Susan Loraine Adam Metzler

The applicant, an Italian court-appointed interim guardian for an incapable retired priest, sought an order that the Ontario court decline jurisdiction over his guardianship.

The respondents, who held powers of attorney and sought to be appointed guardians in Ontario, argued that Ontario had jurisdiction based on the priest's connections to Canada and Canon Law.

The court determined that the priest had abandoned his Canadian domicile of choice and reverted to his Italian domicile of origin before becoming incapable.

Consequently, the court declined jurisdiction, deferred to the Italian court, and terminated the powers of attorney as they were executed while the priest was incapable.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that largely denied his motion to change child and spousal support and ordered him to pay significant arrears.

He argued the trial judge erred by denying an adjournment to retain counsel, imputing income without sufficient evidence, and ordering him to pay 100 percent of horse-related section 7 expenses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in refusing the adjournment, had a sufficient basis to impute income due to the appellant's failure to provide financial information, and correctly treated the horse-related expenses as section 7 expenses.

The appellant's application for leave to appeal a child custody order was previously dismissed.

The parties subsequently made costs submissions, with the respondent seeking substantial indemnity costs and the appellant seeking no order as to costs.

The Court of Appeal declined to award costs to the successful respondent, departing from the presumption under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules.

The court found that the circumstances surrounding the appealed order were extraordinary, neither party behaved unreasonably, and the procedural issues were unusually complex.

The appellant mother sought leave to appeal a consent order granting shared custody of a two-year-old child, arguing her consent was obtained under duress due to the motion judge's comments.

The Court of Appeal majority held that the order was indeed a consent order requiring leave to appeal under s. 133(a) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The majority established that leave to appeal a consent order involving children requires an arguable case that the order was not in the child's best interests or that consent was vitiated by factors like duress.

Finding no evidence of duress on the record, the majority dismissed the application for leave to appeal, without prejudice to the mother bringing a motion to set aside the order under rule 59.06(2).

The dissenting judge would have granted leave and allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in principle by failing to fully consider the child's best interests.

The appellant appealed an order regarding spousal support and the construction of a 1994 consent judgment.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's findings of fact, application of law, or assessment of accounting evidence.

However, based on fresh evidence admitted on appeal, the court found the trial judge's calculation of the appellant's entitlement to pension benefits fell short by $280 per month.

The court varied the order to increase support payments by $280 per month retroactively, but otherwise dismissed the appeal.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's judicial review application, the respondents sought costs against the applicant's counsel, the African Legal Clinic (ACLC).

The respondents argued the ACLC was the real litigant and made extreme allegations.

The Divisional Court dismissed the request, finding no evidence of reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous conduct by the ACLC.

The court also noted the matter raised novel issues of public importance, making a costs award inappropriate.

No costs were ordered.

The applicant sought judicial review of a school board decision upholding her son's limited expulsion for bringing a concealed knife to school and threatening another student.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the principal's inquiry and the board's appeal hearing were procedurally fair.

The court held that the board's decision was not patently unreasonable and that the expulsion did not violate the student's or parent's section 7 Charter rights.

The appellant appealed a decision interpreting Clause 2.7 of an asset purchase agreement.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the clause was clear and unambiguous, producing a commercially reasonable result.

The court upheld the refusal to admit extrinsic evidence or direct a trial on the rectification claim, and dismissed the claim against Stikeman Elliott.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant husband appealed a variation of a spousal support order that reduced his monthly payments from $800 to $680 but included an automatic annual increase based on his income.

The Court of Appeal panel first determined that under the Courts of Justice Act, jurisdiction to hear the appeal lay with the Divisional Court because the periodic payments amounted to less than $25,000 annually.

Reconstituted as a Divisional Court panel, the court upheld the reduction in support but set aside the automatic annual increase, finding the application judge had no jurisdiction under the Divorce Act to make such an order.

The appellants appealed an order enforcing Minutes of Settlement reached at mediation.

They argued that one appellant had not signed the settlement and had not agreed to its contents.

The court held that the other appellant signed on her behalf as her agent and that both defendants were represented by counsel at the mediation.

The Minutes of Settlement were valid and enforceable, and the appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicant sought an interim stay pending leave to appeal under s. 65.1 of the Supreme Court Act, after a judge of the Court of Appeal had previously refused the relief.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the application, holding that successive applications for a stay should only be permitted in special circumstances.

The Court found no special circumstances to warrant re-examining the lower court judge's conclusion that there was no serious question to be tried.