[85] Further, I don’t accept the argument that the respondent does not have the ability to pay arrears on an interim basis above the suggested $50 per month. Despite what was argued and set out in the materials filed regarding the respondent’s financial circumstances, during submissions, the respondent’s counsel could not argue strongly that the respondent did not have the ability to pay $350 per month towards arrears given what he was paying for support ($550 to $500), and in fact agreed that the respondent could probably pay this amount if support was terminated.
CONCLUSION
[86] Based on the above analysis and conclusions, I hereby order as follows:
The support ordered in paragraph 1 of the order of the Honourable Mr. Justice I.S. McMillan dated October 28, 2011 is terminated on a final basis, effective October 31, 2017.
On a temporary without prejudice basis, the respondent shall pay $100 per month to the applicant on account of the support arrears owed to the applicant commencing July 1, 2018 and continuing on the first day of each month that follows until those arrears are paid in full and/or otherwise varied by further court order.
On a temporary without prejudice basis, the respondent shall pay $250 per month to the Ministry on account of the support arrears owed to the Ministry commencing July 1, 2018 and continuing on the first day of each month that follows until those arrears are paid in full and/or otherwise varied by further court order.
The applicant and the Ministry shall serve and file further evidence outlining and confirming what was actually paid to whom by whom in respect of funds collected by the Director, Family Responsibility Office on and after March 1, 2009 to today’s date within 30 days of today’s date.
Mr. Walz, as offered, will obtain and file an updated Director’s Statement of Arrears within 7 days to my attention via the trial coordinator.
A case conference continuation before me shall be set by the parties via the trial co-ordinator. The continuation shall be set to a date and set to occur within the next 60 days from today.
The balance of the issues relating to arrears of support will continue to be adjourned until such time as the evidence ordered above, to be filed can be reviewed and addressed at the said case conference continuation.
Rasaiah J.
Released: June 14, 2018
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
MARILYN SHARPE
- and –
IAN SHARPE
REASONS ON MOTION TO CHANGE
Rasaiah J.
Released: June 14, 2018