Heather C. Mackay

The defendant, the Attorney General of Ontario, brought a Rule 21 motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' action on the ground that it was barred by a limitation period.

The plaintiffs, police officers, alleged negligence and misfeasance in public office by Crown counsel.

The court, applying the principles from Beardsley v. Ontario Provincial Police, found that the limitation period issue involved legal and factual complexities, including the discoverability of a potentially novel claim, and therefore should not be determined at a preliminary stage before pleadings were closed.

The preliminary question was decided in favour of the plaintiffs, and the motion to dismiss on this ground was denied.

The respondent was arrested during the G20 summit and filed a timely complaint against the arresting officers.

After receiving the investigative report, he discovered that higher-ranking officers may have ordered the arrests, prompting him to file a second complaint outside the six-month statutory period.

The Director of the OIPRD refused to deal with the second complaint, citing the time limit without further explanation.

The Divisional Court quashed the decision, finding the Director failed to apply discoverability principles and failed to provide adequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Director's appeal, affirming that discoverability applies to the screening of complaints and that the Director's cursory reasons were inadequate and unreasonable.

The applicants sought to set aside a single judge's decision quashing their application for judicial review on the basis of mootness.

The applicants argued that the judge should have applied the 'plain and obvious' test and referred the matter to a full panel.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, holding that the 'plain and obvious' test applies to defects on the face of a proceeding, whereas the Borowski test is the correct framework for determining mootness.

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the motions judge's discretionary decision to decline hearing the moot application.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his civil wrongful-conviction action as an abuse of process and alternatively staying it under s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The action alleged negligence, misfeasance, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, misrepresentation, and Charter breaches arising from the non-disclosure of potentially exculpatory alibi evidence in a murder prosecution.

The court held that the prior criminal reference did not determine all issues raised in the civil action and was not intended to bind future proceedings after the conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The motion judge also erred in relying on delay and changed positions by the appellant to justify a stay.

The appeal was allowed and the dismissal and stay orders were set aside.

The appellant, the Office of the Independent Police Review Director, appealed a Divisional Court order requiring it to produce a comprehensive record of proceedings under the Judicial Review Procedure Act (JRPA) after screening out the respondent's police complaints.

The Court of Appeal held that the Director's decision to screen out a complaint under the Police Services Act is the exercise of a statutory power of decision, as it decides a complainant's legal right to have their complaint pursued.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding the Divisional Court's order regarding the contents of the record was overly broad, and substituted a narrower requirement for the record of proceedings.

The plaintiff, whose murder conviction was quashed by the Court of Appeal after a reference, brought a civil action against the Crown and police alleging negligence and wrongdoing related to an undisclosed alibi.

The defendants moved to dismiss or stay the action.

The court dismissed the action as an abuse of process, finding that it sought to relitigate factual findings already made by the Court of Appeal regarding the absence of wrongdoing by the Crown and police.

The court also held that, alternatively, a permanent stay under s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act was warranted due to the impossibility of a fair trial given the passage of over 40 years, faded memories, and lost evidence.

The applicant brought a motion for an order compelling the Independent Police Review Director to file a record of proceedings in an application for judicial review.

The respondent argued it had no obligation to provide a record because its decision to screen out the applicant's complaint was not a statutory power of decision.

The Divisional Court held that the statutory scheme of the Police Services Act creates a right for the public to complain and a duty on the Director to deal with the complaint unless specific criteria apply.

Therefore, the decision to screen out a complaint constitutes a statutory power of decision, and the motion to compel the filing of the record was granted.

The applicant sought judicial review of two decisions by the Office of the Independent Police Review Director.

The Director had screened out a complaint regarding seized funds and confirmed a decision by the Hamilton Police Service not to proceed to a disciplinary hearing regarding allegations of excessive force.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to set aside a criminal conviction or order the return of funds on judicial review, and that the Director's decisions were reasonable.

Eight police officers sought judicial review of decisions by the Toronto Police Services Board allowing the Chief of Police to delay serving Notices of Hearing for public complaints arising from the G20 summit.

The respondents moved to dismiss the application for prematurity.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no exceptional circumstances to justify judicial review of an interlocutory administrative decision.

The court noted the officers had an adequate alternative remedy to raise the issue of prejudice caused by delay through an abuse of process motion before the hearing officer.

A reporter sought access under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act to records of communications among Ministry of the Attorney General officials regarding an ongoing, high-profile criminal prosecution of police officers.

The Ministry refused, relying on the exclusion in s. 65(5.2) for records relating to an ongoing prosecution.

An adjudicator ordered the records produced for an inquiry, interpreting the exclusion narrowly to require a 'substantial connection' and limiting it to documents in the Crown brief.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court quashed the order, holding that the adjudicator erred in law by reading in a substantial connection requirement and that the exclusion applied broadly to protect the integrity of ongoing criminal proceedings.

The appellant, a participant in the provincial Witness Protection Program, sued the government for breach of contract, negligence, and Charter violations after experiencing significant delays in receiving new identity documents and being terminated from the program.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that while the government's administration of the program was flawed and delayed, it had exceeded its financial obligations under the agreement, and the appellant's own conduct justified his termination from the program.

The appellants appealed an order striking paragraphs of their statements of defence without leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal held that while the paragraphs were properly struck for improperly relying on set-aside Commission findings and lacking clarity, the motion judge erred in refusing leave to amend.

The appeal was allowed in part to grant the appellants leave to amend their statements of defence.

The moving defendant, an assistant Crown Attorney, sought leave to appeal an order dismissing her motion for summary judgment in a malicious prosecution action.

The plaintiff had been charged with murder, but the charges were withdrawn after new evidence surfaced implicating another individual.

The motion judge found that while reasonable and probable grounds existed initially, there were disputed facts regarding the reasonableness of continuing the prosecution after the new evidence emerged.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflict of principle or good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision.

The appellant appealed a decision of a single judge of the Divisional Court directly to the Court of Appeal.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion and quashed the appeal, holding that the proper route for such an appeal is to the full panel of the Divisional Court under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The applicants sought judicial review and an order of mandamus to compel the Minister of Natural Resources to require public consultation and amendments to Forest Management Plans before two forestry companies could restructure their operations, close certain sawmills, and redirect wood supply.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Plans regulate forest operations and sustainability, not the processing of harvested wood at specific mills.

As the restructuring did not change the forest operations or impact sustainability, no Plan amendments or public consultations were required under the Crown Forest Sustainability Act.

The Children's Aid Society applied for judicial review of a Director's decision under s. 144 of the Child and Family Services Act to review the Society's refusal to place Crown ward children with extended family members for adoption.

The Divisional Court quashed the application, holding that the Director's decision to conduct a review was not a 'statutory power of decision' under the Judicial Review Procedure Act because it did not decide or prescribe anyone's legal rights.

In the alternative, the majority found the Director's decision to be reasonable and entitled to deference.

The appellant, a member of a police services board, appealed a decision of a civilian commission finding him guilty of misconduct.

The appellant argued that the panel lost jurisdiction due to a reasonable apprehension of bias, as the same three members who adjudicated the hearing had previously participated in the investigation and the decision to hold an inquiry.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the merging of investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions by the panel members created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The decisions of the commission were quashed and the matter was remitted for a re-hearing.