Susan Loraine Adam Metzler

At a trial management conference in a long-running family law proceeding, the court addressed trial preparation, disclosure issues, expert reports, and scheduling.

The dispute involved claims for equalization of net family property, an unequal division of property, constructive trust, spousal support, residual child support issues, and costs.

The court emphasized the proportionality principle under Rule 2.09 of the Family Law Rules and rejected the applicant’s intention to call an excessive number of witnesses.

Directions were issued concerning the delivery of expert reports, appraisal access to the matrimonial home, disclosure of financial records, and the use of will-say statements.

The court set a 20‑day trial beginning May 3, 2015 and imposed procedural orders to ensure efficient trial management.

The applicant filed an application alleging discrimination with respect to goods and services because of race and place of origin, claiming that cigarettes he purchased from the respondent's gas station were poisoned.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant stated he would rely only on his own testimony about his experiences and had no other evidence to support his allegations.

The Tribunal concluded there was no reasonable prospect the applicant could successfully prove the cigarettes were poisoned as alleged and dismissed the application.

The applicants, a non-Catholic student and his father, sought an exemption from mandatory attendance at liturgies and religious retreats at a Roman Catholic secondary school.

The school board refused, arguing these activities were not 'programs or courses of study in religious education' under section 42(13) of the Education Act.

The Divisional Court held that liturgies and retreats are planned series of events with a central purpose of religious education and experience, thus qualifying as programs under the Act.

The application for judicial review was allowed, and the student was granted the exemption.

The Canadian Civil Liberties Association and the Mental Health Legal Committee brought motions for leave to intervene as friends of the court in an upcoming appeal concerning the constitutionality of the involuntary detention provisions of the Mental Health Act.

The appellant supported the motions, while the respondent Crown and mental health facility opposed them, arguing the proposed interventions would be duplicative or raise new issues.

The Court of Appeal granted both motions, finding that the proposed interveners had special expertise, would make useful contributions without duplicating the appellant's arguments, and that the new legal arguments raised did not require fresh evidence or cause prejudice to the respondents.

Following the closure of a refinery, 18 former employees filed human rights applications alleging that the employer discriminated against them on the basis of age, disability, gender, and family status by failing to rehire them for other positions within the company.

The applicants relied primarily on statistical evidence and a management ranking list.

The Tribunal found that the statistical evidence did not support an inference of discrimination and that the ranking list was based on performance rather than discriminatory factors.

After reviewing the individual circumstances of each applicant, the Tribunal concluded that none had established a prima facie case of discrimination or provided sufficient circumstantial evidence to infer that protected grounds played a role in the hiring decisions.

The applications were dismissed.

The applicant, an Italian court-appointed interim guardian for an incapable retired priest, sought an order that the Ontario court decline jurisdiction over his guardianship.

The respondents, who held powers of attorney and sought to be appointed guardians in Ontario, argued that Ontario had jurisdiction based on the priest's connections to Canada and Canon Law.

The court determined that the priest had abandoned his Canadian domicile of choice and reverted to his Italian domicile of origin before becoming incapable.

Consequently, the court declined jurisdiction, deferred to the Italian court, and terminated the powers of attorney as they were executed while the priest was incapable.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that largely denied his motion to change child and spousal support and ordered him to pay significant arrears.

He argued the trial judge erred by denying an adjournment to retain counsel, imputing income without sufficient evidence, and ordering him to pay 100 percent of horse-related section 7 expenses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in refusing the adjournment, had a sufficient basis to impute income due to the appellant's failure to provide financial information, and correctly treated the horse-related expenses as section 7 expenses.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination with respect to services because of disability regarding the Law School Admission Test (LSAT).

In this interim decision, the Tribunal addressed the applicant's failure to provide pre-hearing disclosure and his requests for an adjournment, further production, and to amend the application.

The Tribunal denied the adjournment request, finding no exceptional circumstances, and directed the applicant to comply with his disclosure obligations.

The respondent was directed to respond to the production and amendment requests.

The appellant's application for leave to appeal a child custody order was previously dismissed.

The parties subsequently made costs submissions, with the respondent seeking substantial indemnity costs and the appellant seeking no order as to costs.

The Court of Appeal declined to award costs to the successful respondent, departing from the presumption under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules.

The court found that the circumstances surrounding the appealed order were extraordinary, neither party behaved unreasonably, and the procedural issues were unusually complex.

The appellant mother sought leave to appeal a consent order granting shared custody of a two-year-old child, arguing her consent was obtained under duress due to the motion judge's comments.

The Court of Appeal majority held that the order was indeed a consent order requiring leave to appeal under s. 133(a) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The majority established that leave to appeal a consent order involving children requires an arguable case that the order was not in the child's best interests or that consent was vitiated by factors like duress.

Finding no evidence of duress on the record, the majority dismissed the application for leave to appeal, without prejudice to the mother bringing a motion to set aside the order under rule 59.06(2).

The dissenting judge would have granted leave and allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in principle by failing to fully consider the child's best interests.

The applicant, a part-time cook/cleaner at a parish, took an eight-month leave of absence after sustaining physical injuries at another job.

When she attempted to return to work, the parish pastor informed her that her employment was terminated and her replacement would be kept on.

The applicant alleged discrimination on the basis of disability and age.

The Tribunal found that the respondents discriminated against the applicant because of her disability by failing to accommodate her return to work and terminating her employment.

The age discrimination allegation was dismissed due to insufficient evidence.

The Tribunal awarded $5,000 for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect, and ordered human rights training and policy updates.

The applicant alleged that the respondent appraiser discriminated against him in the provision of services by undervaluing his home due to its proximity to the Douglas Creek Estates First Nations land dispute.

The applicant argued that the appraiser's use of the term 'native occupation' and his selection of comparators demonstrated an anti-native bias that negatively affected the appraisal.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, finding no evidence that the appraiser intentionally undervalued the property or that considering the unresolved land dispute as a factor in the neighbourhood's property values was discriminatory.

The applicants, former employees of a closed refinery, alleged age and disability discrimination when they were not hired for new positions within the respondent company.

The Tribunal heard the evidence of the lead applicant, who alleged his placement on an attendance management program negatively impacted his performance ranking and subsequent failure to be hired.

The Tribunal found the statistical evidence unreliable and concluded the lead applicant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that his disability played a role in his performance assessment, ranking, or the decision not to hire him.

The appellant appealed an order regarding spousal support and the construction of a 1994 consent judgment.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's findings of fact, application of law, or assessment of accounting evidence.

However, based on fresh evidence admitted on appeal, the court found the trial judge's calculation of the appellant's entitlement to pension benefits fell short by $280 per month.

The court varied the order to increase support payments by $280 per month retroactively, but otherwise dismissed the appeal.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's judicial review application, the respondents sought costs against the applicant's counsel, the African Legal Clinic (ACLC).

The respondents argued the ACLC was the real litigant and made extreme allegations.

The Divisional Court dismissed the request, finding no evidence of reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous conduct by the ACLC.

The court also noted the matter raised novel issues of public importance, making a costs award inappropriate.

No costs were ordered.

The applicant sought judicial review of a school board decision upholding her son's limited expulsion for bringing a concealed knife to school and threatening another student.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the principal's inquiry and the board's appeal hearing were procedurally fair.

The court held that the board's decision was not patently unreasonable and that the expulsion did not violate the student's or parent's section 7 Charter rights.

The appellant appealed a decision interpreting Clause 2.7 of an asset purchase agreement.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the clause was clear and unambiguous, producing a commercially reasonable result.

The court upheld the refusal to admit extrinsic evidence or direct a trial on the rectification claim, and dismissed the claim against Stikeman Elliott.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant husband appealed a variation of a spousal support order that reduced his monthly payments from $800 to $680 but included an automatic annual increase based on his income.

The Court of Appeal panel first determined that under the Courts of Justice Act, jurisdiction to hear the appeal lay with the Divisional Court because the periodic payments amounted to less than $25,000 annually.

Reconstituted as a Divisional Court panel, the court upheld the reduction in support but set aside the automatic annual increase, finding the application judge had no jurisdiction under the Divorce Act to make such an order.

The appellants appealed an order enforcing Minutes of Settlement reached at mediation.

They argued that one appellant had not signed the settlement and had not agreed to its contents.

The court held that the other appellant signed on her behalf as her agent and that both defendants were represented by counsel at the mediation.

The Minutes of Settlement were valid and enforceable, and the appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicant sought an interim stay pending leave to appeal under s. 65.1 of the Supreme Court Act, after a judge of the Court of Appeal had previously refused the relief.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the application, holding that successive applications for a stay should only be permitted in special circumstances.

The Court found no special circumstances to warrant re-examining the lower court judge's conclusion that there was no serious question to be tried.