George Andrew Bougadis

The applicant sought $25,000 for a dental treatment plan following a motor vehicle accident.

The respondent insurer denied the claim, arguing the dental issues were caused by pre-existing periodontal disease rather than the accident.

The Tribunal applied the 'but for' test and found the accident was a necessary cause of the rapid deterioration of the applicant's dental health, relying on the opinion of the applicant's dental surgeon.

The Tribunal concluded the proposed treatment was reasonable and necessary, ordering the respondent to pay for the treatment plan plus interest.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought various medical and rehabilitation benefits, as well as the cost of several assessments, which the respondent insurer denied.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found that the applicant was entitled to the cost of a top cover foam mattress, chiropractic, physiotherapy, and massage services, and an orthopaedic assessment, as these were reasonable and necessary for her recovery.

However, the Tribunal dismissed the claims for a psychological assessment and an occupational therapy assessment, finding them unnecessary given prior assessments and a lack of supporting evidence.

The applicant was also awarded interest on overdue payments.

The plaintiff, a person under disability following a motor vehicle accident, applied for approval of a combined tort and accident benefits settlement of $1,525,000.

The court reviewed the proposed legal fees and disbursements under a contingency agreement, approving the fees but reducing the payable disbursements to only those recovered from the insurer, as per the agreement's terms.

The court declined to approve the proposed structured settlement, ordering plaintiff's counsel to file a case manager report demonstrating how the structure would meet the plaintiff's future needs.

The plaintiff S.M. brought a motion to strike his jury notice, filed in 2014, seeking to proceed with a judge-alone trial in March 2021 due to anticipated delays in jury trials caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The primary defendant, Ero Longo, opposed the motion.

The court applied the "justice better served" test, considering factors such as the substantive right to a jury trial, the extent of delay, and the practicalities of trial scheduling.

The court found that a six-month delay to an October 2021 jury trial blitz was not unconscionable, especially given the plaintiff's own delays in the action and the availability of retrofitted court facilities.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate sufficient prejudice beyond delay or that a judge-alone trial would better serve justice.

The motion was dismissed, the March 2021 trial dates were vacated, and the case was placed on the October 2021 trial blitz for an in-person jury trial.

The issue of striking the jury was left open for future reconsideration if the October trial does not proceed.

The applicant was injured in a motorcycle accident and sought medical benefits for two treatment plans proposing chiropractic and massage therapy.

The respondent insurer denied the plans, arguing they were not reasonable and necessary based on insurer examinations.

The Tribunal found the applicant's family physician and treating clinic records established the treatments were reasonable and necessary, noting the applicant's condition deteriorated when therapy stopped.

The Tribunal ordered the respondent to pay for both treatment plans with interest.

The applicant sought medical benefits for psychological treatment following a motor vehicle accident.

The respondent insurer denied the treatment plans.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found that the applicant failed to prove the treatment plans were reasonable and necessary.

The applicant had returned to work, was independent in self-care, and denied a desire for psychotherapy.

Insurer examinations concluded the applicant did not evidence clinically significant symptoms of mental illness and had reached maximum medical improvement.

The application was dismissed.

This costs endorsement followed a trial where claims of negligence against a regional municipality were dismissed, along with related Family Law Act claims and a cross-claim.

The successful municipality sought partial indemnity costs.

The court considered factors under Rule 57.01, including the complexity, importance, and length of the 23-day trial, as well as the conduct of counsel and the financial circumstances of the unsuccessful plaintiffs.

The court found the municipality's requested costs somewhat high and the opposing parties' proposals somewhat low.

A total partial indemnity costs award of $365,000.00 (inclusive of fees and disbursements) was made in favor of the municipality, apportioned 65% to the plaintiffs and 35% to the co-defendant, whose interests were largely aligned with the plaintiffs due to a Mary Carter agreement.

The plaintiff was catastrophically injured in a single motor vehicle collision when the vehicle, driven by the defendant driver, lost control after traversing a dip in a rural road.

The plaintiff sued the driver and the municipality, alleging the road was in a state of non-repair.

The plaintiff and the driver entered into a Mary Carter agreement and jointly pursued the municipality for liability.

The court found that the dip in the road did not constitute a state of non-repair, as it did not pose an unreasonable risk to an ordinary reasonable driver.

The court concluded the collision was caused by the driver's excessive speed and distraction from opening a beverage bottle.

The action against the municipality was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave under Rule 48.04(1) to seek payment of expert fees, amend its statement of claim, and obtain certificates of pending litigation (CPL) after the action was set down for trial.

The Master granted leave due to the defendants' ongoing failure to comply with production orders, which constituted a substantial and unexpected change in circumstances.

The defendants were ordered to pay $10,000 in wasted expert fees caused by their piecemeal production.

While leave to amend the statement of claim was granted, the request for CPLs was dismissed because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a reasonable claim to an interest in land, as the underlying agreement did not establish a fiduciary relationship or joint venture.

A dispute arose after the defendant purchased a winning $2 million scratch lottery ticket while in a romantic relationship with the plaintiff and living with her parents.

The plaintiff claimed the parties had agreed to share lottery winnings, while the parents argued they owned the winnings because the ticket was purchased using their company's debit card.

The court held that the evidence did not establish any express or implied agreement between the romantic partners to share the winnings and rejected claims of constructive trust or unjust enrichment.

The court further found that the parents had implicitly permitted the debit card use and had no entitlement to the proceeds.

The winnings belonged solely to the defendant, subject only to a small damages award relating to a lost deposit caused by a freezing order obtained by the plaintiff.

The appellants appealed an order requiring them to produce an edited copy of a Mary Carter Agreement to the respondent municipality.

The appellants argued that they were only required to disclose the existence of the agreement, not its terms.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the terms of a Mary Carter Agreement that change the litigation landscape must be disclosed to the court and to non-settling parties to ensure procedural fairness and maintain the integrity of the adversarial process.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order requiring them to produce a partially redacted copy of a Mary Carter Agreement to a non-settling defendant prior to trial.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding that there were conflicting decisions on the extent to which the terms of Mary Carter Agreements must be disclosed to non-settling parties, and that there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the order in light of recent Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence on settlement privilege.

The court held that the issue was of general public importance.

The plaintiffs appealed an order of a Master requiring partial disclosure of a Mary Carter Agreement to a non-settling defendant in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The appellants argued the agreement was protected by settlement privilege and that disclosure would undermine settlement incentives and exceed the Master's jurisdiction.

The court reviewed Ontario jurisprudence on Mary Carter Agreements and emphasized that while settlement privilege applies, such agreements may require disclosure where they alter the adversarial landscape of the litigation.

The court held that the Master properly exercised discretion in ordering limited disclosure to ensure fairness to the non-settling defendant and to maintain the integrity of the adversarial process.

The appeal was dismissed and the order for partial disclosure upheld.

The appellants appealed an order of the motion judge regarding the validity of an assignment of an action by a bankruptcy trustee.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge misapprehended a critical fact, as the action was assigned by the trustee before its discharge in accordance with s. 40(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, not after.

The creditors had been informed and declined to fund the action.

The appeal was allowed and paragraph 21(i) of the Statement of Claim was reinstated.