Mary M. Thomson

The appellant surgeon mistakenly cut the respondent's common bile duct during laparoscopic gallbladder surgery.

At trial, the judge found that the surgeon used proper techniques but breached the standard of care by failing to adopt reasonable precautions based on 'common sense'.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred in relying on common sense to find standard medical practices inadequate in a complex medical negligence case where expert evidence conflicted.

The defendants appealed a motion judge's decision refusing to stay an Ontario multi-jurisdictional class action in favour of a similar Saskatchewan class action that had been certified earlier.

The defendants argued that the principles of comity and full faith and credit constitutionally required the Ontario court to defer to the Saskatchewan certification order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge was not bound to stay the proceeding, particularly given a prior Ontario carriage decision that found the plaintiffs' counsel in the Saskatchewan action unsuitable to represent a national class.

The court also found that permitting two overlapping multi-jurisdictional class actions to proceed did not constitute an abuse of process.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee finding him guilty of professional misconduct and incompetence, revoking his license, and imposing a $25,000 costs award.

The misconduct stemmed from his failure to supervise an EEG clinic where a technician infected numerous patients with Hepatitis B. The Divisional Court upheld the misconduct findings but found the penalty of license revocation unreasonable, as the appellant posed no risk practicing solely as a neurologist.

The court substituted a two-year suspension and a lifetime ban from acting as a medical director, while upholding the costs award.

The appellant appealed a decision finding no conflict between a municipal by-law imposing development charges on commercial/industrial developments and a prior financing agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the agreement's silence regarding non-residential development charges did not create a conflict with the by-law under section 14(4) of the Development Charges Act.

The court affirmed that the by-law and the agreement could stand together.

The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of a medical malpractice action on summary judgment.

The respondents had relied on expert opinion evidence that the standard of care was met, while the plaintiffs had no expert evidence supporting negligence.

The court held that neither the alleged "high forceps" theory nor the "excessive force" theory raised a genuine issue for trial.

The appeal was dismissed and no costs were awarded.