Anthony Marrato

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion to transfer carriage of child protection proceedings to Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services, a newly designated native children's aid society.

The motion was dismissed because Nogdawindamin CAS lacked jurisdiction over the children in question.

The court found that while two of the children had First Nations heritage through their father, the other two children and their mother did not qualify under any paragraph of Nogdawindamin's ministerial designation.

Additionally, Nogdawindamin was prohibited from exercising certain functions under conditions imposed by the Minister that had not yet been lifted.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion to transfer carriage of child protection proceedings to Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services, a newly designated native children's aid society.

The motion involved two children whose father was a registered member of a First Nation band.

The court examined the ministerial designation of Nogdawindamin CAS, the jurisdictional limitations imposed by conditions in that designation, and the statutory framework governing native societies under the Child and Family Services Act.

The court determined that Nogdawindamin CAS had jurisdiction over the children as members of the father's First Nation band and granted the transfer motion, while also addressing broader issues regarding the interpretation of ministerial designations and the court's role in adjudicating society jurisdiction in child protection proceedings.

The Children’s Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion to transfer the conduct of an appeal and the care of two children to Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services.

This request followed Nogdawindamin's designation as a child protection agency for the T[...] First Nation, of which the children are registered band members.

The appellant, P.M., opposed the motion, questioning the legal authority for the transfer.

The court granted the motion, finding that the Minister's designation under section 15(2) of the Child and Family Services Act provided sufficient authority for the transfer of jurisdiction and care.

Multiple motions and appeals arose from child protection proceedings involving the society and the parents.

Motions were brought by the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, the father, and the mother seeking, among other things, permission to introduce fresh evidence on appeal.

On consent of all parties, the court issued procedural directions governing the scheduling of the motions, filing of factums and records, and the handling of proposed fresh evidence.

The court ordered that the motions would be heard on a specified date and scheduled the society’s appeal followed by the parents’ appeals.

Directions were also given regarding sealed filings and the sharing of materials across the related appeals.

The appellant mother appealed a summary judgment order making her child a Crown ward with no access, and placing her other child with a paternal aunt.

The mother argued that her recovery from substance abuse and stabilization of her mental health created a genuine issue for trial regarding her fitness to parent.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge correctly applied the test for summary judgment and that the evidence, including parental capacity assessments and the mother's inconsistent progress, supported the conclusion that there was no genuine issue for trial.

Three motions were heard regarding temporary care and custody of a newborn child apprehended at birth.

The Children's Aid Society sought temporary care and custody, as did the mother and father.

The court applied the two-part test under section 51(3) of the Child and Family Services Act.

While the first part of the test (reasonable grounds to believe risk of likely harm) was satisfied, the court found the second part (child cannot be adequately protected by court order) was not met.

The court awarded temporary care and custody to the father, finding he had demonstrated maturity, responsibility, and a concrete plan for the child's care, supported by his mother's presence in the home.

The order included conditions regarding residency, school attendance, substance use, and maternal contact.

This is a motion brought by the father in a child protection status review proceeding seeking an interim variation of an access order made by Gregson J. on November 1, 2012.

The father sought immediate, increased, unsupervised access to his two children, including weekend access.

The court found that significant changes in circumstances had occurred since the original order, including the father's completion of anger management and counselling programs, separation from his former partner, improved communication with child protection authorities, and consistent, incident-free exercise of existing access.

The court granted the motion in part, expanding paternal access from three hours bi-weekly at a supervised access centre to daytime access in the community with progressive increases in duration, while maintaining some supervision at the society's discretion and prohibiting overnight access without society approval.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a child protection application seeking temporary care and custody of a 12-year-old child (K.A.) with placement with the child's paternal grandparents, subject to a supervision order.

The mother opposed the application and sought return of the child to her care.

The court found that the society met the two-part test under section 51(3) of the Child and Family Services Act, establishing reasonable grounds to believe the child was likely to suffer harm if returned to the mother's care and that the child could not be adequately protected by a non-removal order.

The court granted temporary care and custody to the paternal grandparents.

This is a child protection matter involving a temporary care and custody determination.

The Children's Aid Society sought to place a child in its care following an apprehension from the mother.

The court examined the legality of the warrantless apprehension and found it did not meet the statutory requirements under section 40(7) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The court also addressed party status issues, determining that the alleged father should be removed as a party after DNA testing excluded him as the biological parent.

Ultimately, the court ordered temporary care and custody to remain with the mother subject to supervision and conditions, including a restraining order under section 80 of the Act prohibiting contact between the child and the non-biological father figure.

The mother brought a motion seeking recusal of the trial judge on grounds of perceived bias.

The judge had previously presided over a summary judgment motion where she determined the children were in need of protection and could not be placed in the mother's full-time care and custody.

The mother argued that the judge's prior findings and exposure to inadmissible evidence would cloud her judgment on the remaining issue of access.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no cogent evidence of actual bias or reasonable apprehension of bias.

The judge emphasized that findings regarding full-time parenting capacity were distinct from determinations regarding access rights.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that four children were in need of protection and that their mother was not an appropriate caregiver.

The mother had an extensive history with the Society spanning decades, including her own childhood as a Crown Ward, and demonstrated persistent inability to provide adequate supervision, maintain stable housing, manage substance abuse and mental health issues, and exercise appropriate parenting judgment.

The court found that the children were in need of protection under the Child and Family Services Act and that the mother could not be placed in full-time care of the children, though supervised access would continue.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion under section 54 of the Child and Family Services Act seeking an order requiring the respondent father to undergo a psychosexual assessment, including phallometric testing, based on allegations of sexual abuse of two girls from a prior relationship made over a decade after the alleged incidents.

The father opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the statutory and regulatory prerequisites for ordering such an assessment had not been satisfied, that the motion was premature, and that the proposed assessment lacked sufficient evidentiary foundation and utility in a forensic context.

This case involves two motions concerning temporary care and custody of four children apprehended by the Children's Aid Society of Algoma.

The Society sought temporary care and custody in its favour; the father sought placement of the children with himself or alternatively unsupervised liberal paternal access.

The court found that the Society failed to meet the statutory two-part test under section 51(3) of the Child and Family Services Act with respect to three of the four children.

The court was particularly critical of the warrantless apprehension of two older children, finding insufficient reasonable and probable grounds for their apprehension.

The court ordered the return of three children to their father's care and deferred determination regarding the youngest child pending further evidence on kinship placement options.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion seeking temporary care and custody of an eight-year-old child, along with orders for maternal and paternal access.

The child had been apprehended approximately three months prior due to concerns regarding malnutrition, poor hygiene, inadequate dental care, and general neglect.

The mother opposed the society's claims and sought return of the child to her care.

The father supported the society's custody claim but sought progressive paternal access.

The court granted the society's claim for temporary care and custody, finding reasonable grounds to believe the child would suffer harm if returned to the mother's care and that the mother had failed to adequately address identified problems despite months of intervention.

However, the court dismissed the society's claims for both maternal and paternal access orders, finding insufficient evidence that such orders would be in the child's best interests.

A motion brought by the maternal grandfather of a child in a child protection proceeding seeking to be added as a party respondent.

The grandfather claimed statutory party status under the Child and Family Services Act based on a written custody agreement signed by both parents.

The court found that the grandfather qualified as a "parent" under section 37(1) of the CFSA and was therefore a statutory party who should have been named as a respondent by the society.

The court granted the motion and ordered the grandfather be added as a party respondent with thirty days to file an Answer and Plan of Care.

The appellant police officer appealed a conviction and penalty for insubordination after leaving his issued firearm in an insecure locker.

The officer argued the offence was one of strict liability and he had no intention to leave the locker open, blaming the quality of the lock.

The Commission agreed it was a strict liability offence but found the officer failed to exercise reasonable care by not double-checking the lock.

The Commission also dismissed an allegation of bias regarding the prosecutor's promotion to Chief of Police and upheld the penalty of 24 hours forfeiture of time off as consistent with similar cases.