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Evidence excluded under s. 24(2) due to wrong address on warrant and unjustified no-knock entry.
The applicants, charged with cannabis and proceeds of crime offences, brought Charter applications to exclude evidence seized from their residence and coffee shop.
They alleged breaches of ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter.
The court found multiple s. 8 breaches: the search warrant contained the wrong address (rendering it a warrantless search), the Information to Obtain (ITO) failed to disclose reasonable grounds to search the apartment, and the police executed a 'no-knock' entry without justification.
The court dismissed the s. 7 claim that police planted evidence.
Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and excluded the seized cannabis and cash.
The court dismissed the accused's Charter application, finding no violations during a vehicle search incidental to an arrest for public intoxication.
The applicant, Zedekiah McAnuff, brought a pretrial application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and seeking exclusion of evidence under section 24(2).
The application arose from a RIDE stop where the co-accused driver was arrested for impaired driving, and McAnuff was subsequently arrested for public intoxication, leading to a search of his vehicle and the discovery of drugs, cash, and ammunition.
The court found no arbitrary detention, no arrest without reasonable and probable grounds for public intoxication, and no violation of the right to counsel or unreasonable search.
The application was dismissed, and the evidence was deemed admissible.
Drug evidence excluded after arbitrary detention and delayed right to counsel violated Charter rights.
The accused was charged with multiple counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking after a police officer approached his parked vehicle, detained him, and discovered drugs.
The accused brought a Charter application alleging arbitrary detention, denial of the right to counsel, and unreasonable search.
The court found that the initial detention was arbitrary and based on mere suspicion, violating section 9.
The court also found a violation of section 10(b) because the accused was not informed of his right to counsel without delay.
Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and excluded the drug evidence under section 24(2).
Accused acquitted of drug possession charges as circumstantial evidence failed to prove knowledge and control.
The accused were charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of marihuana and MDMA, following a police search of an apartment.
The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including police surveillance of the accused entering the building and their presence in the apartment when the search warrant was executed.
The court applied the Villaroman test for circumstantial evidence and found that the evidence reasonably supported inferences other than guilt, specifically that the accused lacked knowledge and control of the drugs.
Both accused were acquitted on all counts.
Drug evidence was excluded due to Charter violations, resulting in acquittals on all charges.
The accused, Jonathon Leitch and Shawn Ball, were tried for drug possession and possession for the purpose of trafficking.
Leitch brought a Charter application alleging violations of his rights against arbitrary detention (s. 9) and the right to counsel (s. 10(b)).
The court found that Leitch's s. 9 and s. 10(b) rights were violated, leading to the exclusion of methamphetamine evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.
Consequently, Leitch was acquitted on all four drug charges, and Ball was acquitted on the joint trafficking charge due to insufficient evidence of possession.
Leave to appeal denied; lower courts reasonably assessed delay and prejudice under s. 11(b).
The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal judge's decision setting aside a stay of proceedings for impaired driving charges.
The trial judge had originally granted the stay under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to delay.
The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding that the lower courts reasonably attributed a four-month adjournment to neutral delay rather than institutional delay.
The Court also agreed that the prejudice of additional legal fees did not override the public interest in a trial on the merits in a borderline delay case.