Douglas Gosbee

The applicants, charged with cannabis and proceeds of crime offences, brought Charter applications to exclude evidence seized from their residence and coffee shop.

They alleged breaches of ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The court found multiple s. 8 breaches: the search warrant contained the wrong address (rendering it a warrantless search), the Information to Obtain (ITO) failed to disclose reasonable grounds to search the apartment, and the police executed a 'no-knock' entry without justification.

The court dismissed the s. 7 claim that police planted evidence.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and excluded the seized cannabis and cash.

The appellant appealed his convictions under sections 7(1) and 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act for operating a marijuana grow-operation in his rental apartment unit.

The appellant challenged the convictions on grounds of misapprehension of evidence and unreasonable verdict.

The trial judge had found that the appellant maintained control of the unit and had knowledge of the grow-operation based on his tenancy, exclusive access, rent payment, and personal documents found in the unit.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding all findings of fact were open to the trial judge and that no other rational conclusion was available on the evidence.

The appellants appealed their convictions for forcible confinement arising from a home invasion, arguing that their identity as the perpetrators was not the only reasonable inference from DNA and fingerprint evidence found at the scene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the trial judge properly considered the totality of the evidence, including the pristine condition of the mask containing DNA, the location of the fingerprint on the duct tape roll, and the victims' descriptions of the perpetrators.

The court concluded that innocent explanations for the forensic evidence were speculative rather than reasonable.

The respondent, a licensed driver and trainer, was disciplined by track judges for providing an improper urine sample.

He appealed to the Ontario Racing Commission, which held a hearing de novo.

At the hearing, the Commission allowed the senior track judge from the initial panel to testify.

The Divisional Court quashed the Commission's decision, finding this created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the track judge had relevant factual evidence to give and his testimony did not create a reasonable apprehension of bias, as the Commission Panel's ruling did not show preconceived views or give undue weight to his evidence.

The applicant, a licensed driver, was penalized by track judges for failing to provide a proper urine sample during random drug testing.

He appealed to the Ontario Racing Commission, which held a de novo hearing and upheld the penalty.

During the hearing, the Commission permitted the senior track judge who made the initial decision to testify.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court held that allowing the first-instance judge to testify created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The application was allowed and the Commission's decision was quashed.

The licensee, a standardbred owner/driver/trainer, appealed a Judges' ruling that fined him $1,500, suspended him for 120 days, and placed him on probation for two years for failing to provide a proper urine sample.

The licensee provided urine samples that registered below the required 90 degrees Fahrenheit on the temperature strip.

The Commission accepted expert evidence that samples below this temperature indicate alteration or substitution.

The Commission found the licensee failed to provide a proper sample and dismissed the appeal, affirming the penalty.

The appellants challenged a s. 37 order sustaining Crown objections to questions that might reveal the identity of a confidential source described in a wiretap affidavit.

The Court of Appeal held that even if the source acted as a police agent in an unrelated stolen-goods transaction, that did not convert the source into an agent for all purposes or in relation to the appellants' drug investigation.

The court further held that, even assuming the Crown's earlier characterization of the source as an agent in the wiretap materials created prejudice and amounted to an abuse of process, compelled disclosure of identity was unavailable because informer privilege must be protected if it in fact applies.

Any appropriate remedy would instead lie, if warranted, in a Garofoli challenge to the authorization and possible exclusion of intercepted evidence.