OTTAWA COURT FILE NO.: 13-56908
DATE: 2015/12/10
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
JOHN DEERE FINANCIAL INC.
Plaintiff
– and –
1232291 ONTARIO INC. O/A NORTHERN HAUL CONTRACTING, RYAN BIGNUCOLO, RICHARD BIGNUCOLO, LUCIA BIGNUGCOLO, BIGNUCOLO INCORPORATED, CHAPLEAU VILLAGE SHOPS INC., 1039442 ONTARIO INC. and 1558738 ONTARIO INC.
Defendants
Counsel: John P. O’Toole and Kathleen McDormand, for the Plaintiff Christopher J. Cosgriffe, for the Defendants
HEARD AT OTTAWA: November 19, 2015
Patrick Smith J.
Overview
[1] This is a motion for summary judgment by John Deere Financial Inc. (“JDFI”), formerly John Deere Credit Inc. (“JDCI”).
[2] JDFI brought an action against the Defendant, 1232291 Ontario Inc., carrying on business as Northern Haul Contracting (“NHC”), for amounts allegedly owing to JDFI pursuant to Commercial Lease Agreements and a Repair and Overhaul Finance Agreement.
[3] JDFI has also brought an action against the Defendants, Ryan Bignucolo, Richard Bignucolo, Lucia Bignucolo, Bignucolo Incorporated, Chapleau Village Shops Inc., 1039442 Ontario Inc. and 1558738 Ontario Inc. for amounts owing to JDFI pursuant to unconditional guarantees.
[4] Nortrax Canada Inc. (“Nortrax”) entered into six commercial lease agreements (the “Leases”) with the Defendant NHC whereby Nortrax provided forestry equipment and an engine to NHC. The other named Defendants, both corporate and personal, provided guarantees to pay all liabilities incurred by NHC under the equipment leases, up to a maximum aggregate amount of $500,000 plus interest from the date of demand for payment at the rate of 3% greater than the prime rate of interest of the Toronto-Dominion Bank.
[5] Nortrax assigned the Leases and the guarantees to John Deere Credit Inc., now carrying on business as John Deere Financial Inc.
[6] JDFI’s claim arises from the failure of the Defendant, NHC to pay the lease amounts due for the forestry equipment.
[7] JDFI is seeking payment from NHC of amounts owing under the Leases and the Repair and Overhaul Finance Agreement along with interest at a rate of 24% per annum.
[8] JDFI also sues for payment by the Guarantors for the amount owing under the unconditional guarantees executed February 22, 2011, plus interest at a rate of 3% greater than the prime rate of interest of the Toronto-Dominion Bank.
[9] Finally, JDFI is seeking an Order for costs on a substantial indemnity basis.
[10] The Defendant, NHC is counterclaiming for damages for breach of contract and asks that these damages be set-off against the amounts owing under the contract. It claims that the Defendants by counterclaim fundamentally breached the contract and should be prohibited from relying on the exclusionary provisions in the leases.
[11] JDFI states that it mitigated its damages by selling the equipment once it was returned and now sues for the balance owing.
[12] NHC states that this motion for summary judgment should be dismissed for four reasons:
- Is there evidence of an assignment of the debt to JDFI?
- The original lessor, the manufacturer and/or JDFI fundamentally breached the Leases because of numerous equipment deficiencies;
- It is not proportionate for there to be a trial on the Counterclaim in the absence of a trial on the Claim when the incremental cost of trying both is insignificant; and
- There are significant issues of credibility with the witnesses proffered by the JDFI that can only be resolved at a trial.
[13] Neither party is asking that the counterclaim be decided on this motion for summary judgment.
The Law of Summary Judgment Motions
[14] Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, allows a party to move for summary judgment. On a contested motion for summary judgment, the Applicant must convince the court that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial (r. 20.04(2)(a)). Though the Applicant bears the onus of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial, the Respondent is under an evidentiary burden to satisfy the court that that his or her claim has a real chance for success (Guarantee Co. of North America v. Gordon Capital Corp., 1999 664 (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 423 at 434-435).
[15] Summary judgment will be granted where the responding party does not offer sufficient evidence to support its claim or defence (Wong v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2009 ONSC 66385 at para. 44 (Ont. Sup. Ct.)). The respondent “must lead trump or risk losing” (1061590 Ontario Ltd. v. Ontario Jockey Club (1995), 1995 1686 (ON CA), 21 O.R. (3d) 547 at para. 35 (C.A.)).
[16] Rule 20 has been the subject of recent Supreme Court commentary. In Hryniak v. Maudlin, 2014 SCC 7 at para. 49, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87, the Court explains that:
There will be no genuine issue requiring a trial when the judge is able to reach a fair and just determination on the merits on a motion for summary judgment. This will be the case when the process (1) allows the judge to make the necessary findings of fact, (2) allows the judge to apply the law to the facts, and (3) is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result.
[17] The Court commented on the framework that a court should adopt on summary judgment motions:
On a motion for summary judgment under Rule 20.04, the judge should first determine if there is a genuine issue requiring trial based only on the evidence before her, without using the new fact-finding powers. There will be no genuine issue requiring a trial if the summary judgment process provides her with the evidence required to fairly and justly adjudicate the dispute and is a timely, affordable and proportionate procedure, under Rule 20.04(2)(a). If there appears to be a genuine issue requiring a trial, she should then determine if the need for a trial can be avoided by using the new powers under Rules 20.04(2.1) and (2.2). She may, at her discretion, use those powers, provided that their use is not against the interest of justice. Their use will not be against the interest of justice if they will lead to a fair and just result and will serve the goals of timeliness, affordability and proportionality in light of the litigation as a whole. (at para. 66)
[18] Though summary judgment must be granted if there is no genuine issue requiring a trial, the use of the new powers is discretionary (at para. 68).
[19] Mere assertions of facts will not meet the evidentiary burden on a motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeal in Goldman v. Devine, 2007 ONCA 301 at para. 23, held that “[s]elf-serving evidence that merely asserts a defence or a claim without providing some detail or supporting evidence is not sufficient to create a genuine issue for trial” (at para. 23).
A Summary of the Issues
[20] The issues before the court may be summarized as follows:
- Is there evidence of an assignment of the debt to JDFI?
- Is credibility a genuine issue requiring a trial?
- Is the exclusion clause of no force and effect because JDFI fundamentally breached the equipment leases by supplying equipment not fit for the purpose for which it was leased?
- Is it proportionate to resolve the main action and grant summary judgment even though the counterclaim will be proceeding to trial?
Discussion
[21] Before engaging in an analysis of the issues, the following additional factual information is relevant and will provide context to my decision.
[22] NHC needed to lease forestry equipment in order to be able to supply and deliver timber pursuant to the terms of a contract it had with Eacom Timber Corporation (“Eacom”).
[23] As a result of discussions between Nortrax Canada Inc., John Deere Limited and Eacom, Nortrax agreed to enter into equipment leases based upon the specifications provided by Eacom.
[24] Nortrax (as Lessor) and NHC (as Lessee) executed six Commercial Lease Agreements between February 22, 2011, and April 29, 2011.
[25] The Leases provided that Nortrax would lease forestry equipment to NHC and NHC would make monthly payments over 48 months. The leases gave NHC the option to purchase each piece of equipment for $1.00 at the end of the 48 months if NHC was not in default.
[26] The aggregate rental payments required under the Leases for the duration of the leases total $3,462,545.40.
[27] Title to the equipment remained with the Lessor as provided for in clause 20 of each equipment lease.
[28] NHC defaulted by failing to make payments when due in breach of paragraph 22 of each equipment lease.
[29] Clause 23 of the Leases provides that, in the event that a default occurs, the remedies available to the Lessor include acceleration of the payments due under the Leases, payment of interest and legal fees, and sale of the equipment by the Lessor.
Assignment of Equipment Leases to JDFI
[30] Paragraph 28 of the Leases provides for immediate assignment to John Deere Limited, and further assignment at the Lessor’s discretion, without the consent of the Lessee.
[31] Pursuant to the above clause, the Leases were assigned by Nortrax as Lessor, to John Deere Limited.
[32] John Deere Limited, now carrying on business as John Deere Canada ULC, purports to have assigned the Leases to John Deere Credit Inc., now carrying on business as John Deere Financial Inc. NHC disputes that an assignment to JDFI was ever made and accordingly, JDFI is not a proper party/plaintiff to these proceedings.
Repair and Overhaul Finance Agreement
[33] On July 6, 2011, Nortrax as seller, and NHC as buyer, entered into a Repair and Overhaul Finance Agreement (the “Finance Agreement”) for an engine for the 2011 John Deere 903KH Track Harvester.
[34] The price agreed upon, including tax, was $35,084.24 and was to be paid through 5 monthly installments of $7,016.85 each, commencing August 6, 2011, and ending December 6, 2011. No payments were ever made by NHC.
[35] The Finance Agreement provided for immediate assignment of the agreement to John Deere Limited and provided for further assignments without the consent of NHC.
[36] John Deere Limited assigned the Finance Agreement to JDCI, now carrying on business under the name JDFI. All assignments were authorized in accordance with the Finance Agreement.
[37] JDFI alleges that NHC defaulted under the Finance Agreement by failing to pay the amount owed when it was due thereby triggering various remedies including immediate payment of all money due under the Finance Agreement, the right to take possession of the equipment and to sell it, the right to commence a civil suit, and any other rights in law or in equity.
[38] JDFI maintains that the amount owing on the Finance Agreement as of May 30, 2014, was $58,635.83 and that NHC owes, as of May 30, 2014, the combined amount of $2,206,448.34 on the Finance Agreement and Leases. JDFI asserts that interest continues to accrue at the rate of 24% per annum from that date.
[39] NHC alleges that the Finance Agreement was never assigned to JDFI and that JDFI is not a proper party/plaintiff to this action.
The Guarantors
[40] JDFI seeks judgment against the Defendant Guarantors alleging that they are personally liable for all outstanding amounts owing to it.
[41] On February 22, 2011, Ryan Bignucolo, Richard Bignucolo and Lucia Bignucolo personally executed Guarantees in favour of John Deere Credit Inc.
[42] As well, on February 22, 2011, Bignucolo Incorporated, Chapleau Village Shops Inc., 1039442 Ontario Inc., and 1558738 Ontario Inc. executed Guarantees in favour of John Deere Credit Inc.
[43] The guarantees signed by the individuals and the corporations are collectively referred to as the “Guarantees”, and the obligors thereunder are collectively referred to as the “Guarantors”.
[44] The Guarantees require the Guarantors to pay all liabilities incurred by NHC under the Equipment Leases, up to a maximum aggregate amount of $500,000 plus interest from the date of demand for payment at the rate of 3% greater than the prime rate of interest of the Toronto-Dominion Bank. The Guarantors are also responsible for payment of the Plaintiff’s legal costs on a solicitor and client (full indemnity) basis.
[45] The Guarantees apply to all liabilities of NHC to John Deere Credit Inc. pursuant to the Equipment Leases and the Repair and Overhaul Finance Agreement.
[46] JDFI alleges that the Defendants have refused and/or neglected to make any payments owing on account of the indebtedness and continue to do so.
[47] The Guarantees were never assigned and were given in favour of JDCI, whose corporate name was subsequently changed to JDFI. JDFI submits that it is entitled to rely on the Guarantees.
The Sale by JDFI of the Equipment
[48] NHC alleges that Eacom was aware of the problems that were being encountered with the leased equipment and further that Eacom wrongfully terminated the Eacom Contract on August 2, 2011, on the basis that NHC had not supplied and/or delivered all of the required product under the contract.
[49] NHC maintains that it was not able to satisfy the terms of the Eacom Contract because of Nortrax’s failure to provide equipment in good working order and to repair it on a timely basis.
[50] The equipment was returned to Nortrax in August, 2011. By then Eacom had made it clear that, because NHC could not fulfill the terms of the contract, the contract was terminated.
[51] The six pieces of equipment leased to NHC under the Leases were returned to JDFI subsequent to NHC’s default.
[52] JDFI alleges that the returned equipment was marketed and sold in a prudent and commercially reasonable manner and that, at all material times, NHC was kept informed of all efforts to market and sell the equipment.
[53] The Defendants have not contested the evidence regarding the Plaintiff’s efforts in selling the equipment as submitted in the Affidavit of John Winger sworn on June 24, 2014.
[54] JDFI states that it by selling the equipment it recovered approximately $1,900,000 net of tax and inclusive of repairs, which was higher than the guaranteed net value that had been proposed by a third party, namely Ritchie Brothers.
Analysis
The First Issue – The Issue of Assignment
[55] The Defendant claims that there is no evidence that the Leases were assigned to John Deere Limited or to JDFI. There is a 1996 agreement between John Deere Limited and John Deere Credit Inc. that allows for assignment of commercial agreements; however, it requires a credit memorandum to be issued by JDCI (now JDFI) and no such document has been provided.
[56] Further, the Defendant alleges that JDFI never registered a security interest under the PPSA, suggesting that there was no assignment.
[57] The Defendant therefore claims that JDFI is not a proper party to the action, and asks that the claim should be dismissed. In the alternative, the Defendant submits that there is a genuine issue for trial as to whether JDFI is a proper plaintiff.
[58] JDFI relies on the Affidavit of John Winger, the former VP Canadian Operations, and on various documents to demonstrate that there was an assignment to JDFI. Notably, JDFI submits that the “Notice of Sale or Other Disposition Pursuant to Sections 63(4) and 63(5) of the Personal Property Security Act (Ontario)” states that the “Security Agreement has been duly assigned to John Deere Credit Inc (JDCI), in respect of which a financing statement was registered under the Personal Property Security Act”.
[59] JDFI also relies on a 1996 redacted agreement between John Deer Limited and JDCI which allows for the assignment of contracts or leases to JDCI without individual endorsements, as long as a credit memorandum is issued. Because the Equipment Leases contemplate assignment to John Deere Limited, JDFI states that this completed the assignment to JDCI, now JDFI. JDFI filed the Articles of Amendment demonstrating the name change from JDCI to JDFI.
[60] Further, JDFI notes that the guarantees were executed in favour of JDFI and that upon default the equipment was returned to JDFI and sold by JDFI. The proceeds of the sale were applied against the amounts owing under the Leases. All of these factors, JDFI submits, suggest that the Leases had been assigned to JDFI.
[61] Finally, JDFI asserts there was no assignment of the Guarantees. The Guarantees were provided directly to JDCI from the Guarantors. JDCI subsequently changed its name to JDFI.
Finding
[62] I accept the evidence regarding assignment contained in the affidavit of John Winger. I am satisfied that, using the new powers afforded to me by Rule 20.04(2.1) there is tangible and credible evidence that an assignment of the debt to JDFI occurred and that this is not a genuine issue for trial.
[63] Further, it is my view that use of the new powers afforded to me is not contrary to the interest of justice and will lead to a fair and just result that will serve the goals of timeliness, affordability and proportionality in light of the litigation as a whole.
The Second Issue - The Issue of Credibility
[64] The Defendants argues that summary judgment should not be granted because the credibility of the Plaintiff’s witnesses raises a genuine issue requiring a trial. The Defendants raise seven points of concern.
[65] In my view, only one of the points raised relates to an issue of credibility relevant to this motion, namely, whether the affiant John Winger may not have been telling the truth when he swore affidavits stating that there was an assignment of the Leases to JDFI.
Finding
[66] Rule 20.04(2.1) provides judges with new fact-finding tools and powers. In this case, I am satisfied that the evidence contained in the two affidavits of John Winger is credible and I accept it. Mr. Winger was the VP of Canadian Operation of JDFI at the time he swore his affidavits and he clearly stated that an assignment to JDFI had occurred. His evidence has not been shaken on cross-examination and there is nothing proffered by the Defendants to contradict his testimony.
[67] Further, it is my view that use of the new powers afforded to me by the Rule 20.04(2.1) is not contrary to the interest of justice and will lead to a fair and just result that will serve the goals of timeliness, affordability and proportionality in light of the litigation as a whole
The Third Issue - The Exclusion Clauses and the Question of Fundamental Breach
[68] NHC submits that there is a genuine issue for trial as to whether JDFI can rely on the exclusion clauses in the equipment leases because JDFI fundamentally breached the leases by providing equipment that was not fit for its intended purpose. NHC argues that, because NHC did not receive what it bargained for, JDFI should not be able to rely on the exclusionary provisions in the lease agreements.
[69] JDFI responds by submitting that the doctrine of fundamental breach of contract was fundamentally changed by the Supreme Court in 2010 in Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. British Columbia (Transportation and Highways), 2010 SCC 4, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 69.
[70] Following the Tercon decision, JDFI maintains that a court should no longer refuse to enforce a valid and applicable exclusion clause unless the person wishing to avoid it raises an overriding public policy issue.
[71] JDFI submits that the exclusion clause is clearly drafted, that there is no question of unconscionability and that there is no public policy issue that would justify overriding the parties’ freedom of contract.
[72] In Tercon, the Supreme Court addressed the doctrine of fundamental breach and unanimously held that “the time has come to lay this doctrine to rest” (at para. 62). Though the court split on the outcome of the case, the majority adopted Justice Binnie’s analytical approach, set out in the dissenting opinion (at para. 62).
[73] Justice Binnie noted that categorizing a contract breach as “fundamental” or “immense” or “colossal” is not particularly helpful. Rather, a court has no discretion to refuse to enforce a valid and applicable contractual exclusion clause unless the party seeking to avoid its effects “can point to some paramount consideration of public policy sufficient to override the public interest in the freedom of contract and defeat what would otherwise be the contractual rights of the parties” (at para. 82). He went on to observe that “[t]here is nothing inherently unreasonable about exclusion clauses” (at para. 82). The court’s residual power to decline enforcement should only be exercised in clear cases where “the harm to the public is substantially incontestable” (at para. 117).
[74] Justice Binnie set out a three stage test to determine whether courts should decline to enforce a contractual exclusion clause. First, the court must determine “whether as a matter of interpretation the exclusion clause even applies to the circumstances established in evidence” (at para. 122). If the clause does not apply, there will be no need to continue with the analysis.
[75] Second, a court must determine “whether the exclusion clause was unconscionable at the time the contract was made” (at para. 122). In particular, the courts should consider any unequal bargaining power between the parties.
[76] Finally, if the clause is both valid and applicable, the court must undertake a third stage of analysis and determine whether it should “refuse to enforce the valid exclusion clause because of the existence of an overriding public policy” (at para. 123). The onus is on the party seeking to avoid the effect of an exclusion clause to identify the overriding public policy that it claims outweighs the public interest in contract enforcement (at para. 120).
[77] The framework in which to conduct an analysis of whether a contract is unconscionable was set out by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Titus v. William F. Cooke Enterprises Inc., 2007 ONCA 573, 284 D.L.R. (4th) 734:
- Is there evidence of a grossly unfair and improvident transaction;
- Is there evidence of victim’s lack of independent legal advice or other suitable advice;
- Is there evidence of an overwhelming imbalance in bargaining power caused by victim’s ignorance of business, illiteracy, ignorance of the language of the bargain, blindness, deafness, illness, senility, or similar disability; and
- Did one party knowingly take advantage of the victim’s vulnerability?
[78] In Tercon the term public policy is not defined. Broadly speaking, non-enforcement of an exclusionary clause on public policy grounds requires wilful conduct by a party who intends to hide behind the exclusion clause.
Finding
[79] I agree with the position of JDFI. The contracts in question are not improvident, involve sophisticated commercial entities who had independent legal advice and equal bargaining power, are not unconscionable and there is no public policy reason not to enforce them. Accordingly, I find that the issue of enforcement of the Leases is not a genuine issue for trial.
The Fourth Issue -Proportionality
[80] NHC submits that granting summary judgment would not meet the “goals of timeliness, affordability, and proportionality in light of the litigation as a whole” and that the issues that will be resolved by summary judgment will still have to be argued before the court in the context of the counterclaim.
[81] In the alternative, NHC asks that, should the court grant summary judgment in favour of the Plaintiff, the court should order a stay of execution because its counterclaim is meritorious and that it would be inappropriate to require payment on the action until the counterclaim is resolved and the total liability including any set-off is determined.
[82] In response, JDFI argues that none of the Guarantors have a valid defence based on the clear terms of the Guarantees and that none of the Guarantors are party to the Leases or the Finance Agreement. Granting summary judgment at this point would remove these seven parties from the ongoing litigation
[83] Additionally, JDFI submits that granting summary judgment as requested would streamline the litigation process by allowing the parties to focus on the narrow issues of the maintenance, performance, and repair of the equipment that was leased to NHC.
Finding
[84] The facts of this case are well suited for the application of the summary judgment rules. I do not accept the argument of the defendant that judgment in favour of the plaintiff will offend the principle of proportionality. Judgment in favour of JDFI on its motion will significantly shorten and expedite the trial by narrowing the issues and releasing seven unnecessary parties.
Set-off and the Risk of Inconsistent Verdicts
[85] NHC argued that it may be entitled to a set-off against a judgment granted in favour of JDFI if awarded damages in the counter-claim. For this reason, NHC maintains that it would be prudent to hear both the claim and counter-claim together to avoid the possibility of inconsistent and conflicting decisions.
[86] In Canaccord Genuity Corp. v. Pilot, 2015 ONCA 716, the Court of Appeal overturned the motion judge’s decision to grant summary judgment in a case where the Plaintiff was seeking repayment for loans and the Defendant was countering with a claim for set-off. This case primarily turned on the possibility of inconsistent verdicts: there were multiple defendants making similar claims based on similar agreements. The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge failed to consider the impact of her decision on the other defendants (at para. 5). Because these other claims still needed to be tried, the Court stated that a summary judgment would result in no real reduction of trial time and raised the spectre of inconsistent verdicts with respect to the same agreement and defences. The Court notes at paragraph 31 that:
If a trial is necessary for some of the claims against some parties, it may not be in the interests of justice to use these fact-finding powers to grant summary judgment against a single defendant because of the risk of duplicative proceedings or inconsistent findings of fact: para. 60 [Hryniak]. On the other hand, the most proportionate, timely and cost-effective approach may be to grant summary judgment against a key party: paras. 60, 66 and 68 [Hryniak].
[87] The Court in Canaccord ruled that the motion judge’s dismissal of the defence of set-off while still allowing the counterclaim for set-off to proceed to trial due to issues of credibility requiring viva voce evidence was an error (at paras. 25, 59). The concern of the Court was based upon the possibility of inconsistent verdicts and substantial injustice.
[88] Quoting the Supreme Court in Holt v. Telford, 1987 18 (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 193, the Court set out the relevant principles of equitable set-off:
• the party claiming set-off must show some equitable ground for being protected from his adversary’s demands; • that ground must go to the very root of the plaintiff’s claim; • the counterclaim must be so clearly connected with the plaintiff’s demand that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the plaintiff to enforce payment without taking into consideration the counterclaim; • the claim and counterclaim need not arise out of the same contract; and • unliquidated claims are on the same footing as liquidated claims. (at para. 57)
[89] In the case at bar, I am not convinced that a decision to grant summary judgment in favour of JDFI given the possibility of a set-off once the counter-claim is resolved raises a possibility of inconsistent decisions.
Disposition
[90] For the reasons set out above, the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted against the Defendant, 1232291 Ontario Inc. (c.o.b. as Northern Haul Contracting), in the amount of $2,206,448.34 plus interest thereon at the rate of 24% per annum, from May 30, 2014 to the date of judgment and thereafter at the interest rate calculated pursuant to the Courts of Justice Act.
[91] An order shall issue granting summary judgment in favour of the Plaintiff against the Defendants, Ryan Bignucola, Richard Bignucolo, Lucia Bignucolo, Bignucolo Incorporated, Chapelau Village Shops Inc., 1039442 Ontario Inc. and 1558738 Ontario Inc. in the amount of $500,000.00 plus pre-judgment interest and post-judgment interest at the rate of 3% greater than the prime rate of the Toronto-Dominion Bank as stipulated in the Guarantees.
[92] Execution on the judgment is stayed pending completion of the trial and release of a decision on the counterclaim.
Costs
[93] In the event that the parties are unable to resolve the issue of costs of this motion themselves, they may file written submissions within 30 days not to exceed 5 pages in length.
Mr. Justice Patrick Smith
Released: December 10, 2015
OTTAWA COURT FILE NO.: 13-56908
DATE: 2015/12/10
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
JOHN DEERE FINANCIAL INC.
Plaintiff
– and –
1232291 ONTARIO INC. O/A NORTHERN HAUL CONTRACTING,
RYAN BIGNUCOLO, RICHARD BIGNUCOLO, LUCIA BIGNUCOLO, BIGNUCOLO INCORPORATED, CHAPLEAU VILLAGE SHOPS INC.,
1039442 ONTARIO INC. and 1558738 ONTARIO INC.
Defendants
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
P. SMITH J.
Released: December 10, 2015