Jan D. Weir

The plaintiff sought the Court's approval to discontinue her proposed class proceeding against the Attorney General of Canada regarding the interpretation of "self-employment income" under the Canada Emergency Response Benefit Act.

The Court approved the discontinuance without costs, finding that the proposed class members would not be prejudiced because a recent Remission Order relieved individuals from repaying the CERB if they had applied based on gross rather than net self-employment income.

The plaintiff sued the estate of a deceased businessman, alleging he made an oral personal promise to pay a $330,432 debt owed to the plaintiff by an insolvent company he controlled.

The plaintiff claimed it provided consideration by forbearing from litigation and continuing to supply parts.

The court dismissed the claim, finding that the deceased only explained his intention to recapitalize the company from the sale of another business, which did not constitute a binding contract or personal guarantee.

Furthermore, the court found no consideration was given, as the deceased never requested forbearance from litigation.

The former wife brought a motion for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal a procedural order dismissing her motion for valuations, and for a stay pending appeal.

The motion was brought approximately 90 days after the deadline.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the evidence explaining the delay was inadequate and uncorroborated.

Furthermore, as the underlying order was procedural, the proposed appeal lacked merit.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the former husband.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order granting an adjournment of a summary judgment motion on the condition that the respondent's application for divorce be severed from the corollary issues.

The appellant argued the motion judge failed to consider whether the severance would disadvantage her under Rule 12(6) of the Family Law Rules.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge properly balanced the interests of both parties and that there was no evidence the appellant would be disadvantaged by the severance, given the terms of the parties' separation agreement.

Former employees and related parties moved for summary judgment dismissing a counterclaim alleging confidentiality breaches, fiduciary breaches, contractual breaches, inducement of breach, client solicitation, and misuse of confidential business information after the employees left to work for a competitor.

Applying the modern Rule 20 framework, the court held the record did not permit fair and just adjudication of most issues because key facts were disputed, credibility was engaged, and the claim and counterclaim substantially overlapped.

Partial summary judgment was nevertheless granted dismissing the fiduciary duty claim against the receptionist and apprentice hairstylist, as the record disclosed no basis on which either occupied a fiduciary position.

The balance of the action and counterclaim was ordered to proceed to trial, with motion costs left to the trial judge.

In a family trial following lengthy post-separation financial conflict, the court dismissed both parties' claims for post-separation accounting adjustments because the evidentiary record consisted largely of unreliable calculation charts unsupported by source documents.

The parties had agreed to equalization through a pension transfer, and a divorce was granted.

On child support, the court imputed income to the respondent based on his demonstrated standard of living and found him intentionally unemployed in the absence of admissible medical evidence establishing inability to work.

The court also imputed minimum-wage income to the applicant, found the adult daughter remained a child of the marriage while in full-time university studies, and ordered a formula for post-secondary expenses allocating net expenses 50 percent to the respondent, 25 percent to the applicant, and 25 percent to the child after disclosure and deduction of grants, bursaries, and scholarships.

On a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a spouse's corollary relief claim and preservation of a separation agreement, the court held the motion could not proceed because a pending Divisional Court appeal challenged an earlier severance order.

The court applied Rule 16(2) of the Family Law Rules, which prohibits deciding a claim that includes a divorce by summary judgment motion.

Given the unresolved validity of the severance, the court declined to hear the motion, converted the attendance into a case conference, and directed the parties to return after the appeal ruling.

Costs were deferred.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that granted her an adjournment of a summary judgment motion on the condition that the divorce be severed from corollary issues.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in principle by severing the divorce without specifically determining whether the moving party would be disadvantaged or prejudiced, as required by Rule 12(6) of the Family Law Rules.

The court found good reason to doubt the correctness of the order and that the issue was of sufficient importance to warrant leave.

Following a motion for interim injunctive relief in a civil action alleging conspiracy and tortious conduct related to protest activities, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The moving party had obtained a limited interim injunction restraining certain conduct but was denied broader relief, including a proposed order against unidentified persons and further examination of the defendant.

The defendant argued that success on several issues and his status as a public interest protester justified either a costs award in his favour or no costs order.

The court held that the moving party was the successful party overall because it obtained injunctive relief restraining unacceptable conduct.

However, because the moving party sought overly broad relief that was largely denied, the claimed costs were reduced and fixed at a lower amount.

The father appealed a trial judgment that transferred custody of his 16-year-old son to the mother due to severe parental alienation and authorized the mother to take the son to a specialized reunification workshop.

A stay of the trial judgment was previously granted.

The mother brought a motion to set aside the stay, and the son brought a motion for leave to intervene as an added party to the appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the mother's motion, finding the balance of convenience favoured maintaining the stay until the imminent appeal hearing.

The Court granted the son's motion to intervene, noting his age, the profound impact the order would have on his life, and the benefit of hearing his perspective, subject to terms preventing delay or the introduction of fresh evidence.

The appellants appealed an order refusing to set aside a previous order striking their pleading.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's conclusion that the proffered fresh evidence did not demonstrate any ground to set aside the order.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicant brought a motion to lift the automatic stay of a judgment pending appeal.

The parties consented to adjourn the motion but disagreed on the costs of the adjournment.

The respondents sought over $63,000 in costs incurred investigating the applicant's transfer of assets to family members, which allegedly rendered him judgment-proof.

The court fixed the costs of the adjournment at $20,000 payable forthwith by the applicant.

The appellant father appealed a trial judgment permitting the respondent mother, the children's primary caregiver, to relocate with the children to Germany.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to properly assess the children's best interests and misapprehended the section 30 assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the Gordon v. Goertz framework and made no palpable error in concluding that the loss of the primary caregiver would be more detrimental than the loss of familiar surroundings.

Fresh evidence regarding the appellant's employment was also rejected as it would not have altered the outcome.

The appellant guaranteed her husband's business loans and provided a collateral mortgage on her home.

The bank later agreed to replace the guarantee with a new conventional mortgage, but subsequently sued on the original guarantee, which the appellant settled.

When the bank sued to enforce the new mortgage, the appellant raised defences of negligence, unconscionability, misrepresentation, and undue influence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the defences against enforcement, finding the appellant had independent legal advice and entered the transaction freely, rebutting any presumption of undue influence.

However, the Court allowed an equitable set-off against the mortgage debt for the damages the appellant suffered when the bank breached its agreement by suing on the original guarantee.

The appellant signed a distributorship and membership agreement with a company that was never legally incorporated due to restrictions under the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The respondent sued on a promissory note related to the agreement.

The trial judge initially dismissed the action, finding the contracting company was not a legal entity.

However, after allowing a motion to call further evidence, the trial judge reversed her decision, finding the unincorporated company and a similarly named incorporated company were the same entity.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in reversing her initial, well-reasoned decision based on inadequate clerical evidence.

The contract was formed with a non-legal entity and was therefore unenforceable.