Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: FS 12573-13 DATE: 2017-05-01 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Andrew George Robinson Applicant – and – Julie Ann Margaret Connolly Respondent

Counsel: Christopher D. McInnis, for the Applicant Réjean Parisé, for the Respondent

HEARD: April 19, 2017

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

GAUTHIER, J.

Overview

[1] The very narrow issue for trial concerns the provisions of a separation agreement entered into between the parties on May 27, 2011, (the “Agreement”) and how that Agreement provides for the payment of child support from July 1, 2009, up to and including May 2011, by the husband, and the treatment of such child support as a set off against an equalization payment owed by the wife to the husband. The issue requires the interpretation of the domestic contract entered into by the parties.

[2] Put another way (as expressed by the wife in the document entitled “Submissions of the Respondent”), the issue “relates to whether the equalization payment provided for in the separation agreement of May 2011, has been satisfied and whether there are now arrears of child support payments due to the respondent mother, in the amount of $54,922.00.”

Facts

[3] The parties, who I will refer to as the “husband” and the “wife”, and who are 44 and 43 years of age, respectively, began to live separate and apart in June 2009. They had been living together since 2002 and had been married to each other since October 11, 2003.

[4] They entered into the Agreement on May 27, 2011, and were divorced on September 29, 2011.

[5] The parties have three children: Naomi born June 27, 2002, Nathan born September 23, 2004, and Thandeka born December 25, 2006.

[6] The parties are both medical doctors. The husband’s income has historically been significantly higher than the wife’s income.

[7] From the date of separation until the fall of 2013 the parties shared custody of the children. In the fall of 2013, the husband left the Sudbury area to relocate in Kingston, Ontario. The children have been, and continue to be, in the primary care of the wife since that time.

[8] The husband paid child support, in the amount of $2,500 per month, from July 1, 2009, until and including January 2014. The quantum of child support was increased to $5,500 per month, effective February 1, 2014, by virtue of the order referred to below.

[9] The application was commenced by the husband on July 12, 2013, under the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3. I will have more to say about the pleadings in this case later in these reasons.

[10] A temporary order was made on January 17, 2014, dealing with custody, access and child support. Insofar as child support, it provided as follows:

That the Applicant pay to the Respondent child support for the three children of the marriage … the amount of $5,500 per month payable on the first day of each month, beginning February 1, 2014. The child support payable pursuant to this order shall be without set off, pending further order of the court.

[11] The above order was the only substantial order made in the case.

[12] At the outset of the trial of this matter, which proceeded before me on April 19, 2017, the issues of custody, access, and ongoing child support were said to be resolved although no formal minutes of settlement had been executed by the parties. The trial proceeded solely on the issue outlined at the outset of this judgment.

The separation agreement

[13] Both parties had retained family law lawyers to assist in the negotiation of a separation agreement. Those negotiations went on for more than a year and a half until the Agreement was finalized on May 27, 2011.

[14] The Agreement provided, among other things, that the wife owed the husband an equalization payment in the amount of $97,000 and that the payment of the equalization would be based on a credit to the amount owing for the difference between the table guideline amount of child support and the actual child support paid by the husband. The husband paid the amount of $2,500 per month commencing July 1, 2009.

[15] I reproduce certain relevant portions of the Agreement:

6. PROPERTY

i) The parties further acknowledge and agree that the wife shall not be required to pay the aforesaid equalization payment. Rather, the parties agree as follows:

(i) The sum of $97,000.00 shall be a credit for the husband as set out below.

(ii) Where the husband may owe child support, not including section 7 expenses, in excess of $2,500.00 per month then the amount in excess shall be set off against the equalization payment until the credit of $97,000.00 is exhausted and thereafter child support shall be paid in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines. Where the parties cannot agree on the amount to be credited they shall retain an accountant to calculate the credit that should be applied.

(iii) Any balance that may be owing on the equalization payment when the child support obligation ceases shall be forgiven and extinguished.

(iv) Nothing in this clause shall permit the husband to use the credit to reduce his child support obligation except as set out in (ii) herein.

(v) Any change in custodial arrangements or the income of the parties or any other circumstances shall not constitute a material change in circumstances in relation to the equalization payment.

(vi) More particularly, at no time, now or in the future, can the husband make any demand on the wife or her estate for the equalization payment or any balance owing thereunder and the husband acknowledges and agrees that this provision can be pleaded as a complete defence to any claim by him or his estate and that he is estopped from bringing such claim. In those circumstances the husband acknowledges and agrees that the wife can bring a motion staying the claim and that she shall be granted the relief and her full indemnity costs.

11. CHILD SUPPORT

a) The husband and wife acknowledge and agree that both have an obligation to pay support to the other for the children pursuant to the shared custody provisions of the Child Support Guidelines.

b) Based on the husband’s income of $350,000.00 per year, the wife’s income of $200,000.00 per year and the shared custody of the children, the husband shall pay child support for the children of the marriage in the amount of $2,500.00 per month, commencing July 1st, 2009 and continuing on the 1st day of each month thereafter by way of automatic bank transfer.

c) The husband and wife acknowledge and agree that said support is consistent with the Child Support Guidelines and that the husband has made all payments to the date this agreement has been signed and owes no arrears of child support as of the date this agreement was signed.

d) The husband and the wife agree that the [sic] each shall advise the other in writing of any material change in their respective financial circumstances within 30 days of a material change occurring.

e) Both parents shall contribute to the children’s post secondary education costs in proportion to their income subject to the contribution of the child including but not limited to grants, bursaries, scholarships, loans and employment income. This further contribution by the parents is after dispersal of RESPs and may be made by each parent by way of dividend payment to each of the children as shareholders.

f) The husband and the wife agree that the [sic] each shall provide the other with a copy of his/her income tax return, together with all supporting documentation, a copy of the Notice of Assessment and/or Reassessment received from the Canada customs and Revenue Agency and the financial statements of their respective professional corporations within 30 days of the receipt of their Notices of Assessment, commencing in 2010, and continuing for so long as the children are entitled to support.

g) Child support for each child shall terminate when each child is no longer a dependant as defined by the Divorce Act.

h) For so long as the children remain dependants the parties shall provide each other with a release authorizing their accountants and the accountants for their professional corporations (if different) to release to each parent the disclosure set out in section 21 of the Child Support Guidelines.

The pleadings

[16] The application issued on behalf of the husband on July 12, 2013, sought the following relief:

a. Custody of the children;

b. An Order incorporating “the paragraphs of the Separation Agreement executed by the parties on May 27, 2011 (section 4(1) and section 15 of the Divorce Act)”; and

c. An Order varying the custody and access arrangement, to reflect the husband’s relocation to Kingston.

[17] The wife’s answer, delivered on October 7, 2013, sought custody and child support (table amount and other than table amount), commencing October 1, 2013, as well as section 7 expenses. The claim for child support was made both pursuant to the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.) and the Family Law Act. There was other relief sought which is not germane to the issue before me.

[18] Of note are the following paragraphs which are contained in the answer, under the heading “Important Facts Supporting my Claim(s)”:

24. It is viewed that the assumptions that are made in that document in the Separation Agreement may have been wrong in that the income assumptions were that the applicant father was making an income of $350,000.00 per year when in fact the information now provided would show that his 2011 Assessment should have been $427,750.00 and his 2012 Assessment shows an annual income of $463,600.00. This would require a recalculation of the child support obligation from the date provided in the Separation Agreement being July 1, 2009.

25. For the year 2010, the ascribed child support should be based on the Applicant’s income of $496,000.00 and the Respondent’s income of $152,525.00 for the year 2010 for a child support obligation of $5,117.00. The Applicant’s income for the year 2011 would be $427,750.00 and the Respondent’s income would be $173,375.00 for a child support obligation of $3,790.00 per month.

26. Based on the 2012 income information, the child support should be based upon the Applicant’s income of $463,600 which amounts to $7,127.00, effective October 1, 2013.

[19] The husband’s reply, dated October 21, 2013, opposed the claim for table amount child support, but did not oppose the claim for non-table amount child support.

The issue

[20] Is the amount of the credit against the equalization payment to be calculated as of July 2009 or as of May 2011, and be based on the table amount of child support payable and the actual incomes of the parties for the years 2009, 2010, and part of 2011?

[21] Put another way, should the husband have been paying guideline child support based on his higher income, from July 1, 2009, forward? If so, the equalization payment would have been satisfied sooner, and the husband would therefore have underpaid child support resulting in the wife being owed the sum of $54,922.00.

The wife’s position

[22] The wife submits that the Agreement should be interpreted to mean that the set off amount, i.e. the amount of the equalization payment credit earned by the wife with each child support payment due, should be calculated on the table amount of child support payable by the husband, based on his actual income for the years 2009, 2010, and 2011. Effectively, this would mean that the set off amount would begin to be calculated from July 2009, and not from May or June 2011. This would result in the wife being owed the sum of $54,922. This sum would be equal to the amount of child support the husband should have paid, based on the parties’ line 150 income, minus the $2,500 per month the husband in fact did pay.

[23] The first step to be taken in the interpretation of the Agreement is consideration of s. 15.1(3) of the Divorce Act which provides for a presumption that the Child Support Guidelines (“Guidelines”) govern the fixing of the quantum of child support. The presumption can only be displaced if special provisions for child support (i.e. those that deviate from the Guidelines) “directly or indirectly benefit a child” as set out in s. 15.1(5) of the Divorce Act.

[24] The husband has failed to discharge the onus of establishing that the special provision for child support (at less than the Guidelines amount) objectively benefits the children.

[25] Therefore, absent a benefit to the children, the husband and the wife have effectively bargained away their children’s right to appropriate child support based on the Guidelines. The wife refers to Richardson v. Richardson, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 857, at pp. 869-70, where Wilson J. said:

The legal basis of child maintenance is the parent’s mutual obligation to support their children according to their need. That obligation should be borne by the parents in proportion to their respective incomes and ability to pay: Paras v. Paras, supra … Child maintenance, like access, is the right of the child: Re Cartlidge and Cartlidge, [1973] 3 O.R. 801 (Fam. Ct.). For this reason, a spouse cannot barter away his or her child’s right to support in a settlement agreement. The court is always free to intervene and determine the appropriate level of support for the child [Citations omitted.]

[26] The amount of child support set out in the Agreement is far below the Guidelines amount of child support payable, based on the actual income of the husband and the wife for the years in question. The $2,500 was loosely based on the husband’s income being $350,000 and the wife’s income being at $200,000, when in fact, the actual income of each of the parties was as follows:

Year	Husband’s Income	Wife’s Income
2009	$496,000	$143,379
2010	$496,000	$152,525
2011	$451,357	$189,954

[27] The husband is essentially asking that he be exempt from his obligation to pay child support, in accordance with his income, and in compliance with the Guidelines for the period from July 1, 2009, until May or June, 2011. This would not be a benefit to the children.

[28] It would be improper to interpret the Agreement in a manner that results in a parent’s diminished responsibility for child support. The court is urged not to lose sight of the fact that the issue is that of child support. This is not a commercial contract.

[29] In the course of her testimony, the wife indicated that she always believed that the $2,500 child support amount was less than the husband should have been paying based on his income and the Guidelines. However, she said that she always believed that the amount would be adjusted to reflect the husband’s increased income for the years in question.

[30] She concedes that she understood the terms of the Agreement and signed it; however she says she did so because of her “naiveté”, the stress caused by the separation, and her reliance on her counsel at the time. She went on to say that at no time in the course of the negotiation of the agreement was she presented with any documentation establishing the husband’s income during the course of the negotiation of the Agreement, and she implies that the fault lies with her counsel at the time of the making of the Agreement. She maintains that her counsel did not provide her with any “clarity” with regard to the impact of the Agreement.

The husband’s position

[31] The answer does not contain a claim for child support for the period in question, nor does it include a claim to set aside the child support provisions in the Agreement. The issue as framed by counsel for the wife is not the issue which is set out in the pleadings and, generally speaking, pleadings govern.

[32] Notwithstanding this position on behalf of the husband, he is content that the issue to be determined is one of interpretation of the Agreement.

[33] However, in the context of examining and interpreting the Agreement, the provisions of the Divorce Act, relied upon by the wife, are not engaged.

[34] The Agreement is clear and unambiguous: the child support paid, from the date of the separation until the date of the Agreement, was consistent with the Guidelines and there were “no arrears of child support as of the date this agreement was signed” as stated in paragraph 11(c) of the Agreement.

[35] “In the absence of any ambiguity in the words of the contract, parole evidence of the subjective intention of the parties has no place in the interpretative exercise.” Turner v. DiDonato, 2009 ONCA 235, 95 O.R. (3d) 147, at para. 44.

[36] The goal is to ascertain the objective intent of the parties at the time they entered into the Agreement: Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 633.

[37] The parties each had a skilled and experienced family law lawyer assisting in the negotiation of the Agreement. The parties wanted to deal with the issues of child support and equalization in the manner that they did, keeping in mind how complicated their income situations were given that each of them derived income from a professional corporation, as well as employment.

[38] The husband’s position is that the parties had access to the income information that could have been used to calculate child support strictly in accordance with the Guidelines, but they chose to deal with those issues as reflected in the agreement. If the intention had been to calculate the exact amount of child support as per the Guidelines, then the payment formula for the equalization amount would not have been agreed upon in the form that it was.

[39] There are two specific comments to be made in relation to paragraph 6 of the Agreement. First, the words “where the husband may owe child support…” suggest an adjustment in the future not the past. Second, the balance of the provisions all benefit the wife and stringently restrict any recourse the husband might have for monies owing on the equalization amount of $97,000.

[40] The evidence of the wife’s notes to her counsel contained in Exhibit #1 belies the wife’s claim of naiveté and confusion. On the contrary, they indicate a person who is raising clear questions about the draft agreement she is reviewing, is raising issues about details in the draft, and is looking for a copy of the Child Support Guideline tables.

[41] The wife places the blame for having signed an Agreement which provided for less than Guideline child support at the feet of her legal counsel at the time. The husband submits that he bears no responsibility if such is the case. That is a matter between the wife and her former counsel.

Analysis and Conclusion

[42] I begin with my first conclusion: in this very specific exercise of contractual interpretation, I am not bound nor guided by the provisions of the Divorce Act.

[43] I say this for the following reasons.

[44] There is no claim for child support before me, save and except the claim for the period from October 13, 2011, as framed in the wife’s answer. That claim has been resolved without the necessity of a trial.

[45] While the answer makes reference to the possibility of erroneous assumptions having been made in the estimate of the parties’ respective incomes, it does not advance a claim related to this possibility.

[46] Absent a claim for child support under the Divorce Act, none of the provisions of s. 15.1 applies, including the presumption of guideline child support (s. 15.1(3)), the requirement to find a benefit for the child(ren) (s. 15.1(5)), and the requirement to consider the reasonableness of the child support arrangements (s. 15.1(8)).

[47] There is also no request for me to set aside any provision of the May 27, 2011 Agreement.

[48] Nor is there before me a request to vary the May 27, 2011 Agreement. The Agreement was not incorporated into any court order including the divorce order and, accordingly, the court has no jurisdiction to in any way alter the provisions of the Agreement.

[49] Thus, it is clear what the pleadings are not. This is important because it is a fundamental principle that pleadings are to contain a description of the nature of the relief claimed, and that parties are bound by their pleadings.

[50] The principle set out in Richardson, as relied upon in Willick v. Willick, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 670, referred to earlier in this decision, was provided in the context of an application to vary a divorce judgment pursuant to the provisions of s. 17(4) of the Divorce Act.

[51] That is not what is before me.

[52] Both parties, through their counsel, agreed that the issue to be decided by me was whether the husband should have been paying guideline child support from July 1, 2009, as opposed to May or June 2011, depending on the interpretation of the Agreement and, in particular, the provisions of paragraphs 6 and 11 thereof. I have already discussed how that would impact on the calculation of the credit toward the equalization payment.

[53] My task is not to alter the Agreement in any way, nor is it to ensure that the provisions of the Divorce Act, or the Family Law Act for that matter, were complied with. That would have been my task if the pleadings had been framed differently than they were. In family matters, Miglin v. Miglin, 2003 SCC 24, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 303, is often referenced for its warning against a strict commercial approach in family law litigation, however it can be distinguished from the matter before me. Unlike the applicant in Miglin, the wife is not seeking an order under s. 15 of the Divorce Act for the period in question. Therefore, I am to interpret the agreement based on contract principles, considered in the context of the parties’ separation and attempts to resolve the issues arising from the breakdown of their marriage.

[54] Having said that, I turn to the principles of contract interpretation.

Principles

[55] First, effect must be given to the intention of the parties. The Supreme Court of Canada in Consolidated-Bathurst v. Mutual Boiler, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 888 explained, at p. 901:

[T]he normal rules of construction lead a court to search for an interpretation which, from the whole of the contract, would appear to promote or advance the true intent of the parties at the time of entry into the contract. Consequently, literal meaning should not be applied where to do so would bring about an unrealistic result or a result which would not be contemplated in the commercial atmosphere in which the insurance was contracted. Where words may bear two constructions, the more reasonable one, that which produces a fair result, must certainly be taken as the interpretation which would promote the intention of the parties. Similarly, an interpretation which defeats the intention of the parties and their objective in entering into the commercial transaction in the first place should be discarded in favour of an interpretation of a policy which promotes a sensible commercial result.

[56] The Supreme Court provided further guidance in B.G. Checo International Ltd. v. British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 12, at pp. 23-24:

It is a cardinal rule of the construction of contracts that the various parts of the contract are to be interpreted in the context of the intentions of the parties as evident from the contract as a whole.

[57] And, the Ontario Court of Appeal, in MacDougall v. MacDougall, 262 D.L.R. (4th) 120, in applying that principle to domestic contracts said this, at para. 22:

Applying that principle to domestic contracts, a court must search for an interpretation that is in accordance with the parties’ intention at the time they entered into the contract. Where two interpretations are possible, the court should reject the one that would produce a result that the parties would not have reasonably expected at the time they entered into the contract. Instead, the court should favour an interpretation that promotes the reasonable expectations of the parties and that provides a sensible result in the family law context. To arrive at such an interpretation, the court must interpret the provision in the context of the entire contract, including the entirety of the section at issue, to discern the likely intention of the parties.

Application of the principles to the Agreement of May 27, 2011

[58] The surrounding circumstances or “factual matrix” must be considered: Sattva, at para. 46. The parties were attempting, with the assistance of counsel, to settle all of the issues arising from their separation. The Agreement clearly reflects this. The parties objectively intended to deal with the issues of equalization and child support, and develop a formula which did not necessitate any cash outlay on the part of the wife. Paragraph 6.i) confirms this.

[59] Paragraph 6.i) not only provided the formula for the set-off of child support against equalization, it also specifically restricted the husband’s ability to pursue the wife for any amounts owing on the equalization, even in the event of a change in custodial arrangements at subparagraphs (v) and (vi). This was part of the deal made between the parties.

[60] There are other provisions in the Agreement that reflect the parties’ intention to deal with all of the issues arising from their separation, in a manner that was final and binding.

[61] First, I refer to the second paragraph in the recital section of the Agreement:

AND WHEREAS the parties wish to provide for the orderly settlement of their affairs and their respective rights and obligations, including those respecting ownership in, or division of property, an support as more particularly herein set out;

[62] Then, I note paragraph 17, the enforcement clause:

The husband and the wife hereby consent to the incorporation of the provisions of this Separation Agreement into a Court Order at the request of either so far as may be made possible to enforce the provisions of this Agreement and each of the parties.

[63] I also note that paragraph 18 of the Agreement contains the usual releases, including, at subparagraph (5) the following under the heading “FULL AND FINAL SETTLEMENT”:

The support and property provisions of this Agreement are inextricably intertwined and constitute a full and final financial settlement.

[64] I note as well the provisions of paragraph 21(b) that “There are no representations, collateral agreements, warranties or conditions affecting this Agreement.”

[65] Finally, paragraphs 27 and 28 are relevant.

27. INDEPENDENT LEGAL ADVICE AND FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE

The husband and wife each represent and acknowledge that he or she:

d) has had independent legal advice, the husband by Gerald D. Brouillette, Barrister and Solicitor, and the wife by Jerome C. Gardner, Barrister and Solicitor;

e) has read the Agreement in its entirety or had it read to him or her and has full knowledge of the contents;

f) understands his or her respective rights and obligations under this Agreement, the nature of this Agreement and the consequences of this Agreement;

g) has made full and complete disclosure of his or her financial circumstances to the other, including but not limited to his or her income, assets and debts;

h) acknowledges that the terms of this Agreement are fair and reasonable;

i) is subject to no coercion or undue influence; and

j) is signing this Agreement voluntarily.

28. SOLICITOR’S ATTESTATION

Each solicitor signs this Agreement not only in his or her capacity as witness, but also to attest to the other party that he or she:

a) explained to the client the meaning and implications at law of each provision of this Agreement; and

b) is convinced that the client is of sound mind and is signing without duress.

[66] Having considered relevant portions of the Agreement itself, I turn my mind to other evidence that may inform the factual matrix. In doing so, I note that Sattva also instructs that there is a limit on evidence of the surrounding circumstances or “factual matrix”, at para. 58:

It should consist only of objective evidence of the background facts at the time of the execution of the contract (King, at paras. 66 and 70), that is, knowledge that was or reasonably ought to have been within the knowledge of both parties at or before the date of contracting.

[67] I have found the following important background facts from the evidence before me:

• The sum of $2,500 per month was agreed upon by the parties, as being appropriate from the date of the separation onward, to the date of the execution of the Agreement.
• According to her testimony, the wife, at all times believed that the sum of $2,500 was less than what the husband should have been paying. Nonetheless, she agreed to that amount.
• While she testified that she believed that the excess child support amount based on the guidelines that the husband would otherwise have been liable to pay was going to be adjusted retroactively, the Agreement does not reflect this. Paragraph 11 of the Agreement is clear and unambiguous:
  • (b) the incomes attributed to each of the parties is set out, without qualifier such as “estimated”.
  • (c) there is an acknowledgement, by both parties, that the child support of $2,500 is “consistent with the Child Support Guidelines, AND…that there are “no arrears of child support as of the date this agreement was signed.”
  • (f) the mechanism for ongoing disclosure of income information is set out. (I note here that both counsel were of the view that the trigger date of 2010 contained in this clause is of no particular import, but rather, simply reflects the fact that the original draft of the Agreement was exchanged one year earlier than the signature.)
• The income tax and other information required to calculate the amount of child support payable based on the Guidelines was available when the Agreement was negotiated and signed. Both parties indicated as much in their testimony. It is also not disputed that neither of them actually reviewed the income information, with their counsel or otherwise, before signing the Agreement. There is no suggestion that the husband failed to disclose his income information, or otherwise misrepresented his income for the period in question.

[68] The income information is part of the circumstances surrounding the entering into the Agreement, which includes facts known or reasonably ought to have been known to both parties at or before the date of contracting”: Sattva, at para. 60.

[69] Put another way, the information that the wife now says establishes that the husband was not discharging his obligation to pay child support in accordance with the guidelines and in accordance with his income, “ought to have been known to both parties” at the time of entering into the Agreement. That information cannot now be relied upon to alter the Agreement or interpret it to mean that the parties intended the husband to be responsible for child support in an amount in excess of $2,500 at any time prior to May or June of 2011.

[70] The Agreement, read as a whole, giving the words used their ordinary and grammatical meaning, consistent with the surrounding circumstances known (or those which ought to have been known and to which I have made reference above) to the husband and the wife at the time of negotiating and concluding the Agreement, supports the proposition put forward by the husband, and not that posited by the wife.

[71] While neither paragraph 6 or 11 provides a specific date on which the amount of child support shall be reviewed, what is clear is that:

a. notwithstanding that the actual income of each of the parties was different than the income amounts used in the Agreement, the parties agreed to use the income figures they did: $350,000 for the husband and $200,000 for the wife.

b. The parties agreed that the sum of $2,500 payable by the husband as child support based on the agreed upon incomes and the shared custody arrangement that existed at the time, was consistent with the Guidelines. In actual fact, I am advised that the $2,500 was slightly higher than the table amount based on the agreed upon incomes.

c. The parties agreed that the $2,500 child support payments had been made to and including the date of execution of the Agreement.

d. The parties agreed that there were no support arrears, as of the date of execution of the Agreement.

[72] Despite the fact that there is no fixed trigger date for the review of the child support, the Agreement makes it clear that the provisions of paragraph 6.i) (ii) could not be engaged until after May 27, 2011.

[73] For all of the above reasons, I am denying the wife’s request to interpret the agreement to provide that the wife is now entitled to the sum of $54,922 from the husband.

[74] The balance of the issues for trial are adjourned without a date, pending the delivery of minutes of settlement, failing which a new date for trial shall be set by the trial coordinator, at the request of the parties.

[75] In the event that the parties are unable to agree on costs, they are to communicate with the trial coordinator, within 30 days of the date of this decision, to fix a date and time to argue costs, failing which the parties will be taken to have agreed on costs, and no costs will be ordered to either party.

The Honourable Madam Justice Louise L. Gauthier

Released: May 1, 2017