COURT FILE NO.: 3515/12
DATE: 20140108
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
– and –
Manjit Sethi and Waseem Iqbal
J. Selvaratnam, for the Crown
Respondent
L. Beechener, for M. Sethi and
F. Mirza for W. Iqbal
Applicants
HEARD: December 2, 2013
H.K. O’Connell, J.
The Application
[1] By way of a joint application record, the applicants seek an order in the nature of certiorari requesting that the committal for trial made against both parties, be quashed and that they be discharged.
[2] They rely upon their notice of application, wherein they posit that the learned preliminary inquiry justice exceeded her jurisdiction in finding sufficient evidence on any of the counts warranting committal for trial; and in particular in finding that there was some evidence of knowledge and control over the contraband seized by the police after the execution of a general warrant at 18 Valley Woods Road, Unit PH107, Toronto.
[3] A joint comprehensive factum was filed by both applicants. Authorities were likewise provided and referenced in submissions, including 3 decisions that were handed to the court during argument on the application, including R. v. Grey 1996 35 (ON CA), [1996] O.J. No. 1106 (C.A.); R. v. Turner 2012 ONCA 570, [2012] O.J. No. 4088 (C.A.); and R. v. Do 2003 24750 (ON CA), [2003] O.J. No. 1720.
[4] Although these three additional cases were provided by Mr. Mirza, I have considered the principles relied upon in the context of both applicants, given that their positions are largely similar on this application.
The Argument in a Nutshell
[5] To commence neither applicant asserts that the learned justice misstated, failed to appreciate or otherwise erred in referencing the evidence that the Crown relied upon in seeking committal of the applicants to trial. Neither do counsel quarrel with the necessity of the preliminary inquiry justice in engaging in a limited weighing of the evidence to see if the evidence could reasonably support the inferences that she drew.
[6] Counsel further concede that Hourigan J. correctly stated that to commit on the conspiracy count there had to be some evidence of constructive possession of the contents of the condominium.
[7] The essence of the argument is that the preliminary judge erred in finding inferences to support knowledge and control of the contents of the condominium, when she should have come to the conclusion that what was painted to be a reasonable inference was nothing more than speculation. Speculation is not a basis to commit.
[8] In essence it is argued that the preliminary inquiry justice lacked the jurisdiction in her finding that the inferences assisted the Crown with the requirement of a showing of some evidence of knowledge and control over the contraband found in the penthouse unit.
Mr. Beechener for Mr. Sethi
[9] Mr. Beechener curtailed his argument on this application to two main points.
[10] Mr. Beechener conceded that the individual inferences made by the preliminary hearing justice were reasonably capable of being drawn, however the ultimate inference of knowledge and control is not a sustainable inference.
[11] The first major inference drawn by the preliminary inquiry judge and impugned is that Mr. Sethi’s dealings with other players in this case inclusive of his control of others, all of whom there was evidence to support an inference that they were trafficking in controlled substances, does not provide the inference necessary in the absence of other evidence that Mr. Sethi had the degree of influence to substantiate knowledge and control over the contents of the unit.
[12] Although there is evidence that Mr. Lopez is a key player, seen going and coming from the penthouse unit at relevant times with relevant items, Mr. Sethi is never directing, on the evidence, Mr. Lopez to do anything.
[13] Mr. Beechener argues that at its highest, Mr. Sethi has some type of degree of influence and control over others including Mr. Lopez. This does not lead to a reasonable inference of knowledge and a degree of control over the contents of the penthouse.
[14] The second inference impugned is that Mr. Sethi had a showing of a vested inference in the condo, manifested by his urgent meeting with other involved persons at ‘headquarters’, and Sethi’s own commentary after the general warrant was executed. There was also the evidence of his presence and conversations with two others in relation to the condo.
[15] These evidentiary underpinnings at their highest, says Mr. Beechener, equate to Mr. Sethi having dealings and direction with others who were involved in trafficking in controlled substances and that Mr. Sethi had some type of interest in the condominium. There were many different items found in the condo. The inference that he was in possession of everything in condo, or of which items, is tantamount to speculation.
[16] It is not sufficient to say there is some evidence of ownership and to extrapolate from that an inference of knowledge and control. It converts evidentiary shortfall into evidentiary proof. Lack of evidence cannot infer a finding of knowledge.
[17] Mr. Beechener argues that this lack of precision differentiates this case from those where courts deal with reasonable inferences. There is no way to interpret and infer the nature and scope of Sethi’s possession. In this respect Mr. Beechener referenced pages 43-46 of the factum. In the case at bar there is no evidence Sethi was ever in the condo, or ever had personal possession of any of the items in the condo. There was no evidence that Sethi was involved with firearms found in the condo. The only evidence was that of Lopez’s actual attendance at the condo and his access alone.
[18] Without more, an interest and direction or control of others, even those involved in drug trafficking is simply insufficient to make a finding that a reasonable inference exists of knowledge and control.
[19] Effectively what the preliminary inquiry judge has done is come to the conclusion of an all encompassing inference which became a basis to ground an inference of possession. That is the height of speculation, says counsel. Therefore discharge should have occurred on all counts.
[20] With respect to count 25, the conspiracy count, counsel relied upon the factum for his argument.
Mr. Mirza for Mr. Iqbal
[21] At the end of day the issue on this application is whether a reasonable inference was drawn . If Sethi should not have been committed, and it is argued that his committal was improper, then neither should Mr. Iqbal as the evidence was weaker against him.
[22] Counsel submits there is no evidence of control in particular. There is some argument about an inference of knowledge but the larger issue is that of control.
[23] Constructive possession requires knowledge and control. They must be co-existent. Reference was made to R. v. Grey, 1996 35 (ON CA), 28 O.R. (3d) 417 (Ont. C.A.) and a decision referenced therein, R. v. Sparling (1988) 31 O.A.C. 244. The case is of import because even in those factual situations where there is an inference drawn from occupancy knowledge is not necessarily inferable.
[24] The evidence of Iqbal’s involvement is contained to the dates of June 07, 14 and July 02. The prelim judge held that there was some evidence to show Iqbal had knowledge and control over some of the contents of the condo. Counsel reminds the court that absent occupancy or attendance there is no inference to tie Iqbal into the contents of the penthouse unit. There was no direct evidence against Mr. Iqbal to illustrate a connection to the condominium.
[25] The Crown is unable to establish that Iqbal had a temporal connection to the date of the search, which was July 02, 2010. Prior to July 02, the last evidence against Mr. Iqbal is June 14. The Crown simply cannot establish that Iqbal had any connection to the contraband.
[26] Furthermore there is an 18 day temporal gap where no inferences of knowledge or control can be drawn. That is important because in subsequent days there is considerable activity of movement of contraband to the condominium, all of which are absent a connection to Mr. Iqbal.
[27] In relation to the conspiracy counts they too would fall if the substantive counts are not sustainable.
[28] In any event there is no evidence of agreement between Mr. Iqbal and his alleged cohorts. There is simply no evidence of an agreement to traffic, counsel says.
[29] Counsel reminds that in R. v. Munoz, 2006 3269 (ON SC), [2006] O.J. No. 446 (S.C.J.) at paragraph 42, the court noted that an absence of opportunity to conspire defeats the existence of a conspiracy. In the case at bar the meetings and the connection between parties rise to nothing more than an opportunity to conspire.
Submissions of Mr. Selvaratnam, Crown Counsel
[30] Crown counsel says the defence is quarrelling only with the inferences drawn by the preliminary hearing justice. However there is evidence upon which the inferences, which are otherwise reasonable, could be drawn. As a consequence there is no basis upon which this court should interfere.
[31] This is a case involving several individuals who are involved in the trafficking of substances, and the possession of firearms. There is, on the evidence, a high degree of sophistication and organization. The evidence between May and July 2010 shows a clear interest by several individuals, inclusive of Sethi and Iqbal, in the contents of the stash house.
[32] It is the context of the evidence that the preliminary inquiry justice relied upon. That context provided the basis of the drawing of the inferences. In the context of the conspiracy counts, the preliminary judge followed the path as set out in Filiault and Kane.[1]
[33] Context and not segregation of the evidence into isolated pieces is what was required to be undertaken by the preliminary inquiry judge, and the analysis of the judge lived up to that task.
[34] As for possession this is equally a case of constructive as it is joint possession. There was a concerted effort to the operation. There is no requirement at law to show ownership or control over each piece of contraband.
[35] There is ample evidence that Lopez was in control of the stash house, and notes the concurrence of all counsel in the accuracy of the preliminary inquiry judge’s recitation of the evidence. The Crown says the argument of the applicants is simply a quarrel with the inferences drawn. Those inferences were reasonable and therefore sound for purposes of this review. Certiorari is therefore not available to the applicants.
[36] As a preliminary matter, counsel notes that this is a case involving several accused involved in drug trafficking with the use of a stash house, where a large amount of drugs were found. Guns were part of that same enterprise. The evidence substantiates that Sethi and Iqbal and others all had an interest in the property, and were responsible jointly for the contents of the stash house
[37] The preliminary inquiry judge relied upon context in making her findings and coming to reasonable inferences.
[38] Justice Hourigan used the context of the acts and declarations of co-conspirators to frame the context of the evidence directly admissible against the applicants. Instances of these references are at page 68 of the ruling of the preliminary inquiry judge, where just after line 25 the judge notes the evidence and the importance of context. These words are important as they show the judge was alive to the issue of membership in the conspiracy as alleged.
[39] The judge was not to isolate and segregate evidence but was obliged to consider it as a whole.
[40] For instance context is crucial to Mr. Iqbal’s alleged role. Timing of the phone calls shows a clear proximity of what has happened at the stash house, leads to a clear inference of what involvement of others is.
[41] In relation to possession the preliminary inquiry judge used the principle of constructive possession but it is equally that of joint possession. There need not be specific evidence of physical control of each individual item at the stash house. The location of the drugs need not be accompanied by legal ownership of the stash house. If Mr. Lopez had control and is part of the conspiracy, given the evidence against Sethi and Iqbal, this leads to an inference of control and knowledge of the contents of the stash house.
[42] The evidence shows Lopez was in control of the stash house. He was the direct controller but was also on the evidence under the control of Mr. Sethi.
[43] As the preliminary inquiry justice noted this case is an interrelationship between wiretaps, text messages, meetings between parties, and the seizures that were made, as well as items that were not seized. Totality and context of the evidence leads to the inference that the preliminary inquiry judge found was present.
[44] Reference was made to page 71 of the preliminary judge’s ruling, wherein the judge noted that it can be inferred that Sethi and Iqbal had a vested interest in the stash house.
[45] In relation to the firearms, at pages 74 and 75 of her ruling the preliminary inquiry justice referenced the stash house and the issue of the guns, but noted the presence and location of the weapons in the same location as that of some of the controlled substances, and inferred from that knowledge.
[46] All of the evidence before the court leads to a reasonable inference of Mr. Sethi’s knowledge of what had been lost in the general warrant seizure.
[47] Crown counsel referenced R. v. Bremner[2] as a case that may assist the court in the nature of the drawing of the inferences by the preliminary inquiry justice. Counsel says that the measure of control over Mr. Lopez is very intricate by Mr. Sethi. It is a clear inference of the control exercised given the meetings that occur, and then the soon after discovery of the stash house being compromised. This is cogent evidence from which inferences were clearly made. It is very close in time to the stash house being compromised, that Mr. Sethi reaches out to Iqbal and others. It is clear that there is a joint enterprise in play.
[48] Although cumulatively there is less evidence against Iqbal it is still quality evidence. What you have is a series of events and direct actions that lead to the reasonable inferences that the judge held existed. Arguments to make on the evidence and its weight and persuasiveness are matters for a trier of fact.
The Learned Preliminary Inquiry Justice’s Reasons
[49] The reasons consume 100 pages of transcript. Pages 2-5 contain a complete outline, by Justice Hourigan, of her role at a preliminary inquiry and the limited need to weigh the evidence to assess whether it is reasonably capable of supporting the inferences suggested by the Crown. Reference is made to the applicable law.
[50] At pages 6-9 of her reasons Hourigan J. sets out what constitutes a reasonable inference, and cautioned herself in accord with U.S.A. v. Huynh (2005) 2005 34563 (ON CA), 200 C.C.C. (3d) 305, (Ont. C.A.) that the drawing of inferences does not permit a judicial officer to make an educated guess. The presence of evidence is critical to the inference drawing process. Any assessment of the evidence must be done in the light of common sense and human experience, but neither of those are substitutes for the requirement of evidence.
[51] At pages 10-12 of the reasons the justice provides an impeccable overview of the requirements of a showing of conspiracy and probable membership at the preliminary inquiry stage.
[52] At pages 13-14, drawing from R. v. Morelli (2010) 2010 SCC 8, 1 S.C.R. 253, Justice Hourigan referenced the definition of constructive possession and noted that for her to commit either of Messrs. Sethi and Iqbal, there had to be some evidence of knowledge and control in relation to the stash house at Penthouse 107, 18 Valley Woods Road.
[53] In relation to what was described as “Incident #1” which relates to counts 1-17 , these counts subsume two time periods: the conspiracy to traffic counts contained in counts 1-4 between the dates of 01 March and July 08, 2010; and in relation to counts 5-17, the counts that arise out of the general warrant seizures from the stash house on July 02, 2010.
[54] The preliminary inquiry justice noted that the evidence for all of these counts emanated from intercepted communications, text messages, surveillance and the seizures.
[55] Within incident #1, 6 time periods were considered. Intercepted communications were referenced in detail. Given that the applicant Mr. Iqbal was not represented at the preliminary hearing, the issue of voice identification was not conceded for him. The learned preliminary hearing justice concluded, and it is not impugned on this application before me, that there were some evidence that the person identified to be Mr. Iqbal was in fact the applicant Mr. Iqbal.
[56] The learned justice spent pages 16-77 of her reasons dealing with Incident #1. It is important to remind that none of the evidence referenced by Justice Hourigan is challenged by way of any suggestion that it is not accurate or was otherwise not properly considered. In short it provided the pool of evidence for her analysis of inference drawing.
[57] Finally the learned justice spelt out the law that she must consider in assessing whether the Crown had provided a basis to establish some evidence in steps 1 and 2 of the Carter[3] test.
Ruling
[58] The determination by the learned justice that a reasonable inference was available for the drawing, in particular the intercepts that suggest that Lopez, the primary connection to the stash house, was being directed by the applicant Sethi, is simply unassailable. The preliminary inquiry justice was entirely within her jurisdiction to consider the evidence together and in context. Indeed this is a statutory requirement as much as it is a common sense proposition.
[59] The circumstantial evidence made for the logical and reasonable inference that was drawn in the context of all of the evidence from the preliminary inquiry in relation to counts 1-17. As for the argument that the Crown could not establish that Mr. Sethi or Mr. Iqbal could be assigned knowledge and control of the particular items in the stash house the connection of both to the others involved in the stash house enterprise is enough, as the preliminary inquiry justice found it was, to root a finding of knowledge and control over the contents of the stash house.
[60] It would have been, I find, an artificial exercise in the context of the totality of the evidence led by the Crown, to attempt to parse out what contents were constructively possessed by the applicants. There was evidence, for which reasonable inferences could be drawn, that the constructive possession of the totality of the contents visits itself on the applicants.
[61] I can do no better than recite the reasons of the preliminary inquiry justice’s findings, which I adopt as providing the requisite basis to uphold the committal for trial on counts 1-17, which are firmly grounded in her extensive reference to the evidence.
In relation to counts one to four, the conspiracies to traffic in the four controlled substances found at the stash house, I find the Crown has adduced evidence.
When taken and considered together and in context from which it can reasonably be inferred that there was a conspiracy during this time period, set out in the information, to traffic in these controlled substances.
Further I find that there is sufficient evidence adduced again, considered in its totality, and in context as to time and place and events, from which it can reasonably be inferred that Mr. Sethi, Mr. Chan, and Mr. Iqbal were all members of this conspiracy.
Given that the substantive aspect of these charges are the four controlled substances found in the stash house, and given the subject matter of counts five to seventeen are the items found in the stash house, for committal for trial on all these counts the Court must be satisfied there is some evidence of constructive possession, by all three defendants, of the contents of the stash house.
On the evidence adduced, considered together, I find that it can be reasonably inferred that these three defendants had both knowledge and control of the contents of the stash house and that the items were held there for their benefit as members of the conspiracy.
In relation to Mr. Sethi, given the evidence adduced in relation to his dealings and direction of Mr. Lopez, who is connected to the stash house, and his movements and conversations after being made aware of the stash house, I find this inference is reasonable, even though he was never seen at the stash house.[4]
[62] The preliminary inquiry justice expressly recognized and turned her mind to Mr. Sethi’s position that the gaps in surveillance of the stash house negated the argument that he was part of an ongoing conspiracy. However she found:
Although it is true that the surveillance was incomplete, from the surveillance evidence that has been adduced from the dates set out above, links to the stash house, I find, are established, not just through Mr. Lopez’s attendance there, but also when all the evidence is considered together and in context, and in terms of the contemporaneous nature of the observations of the players, together with Mr. Lopez coming and going with various suitcases, boxes, and reusable grocery bags.
For example, with Mr. Sethi, there is a reasonable inference, I find, that can be made through a consideration of all of the evidence, particularly the intercepts that he was directing Mr. Lopez throughout, can be reasonably be inferred that he directed Suri and Tang as well.
Similarly I find there is sufficient evidence from which this Court can draw an inference that Mr. Iqbal was a member of this conspiracy, given his presence contemporaneous to production and sale of controlled substances, and his involvement with Sethi once the break- in was discovered.
On that point, Mr. Pillay[5] submits that the evidence that Mr. Sethi learned of the break-in is not evidence from which this Court can infer membership in the conspiracy prior to that date.
The fact that Sethi and Iqbal’s conversations and actions are after the fact, I find are just one part of the evidence that can be taken together with other parts of the evidence, prior to the break in, to show membership.
From this evidence taken together, I find it can be reasonably inferred that both men had a measure of control and a vested interest in the contents of the stash house.
Sethi is the one used the word “urgent” twice when he demanded that Iqbal come right away and not wait until tomorrow.
This matter is important to note when considering the defence submission that Lopez had a delayed reaction in telling Sethi about the break-in.
The fact, however, remains that Sethi was obviously advised of the break-in by Suri and then, in turn, Sethi summoned Mr. Iqbal to his “headquarters” with “urgency.”
From his words, taken together with other evidence, it can be inferred, I find that both Sethi and Iqbal had a vested interest in the contents of the stash house.[6]
[63] In addition the preliminary inquiry justice expressly alluded to the fact that an inference may be in place that Sethi’s apparent lack of interest in the loss of the contents at the condominium unit, the stash house, might lead to an inference in his favour, however his presence during a discussion about the break-in provided some evidence from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that he had a stake in the stash house. As the preliminary justice indicated, “this meeting must not be looked at in isolation, but together with other evidence.”[7]
[64] This inference is entirely open to the preliminary hearing justice and a reasonable one.
[65] As for the location and seizure of the firearms and ammunition during the execution of the general warrant Justice Hourigan stated:
Given their presence and location in the same suitcase as the controlled substances, I find it can reasonably be inferred, as the Crown suggests, that they, as well, were held at the stash house for the benefit of the conspiracy.
Given their location there is no reason to distinguish them from the controlled substances found there. [8]
[66] Justice Hourigan noted:
Mr. Iqbal’s attendance at Mr. Sethi’s urgence on July 05, I find as well, is further evidence in relation to him, from which it can reasonably be inferred that he also had a vested interest in the stash house.
[67] As I have indicated previously, his connection to the stash house is made out by other evidence as well. That other evidence, absent the argument of permissible inferences to be drawn from it, is not in dispute.
[68] Jurisdictional error could only be established if the requirements of proof of some evidence of knowledge and/or control were deficient in the committal decision. In short, absent a lack of showing to make the reasonable inferences that were said to be present, there is no basis to impugn the committal decision. Justice Hourigan was very alive to the fact that speculation and guesswork are not proxies for a reasonable inference.
[69] My task on review is only to assess whether the inferences drawn were reasonable. Unlike at the trial stage[9], the preliminary justice was not required to establish that the only reasonable inference available from the evidence was that the applicants had knowledge and control, but rather that one of the reasonable inferences established knowledge and control, and therefore constructive possession of the items located in the stash house.
[70] The fact that other inferences may just as readily be applied in favour of the defendants, does not negate the inferences sought by the Crown at the preliminary inquiry stage.
[71] The decision of Hourigan J. in relation to incident #1, namely counts 1-17 that the Crown had provided sufficient evidence to warrant committal for trial against Mr. Sethi, Mr. Chan[10] and Mr. Iqbal, is not on review subject to disturbance. The argument of a lack of jurisdiction in the committal is not made out. I agree with Justice Hourigan that there are a series of events and actions for which reasonable inferences could be drawn, implicating Messrs. Sethi and Iqbal in the charges upon which they were committed.
[72] This was not a case, given the available reasonable inferences, I find, where mere passive acquiescence or consorting was shown, without more.
[73] I hasten to add that although it is trite that occupancy of a place where contraband is found is often a sine qua non for a finding of possession, that is not always the case, provided that a reasonable inference of knowledge and control can be drawn. The very essence of constructive possession in section 4(3)(a)(ii) and (b) of the Criminal Code speaks to that issue.
[74] Finally, it is important to note as well that ‘control’ does not require that either of the applicants did in fact exercise control over the object(s) in question, but rather that they had the power or authority over the object(s) in question. At the other end of the spectrum mere passive acquiescence or consorting with another who has possession would not be sufficient to equate to control.[11]
[75] I further note that Justice Hourigan discharged Mr. Sethi on the count of conspiracy to traffic in ketamine, count 24 on the information. The discharge makes it clear that Justice Hourigan fully appreciated the need to only engage in permissible reasonable inference drawing, and not to engage in speculation. Juxtaposed against the discharge on count 24, is the methodical and reasonable inferences that the justice drew from the evidence in relation to the global conspiracy counts, referenced earlier.
[76] In relation to count 25, described as the sixth incident by Justice Hourigan, a count involving a conspiracy with Sethi, Lopez, Tang, Suri and Rawlings, the court set out the nature of the “buy/sell conspiracy” that the Crown argued was present. That finding on review is not open to attack, as it cannot be shown that committal could not have occurred.[12]
[77] Once again I have to look at my role as the reviewing justice and not substitute my view for that of the learned preliminary inquiry justice. To quote Watt J. (as he then was):
When an applicant moves to quash an order to stand trial on the ground that the order was made without the evidentiary foundation required by s. 548(1), a judge of the reviewing court is not entitled to substitute his or her own views of the sufficiency of the evidence to meet the standard of s. 548(1) for the conclusion reached by the provincial court judge. There is not in other words, a de novo consideration of the standard of s. 548(1) by a different judicial officer. The issue is not whether the reviewing judge would have reached the same conclusion as the judge who presided, but rather, whether the judge at the preliminary could have reached the decision that she or he did.[13]
[78] I hasten to add that in the case at bar I would have reached in any event the same decision that the preliminary inquiry justice did.
[79] The application is therefore dismissed. Messrs. Sethi and Iqbal are properly before the Superior Court of Justice for their trial.
Justice H.K. O’Connell
Released: January 08, 2014
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
– and –
Manjit Sethi and Waseem Iqbal
certiorari application
The Honourable Mr. Justice H.K. O’Connell
Released: January 8, 2014
[1] R. v. Filiault, (1981) 1981 3165 (ON CA), 63 C.C.C. (2d) 321 (Ont.C.A); Aff’d: R. v. Filiault, (1984) 15 C.C.C. (3d) 352 (S.C.C.)
[2] 2007 NSCA 114.
[3] (1982)1982 35 (SCC), 1 S.C.R. 938. Justice Hourigan referenced as well U.S.A. v. Drysdale (2000), O.J. No. 241 (Ont. S.C. per: Dambrot J.); and R. v. H.A. (2005), 2005 32566 (ON CA), O.J. No. 3777 (Ont.C.A); Paradis v. The King (1934) 1933 75 (SCC), 61 C.C.C. 184 (S.C.C.).
[4] Reasons for Committal, January 18, 2013, pages 67-68. Mr. Chan did not partake in the certiorari application.
[5] Mr. Pillay was counsel for Mr. Sethi at the preliminary hearing.
[6] Reasons for Committal, Pages 70-71.
[7] Reasons for Committal, page 72.
[8] Reasons for Committal, page 75.
[9] See: R. v. Yowfoo, 2013 ONCA 751.
[10] Mr. Chan did not partake in the certiorari application.
[11] R. v. Savory 1996 2001 (ON CA), [1996] O.J. No. 3811 (Ont.C.A.); leave to appeal to SCC dismissed, [1997] S.C.C.A. No. 189.
[12] Although committal on this count was challenged, the copy of the indictment in the applicant’s application record does not contain a count that implicates Mr. Sethi in this conspiracy to traffic in ketamine with Messrs. Lopez, Tang, Suri, and Rawlings between the 03 and 04th days of July 2010.
[13] R. v. Scott, 2003 CarswellOnt 101 ( S.C.J.)