3 total
Mental Health Act involuntary committal provisions for long-term detainees violate s. 7 of the Charter.
The appellant, a deaf individual with limited communication skills, was involuntarily committed under the Mental Health Act and detained in a maximum security psychiatric facility for 19 years.
He challenged the constitutionality of the involuntary committal provisions under s. 7 of the Charter and alleged a violation of his s. 15(1) equality rights due to inadequate sign language interpretation.
The Court of Appeal held that the Mental Health Act violates s. 7 when applied to long-term detainees because the Consent and Capacity Board lacks the authority to ensure that liberty is restricted no more than necessary.
The Court also found a violation of s. 15(1) due to the systemic failure to provide adequate interpretation services.
The Court severed the words 'or subsequent' from s. 20(4)(b)(iii) of the Act, suspending the declaration of invalidity for 12 months, and granted a declaration of the appellant's equality rights.
Judicial review of birth registration cancellation dismissed; written hearing satisfied procedural fairness and no bias found.
The applicant sought judicial review of the Registrar General's decision to cancel his birth registration under the Vital Statistics Act, following a criminal conviction where it was found he had assumed a false identity.
The applicant argued that delegating the decision to a Ministry lawyer created a reasonable apprehension of bias and that denying his request for a teleconference hearing breached procedural fairness.
The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias given the distinct roles within the Ministry, and concluding that a written hearing satisfied the duty of fairness as the applicant failed to provide new evidence conclusively impeaching the prior judicial finding of his identity.
Claim against police struck for lack of proximity establishing a private law duty.
The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike a statement of claim alleging negligence, breach of s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and misfeasance in public office arising from a drive‑by shooting committed by a third party.
The plaintiffs alleged that police had prior intelligence about the shooter and owed a private law duty of care to protect a narrow class of potential victims.
The court held that the pleadings did not establish a special relationship of proximity between the police and the victim sufficient to create a private law duty of care, distinguishing the case from Doe v. Metropolitan Toronto Commissioners of Police.
The Charter claim failed because the Charter does not impose a positive obligation on police to prevent harm, and the pleadings did not establish the elements of misfeasance in public office.
The Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim was struck with leave to amend.
