Shantona Chaudhury

The appellants appealed the Ontario Securities Commission's decisions finding them liable for securities fraud and imposing severe sanctions, including lifetime trading bans, disgorgement, and administrative penalties.

The appellants argued that the presiding commissioner was biased, that their counsel at the hearing was incompetent and in a conflict of interest, and that the findings of fraud and the penalties were unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, rejecting the fresh evidence regarding counsel's competence as it would not have affected the outcome, and concluding that the Commission's findings on fraud and sanctions were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

This decision addresses the costs for a three-day trial where the plaintiffs were largely successful.

The court considered the plaintiffs' Rule 49 offer to settle, which they argued triggered substantial indemnity costs, and the defendants' arguments against it, including the implied withdrawal of the offer by subsequent settlement discussions.

The court found that the plaintiffs' Rule 49 offer was not implicitly withdrawn by subsequent non-Rule 49 offers, distinguishing prior case law.

The court also assessed the reasonableness of the plaintiffs' claimed costs under Rule 57.01, reducing them due to excessive lawyer time, duplication of effort, and disallowing a specific disbursement for a legal opinion deemed unnecessary.

Ultimately, the defendants were ordered to pay the plaintiffs $147,966.49 in costs.

This endorsement resolves five outstanding issues between the parties following a prior judgment (2017 ONSC 5680).

The court determined that the quantum of the judgment should not be deferred despite ongoing related proceedings, that simple interest applies to the loan amounts, and accepted the defendants' position on pre-judgment interest for the deposit.

The court also affirmed that Tzimas J. remains the case management judge for outstanding cross-claims and lease issues, and ordered the Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) to be removed at the plaintiffs' expense.

The plaintiffs entered into a complex series of agreements to purchase a commercial property from the defendants.

The plaintiffs advanced approximately $2 million to the defendants prior to closing.

The transaction failed to close on the extended closing date of September 18, 2015.

The court found that neither party was ready, willing, and able to close on that date, as the plaintiffs lacked financing and the defendants' tender was deficient.

The court determined that $1,735,000 of the advanced funds was a loan bearing 12% interest, for which the individual defendants were jointly and severally liable, and the remaining $225,000 was a deposit.

The court ordered the return of all funds to the plaintiffs, lifted the certificate of pending litigation, and dismissed the defendants' counterclaim for damages.

Following the dismissal of a proposed $2 billion class action regarding the Rana Plaza collapse in Bangladesh, the successful defendants sought costs totaling over $2.3 million.

The plaintiffs and the Class Proceedings Fund argued for no costs, asserting the case was novel and brought in the public interest.

The court rejected these arguments, finding the claims were grounded in established negligence principles and prosecuted aggressively with an expectation of costs.

The court awarded the defendants their claimed costs in full on a partial indemnity scale.

Following a certification motion in a proposed class action by former junior hockey players seeking minimum wage and overtime pay, the court determined the costs awards.

The plaintiffs succeeded in certifying the action against the Canadian teams but failed against the American teams.

The court awarded the plaintiffs $1,212,065.63 in partial indemnity costs, with $500,000 payable forthwith and the balance in the cause.

The American teams were awarded $200,000 in costs, which the court ordered to be credited against the plaintiffs' award, akin to a Bullock or Sanderson order, reflecting that both sides were responsible for the excessive litigation expense.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The appellants, The Regional Municipality of Sudbury and The City of Greater Sudbury, appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice dated November 17, 2015.

The appeal was unsuccessful.

The court awarded costs to the respondents in the amount of $95,000, inclusive of disbursements and all applicable taxes.

A tragic motor vehicle accident occurred on November 22, 2000, when a 20-year-old driver lost control of her vehicle on a snow-covered regional road during a winter storm and collided with an oncoming school bus, sustaining catastrophic injuries.

The plaintiff and her family sued the municipality for negligence, alleging failure to maintain the road in a reasonable state of repair under the Municipal Act.

At trial, the municipality was found 100% liable for approximately $12 million in damages.

On appeal, the municipality challenged the trial judge's findings regarding statutory defences under sections 284(1.2) and 284(1.3) of the Municipal Act and the trial judge's rejection of a contributory negligence claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding that the municipality had actual or constructive knowledge of the risk of road refreezing and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the hazardous conditions that caused the accident.

On remand from the Supreme Court of Canada following the Ledcor decision, the Court of Appeal for Ontario reconsidered its earlier dismissal of a class action appeal.

The appellant challenged Bell Mobility's seizure of prepaid credits, arguing that Bell's contractual terms and subsequent communications created an obligation to wait until after expiry before seizing funds.

The court affirmed its previous decision, holding that the expiry date was determined at the time of top-up purchase and reflected in the PIN receipts and phone cards, not in subsequent reminder messages or account page displays.

The court found that the appellant's real complaint concerned misrepresentation or promissory estoppel, neither of which were amenable to class proceeding resolution.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal and cross-appeal in a civil matter.

The respondents (Jarbeaus) were successful on the cross-appeal while the appellant (McLean) was unsuccessful on the appeal.

The court awarded costs to the Jarbeaus in the amount of $75,000, allocated as $18,000 to the cross-appeal and $57,000 to the appeal, inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

The court declined to fix prejudgment interest or vary the trial costs award of $231,000.

The respondents purchased a defective new home from a builder and hired a negligent lawyer who failed to sue the engineer within the limitation period, incorrectly advising them they had no cause of action against the engineer.

After settling their first action, the respondents sued the lawyer for negligence.

The trial judge admitted the lawyer's negligence but characterized both the jury's damage assessments (cost to repair at $433,000 and diminution in value at $265,000) as perverse, awarded judgment for the lesser amount of $190,000 (after deducting the settlement amount), and significantly reduced the respondents' costs despite them bettering their settlement offer.

The Court of Appeal allowed the cross-appeal, finding the jury's assessments were not perverse, that damages should be awarded on a cost-to-repair basis at $433,000 without deducting the settlement amount, and that the respondents were entitled to substantial indemnity costs under Rule 49.10.

Two consortia of law firms appealed a carriage dispute over a multi-billion dollar securities class action against Barrick Gold Corporation.

The motion judge awarded carriage to the Rochon consortium, preferring their broader claims and more extensive preparation over the Koskie consortium's streamlined approach.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the motion judge's application of the Vitapharm factors.

The Court affirmed that the ultimate question on a carriage motion is which action is more likely to advance the interests of the class, and the motion judge's exercise of discretion in balancing the relevant factors is entitled to considerable deference.

The Attorney General of Ontario appealed a motion judge's decision that allowed an Ontario supervisory judge to sit outside the province with judges from British Columbia and Quebec to hear motions regarding a national class action settlement, without requiring a video link to an Ontario courtroom.

The Court of Appeal held that while superior courts have the inherent jurisdiction to conduct hearings outside their home province, the open court principle under section 135 of the Courts of Justice Act requires a video link to a reasonably accessible Ontario courtroom.

The appeal was allowed to amend the order to require a video link.

The appellant and respondent reached a settlement in a copyright infringement class action, which the motion judge refused to approve.

The appellant appealed the refusal to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that an order refusing to approve a class action settlement is an interlocutory order, not a final order, because the litigation continues and the merits of the case remain to be determined.

Therefore, jurisdiction to hear the appeal lies with the Divisional Court, with leave, rather than the Court of Appeal.

The plaintiff appealed the dismissal of a motion to certify a class action against the Toronto Police Services Board arising from mass detentions during the 2010 G20 summit.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the requirements for certification under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 were met.

The court certified two separate class actions: one for five location-based subclasses who were allegedly arbitrarily detained by police cordons, and another for individuals held at a specially created detention centre.

The appellants, representing former Barbados participating policyholders of Manulife, brought a class action for negligence.

They claimed Manulife owed them a duty of care to protect their interests when it transferred their policies to another insurer in 1996, three years before Manulife demutualized and distributed $9 billion to its participating policyholders.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that while harm was foreseeable, policy reasons negated a duty of care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the claim was for pure economic loss and did not fall within established categories.

The Court found no prima facie duty of care because the relationship lacked sufficient proximity, as the policyholders had no legally recognized right to share in a future demutualization at the time of the transfer, and the governing legislation permitted Manulife to terminate the relationship.

The appellants, two municipalities, appealed a trial judgment apportioning them 2/3 liability for a motor vehicle accident that rendered two young women quadriplegic.

The trial judge found the unlit, unmarked rural road was in a state of non-repair due to a dangerous 'accident hill' that blinded drivers.

The respondents cross-appealed, arguing the driver's 1/3 liability should be reduced to 10 percent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding the trial judge's factual conclusions were amply supported by the evidence and his apportionment of fault was entitled to substantial deference.

The appellant obstetrician appealed a trial judgment finding him negligent in the forceps delivery of an infant who suffered catastrophic brain injuries due to an umbilical cord prolapse.

The trial judge found the appellant breached the standard of care by disengaging the fetal head during the procedure.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in discharging the jury, finding negligence, and assessing causation.

The respondents cross-appealed the future care costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding the trial judge's decision to discharge the jury was reasonable, his factual findings on negligence were supported by the record, and the damages award was fair.

The appellant, who was struck on the head with rollerblades by a fellow student in the schoolyard when she was six years old, appealed the dismissal of her negligence action against the school board.

She argued that the absence of an incident report and the presence of rollerblades contrary to school policy compelled a finding of negligent supervision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the incident occurred suddenly and without warning, and that the appellant failed to establish a breach of the duty of care owed by the school.

The appellant suffered severe physical and psychological injuries, including a leg amputation and clinical depression, in a motor vehicle accident.

He sought enhanced statutory accident benefits, arguing he was catastrophically impaired.

The trial judge held that physical and psychological impairments could not be combined under section 2(1.1)(f) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule to meet the 55 per cent whole person impairment threshold.

The Court of Appeal reversed this decision, finding that the language of the Schedule, the purpose of the American Medical Association's Guides, and the goals of the statutory scheme permit the combination of physical and psychiatric impairments to determine catastrophic impairment.