George Andrew Bougadis

The plaintiff S.M. brought a motion to strike his jury notice, filed in 2014, seeking to proceed with a judge-alone trial in March 2021 due to anticipated delays in jury trials caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The primary defendant, Ero Longo, opposed the motion.

The court applied the "justice better served" test, considering factors such as the substantive right to a jury trial, the extent of delay, and the practicalities of trial scheduling.

The court found that a six-month delay to an October 2021 jury trial blitz was not unconscionable, especially given the plaintiff's own delays in the action and the availability of retrofitted court facilities.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate sufficient prejudice beyond delay or that a judge-alone trial would better serve justice.

The motion was dismissed, the March 2021 trial dates were vacated, and the case was placed on the October 2021 trial blitz for an in-person jury trial.

The issue of striking the jury was left open for future reconsideration if the October trial does not proceed.

This costs endorsement followed a trial where claims of negligence against a regional municipality were dismissed, along with related Family Law Act claims and a cross-claim.

The successful municipality sought partial indemnity costs.

The court considered factors under Rule 57.01, including the complexity, importance, and length of the 23-day trial, as well as the conduct of counsel and the financial circumstances of the unsuccessful plaintiffs.

The court found the municipality's requested costs somewhat high and the opposing parties' proposals somewhat low.

A total partial indemnity costs award of $365,000.00 (inclusive of fees and disbursements) was made in favor of the municipality, apportioned 65% to the plaintiffs and 35% to the co-defendant, whose interests were largely aligned with the plaintiffs due to a Mary Carter agreement.

The plaintiffs appealed an order of a Master requiring partial disclosure of a Mary Carter Agreement to a non-settling defendant in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The appellants argued the agreement was protected by settlement privilege and that disclosure would undermine settlement incentives and exceed the Master's jurisdiction.

The court reviewed Ontario jurisprudence on Mary Carter Agreements and emphasized that while settlement privilege applies, such agreements may require disclosure where they alter the adversarial landscape of the litigation.

The court held that the Master properly exercised discretion in ordering limited disclosure to ensure fairness to the non-settling defendant and to maintain the integrity of the adversarial process.

The appeal was dismissed and the order for partial disclosure upheld.