Christina Sibian

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent after accepting expert evidence that the absence of a value for 'uncertainty of measurement' raised a reasonable doubt about the proper functioning of the approved instrument.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that uncertainty of measurement is not required by law and that speculative evidence regarding potential instrument malfunction is insufficient to constitute 'evidence tending to show' under section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for having care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80mg and operating a vehicle as a novice driver with a blood alcohol level greater than zero.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding a realistic risk that he would drive the vehicle after filling it with gas, and misapprehended evidence regarding his level of intoxication.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual conclusion that the appellant posed a realistic risk of driving the vehicle.

The accused were charged with firearms offences after a gun was seized during a traffic stop.

They brought Charter applications to exclude the gun evidence under s. 24(2), alleging violations of their s. 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) and s. 9 (arbitrary detention) rights.

The court found that while the initial traffic stop was lawful, the police unlawfully detained the passenger, requested his identification without justification, and conducted an unlawful search of the vehicle based on a hunch, not reasonable grounds for a CDSA arrest.

Consequently, the court excluded the gun evidence against both accused, leading to their acquittal.

A voir dire was conducted to determine the admissibility of statements made by the defendant to a police officer during breath testing procedures.

The Crown sought to introduce utterances made by the defendant during the breath room interaction.

The court found that statements made before the first breath sample were voluntary, as the defendant was properly cautioned regarding his right to remain silent and appeared to have freely chosen to speak with the officer.

However, the court found that statements made between the two breath samples were not established to be voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt, as the defendant may have believed the questions related to the Alcohol Influence Report were part of the compulsory breath testing process and no caution was provided before those questions.

The offender was convicted after trial of aggravated assault for stabbing an unarmed man in the upper chest within two seconds of the start of a consensual fight.

The victim suffered a collapsed lung requiring hospitalization.

The offender had no prior criminal record at the time of the offence but had subsequent convictions for violent offences.

The sentencing hearing was protracted, involving psychiatric and psychological assessments that revealed significant intellectual deficits, personality disorders with antisocial and borderline features, and a moderately high risk of violent reoffending.

The court imposed a sentence below the typical range for such offences, considering the offender's rehabilitative potential, intellectual limitations, and family support.

Nuzhat Mamoon, a first offender, was convicted of defrauding eight vulnerable individuals of $98,400 through a breach of trust, leveraging her perceived status as a wealthy, religious businessperson and her charitable organization.

The court considered aggravating factors including the duration, planning, number of victims, significant impact on victims, and abuse of community regard.

Mitigating factors were limited to no prior record.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, imposing 18 months' incarceration, a three-year probation order with specific prohibitions, and a restitution order for the full amount.

Nuzhat Mamoon was charged with fraud exceeding $5,000, contrary to s. 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code of Canada.

The Crown alleged that Mamoon defrauded eight individuals by making false representations about investment opportunities in non-existent businesses (catering, laptop sales, fashion shows) and a property transfer, promising unrealistic and guaranteed profits.

The court found Mamoon guilty, concluding that she intentionally used deceit and falsehood to obtain funds from vulnerable, financially unsophisticated individuals, often leveraging her charitable organization to gain trust.

The total amount defrauded from the complainants exceeded $5,000.

The appellant appealed a conviction for driving with excess alcohol, arguing that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, leading to a breach of Charter rights (ss. 7, 8, 9).

The trial judge found the arrest lawful despite contradictory police testimony regarding subjective grounds.

On appeal, the court found the arrest unlawful due to the absence of subjective reasonable and probable grounds by the directing officer, which invalidated the arresting officer's actions.

Consequently, the breath samples obtained were deemed to be in breach of Charter rights.

Applying the s. 24(2) Grant factors, the court determined that the police conduct was serious and had a significant impact on the accused's rights, outweighing society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The evidence was excluded, leading to an acquittal.

A secondary issue regarding s. 11(b) Charter rights was declined due to lack of timely objection at trial.

The accused was charged with driving with blood alcohol content over 80 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The Crown sought to introduce a Certificate of Analysis as evidence.

The sole issue was whether the Crown had proved compliance with section 258(7) of the Criminal Code, which requires that the accused be given a copy of the certificate prior to trial.

The investigating officer's evidence was contradictory and ultimately revealed that he did not provide the certificate to the accused.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the accused received a copy of the certificate and ruled the certificate inadmissible.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg following a motor vehicle collision on June 10, 2014.

The Crown sought to introduce breath sample evidence obtained after the accused's arrest.

The defence challenged the admissibility of this evidence on Charter grounds, alleging violations of section 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) and section 10(b) (right to counsel) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the police failed to make the breath demand as soon as practicable, breached the accused's right to counsel by failing to inform him immediately upon arrest, and failed to provide a reasonable opportunity to exercise the right to counsel in private.

The court excluded the evidence and entered an acquittal on all counts.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed after pleading guilty to public mischief for falsely reporting that an individual had threatened him with a firearm, which led to a police tactical response and the arrest of an innocent person.

The sentencing judge imposed a 14‑day conditional sentence followed by one year of probation.

The appellant argued that the judge overemphasized general deterrence and failed to properly consider a conditional discharge under s. 730 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the sentencing judge considered the relevant principles and the impact of the conduct on an innocent third party, making deterrence and denunciation significant factors.

The sentence was not demonstrably unfit and no error in principle was established.

The offender was convicted by a jury of two counts of sexual assault and two counts of uttering death threats arising from incidents within an intimate relationship.

The sentencing judge determined the factual circumstances of the offences based on the complainant’s evidence, concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that the assaults involved forced anal and vaginal penetration accompanied by threats and domination.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence in cases of domestic sexual violence, noting numerous aggravating factors including repeated assaults, threats against the complainant and her child, breach of trust, and physical injury.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s difficult upbringing, substance abuse history, and mental health challenges, as well as time spent in pre-trial custody and restrictive bail conditions.

A global custodial sentence was imposed along with ancillary orders including a weapons prohibition, DNA order, and lifetime sex offender registration.

The accused pleaded guilty to unauthorized possession of a firearm contrary to section 91(1) of the Criminal Code.

The accused found a loaded antique revolver at an income property, transported it in his truck, and later accidentally discharged it into his own chest while sitting in the vehicle outside his home, suffering a collapsed lung and ongoing complications.

The Crown sought a conditional sentence based on general deterrence and denunciation, arguing the accused knew the firearm was loaded.

The defence sought a conditional discharge, citing the accused's dated criminal record, stable family life, and serious self-inflicted injuries.

The court rejected both positions and imposed a suspended sentence with 12 months probation, finding that incarceration would be disproportionate to the accused's moral culpability while a discharge would undermine general deterrence and denunciation.

In a trial for sexual assault and uttering death threats, the Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit a letter purportedly written by the accused to the complainant while he was in custody.

The defence opposed, arguing lack of provenance and that the prejudicial effect of a line apologizing for 'ruff' sex outweighed its probative value.

The court held that the letter was presumptively admissible as a party admission, finding on a balance of probabilities that the accused authored it.

The court ruled the letter admissible, leaving the parties to agree on edits to mitigate any prejudicial effect.

The accused brought a pre-trial application under s. 276 seeking to adduce evidence of two prior incidents of anal intercourse with the complainant in a sexual assault prosecution.

The defence argued the evidence was necessary to rebut the complainant’s preliminary inquiry statement that she had never done those things before and was therefore not comfortable.

The court held that, if the Crown did not elicit similar evidence at trial, the proposed evidence lost its articulated relevance and its admission would undermine the objectives of s. 276 by inviting discriminatory reasoning and unnecessary intrusion on dignity and privacy.

The application was dismissed, subject to the possibility of reconsideration if the evidentiary landscape changed at trial.

The accused was charged with driving with excess alcohol after registering a fail on an approved screening device (ASD) at the roadside.

The Crown's case relied on breath samples obtained at the police station.

The defence argued that the ASD result was unreliable due to the presence of a throat lozenge in the accused's mouth and the officer's failure to consider the effects of certain foods and substances on the device, as outlined in an Ontario Provincial Police memorandum.

The court found that the officer could not have reasonably relied on the ASD result and that the breath samples were obtained in violation of the accused's Charter rights.

The evidence was excluded and the accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with two offences: (1) breach of undertaking for purchasing and possessing alcohol contrary to s. 145(5.1) of the Criminal Code on December 11, 2013, and (2) breach of recognizance for failing to attend court on March 14, 2014, contrary to s. 145(2)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the accused had an honest mistake regarding the March 14 court date and acquitted him on the breach of recognizance charge.

However, the court found that the accused knew or was willfully blind to the continuing alcohol prohibition in his undertaking and convicted him on the breach of undertaking charge, rejecting his arguments that he believed the condition had been amended and that the de minimis doctrine applied.

The accused was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while blood alcohol content exceeded the legal limit.

The accused was found sitting in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle with keys in the glove compartment.

The Crown alleged care and control; the defence argued the accused had arranged for a sober driver to pick him up and had no intention to drive.

The court found the statutory presumption of care and control was rebutted and that no realistic risk of danger existed that the vehicle would be set in motion.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

He argued the trial judge erred regarding the standard of proof for a s. 8 Charter breach, the lawfulness of the police officer entering his driveway, the timing of the breath tests, and the failure to find arbitrary detention under s. 9 of the Charter.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding the officer was lawfully on the driveway under an implied invitation, the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable, and although the trial judge erred in inferring the reasons for the appellant's continued detention, a stay of proceedings was not warranted.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100 ml.

She argued that statements made to police were compelled under accident reporting requirements and could not form grounds for an approved screening device demand, and that expert “straddle” evidence regarding blood alcohol concentration should have raised a reasonable doubt.

The appeal court held that the trial judge’s adverse credibility findings against the appellant were entitled to deference and were not affected by palpable and overriding error.

As a result, the foundation for the appellant’s expert evidence and statutory compulsion arguments failed.

The conviction was therefore upheld.