Shantona Chaudhury

The appellants sought $207,612.83 in partial indemnity costs for the appeal against the respondent Dr. Librach, who proposed $101,571.06.

The Court of Appeal fixed the appellants' partial indemnity costs against Dr. Librach at $100,000 inclusive of taxes, plus disbursements, noting that even the respondent's proposed figure was on the high end.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical negligence action relating to a birth injury that resulted in cerebral palsy.

The trial judge had dismissed the action against the attending obstetrician, nurse, and hospital.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal with respect to the obstetrician, finding that the trial judge made inconsistent findings regarding the interpretability of fetal heart rate monitor outputs and erred in concluding that the bradycardia would have occurred regardless of the application of a vacuum extractor.

A new trial was ordered for the claim against the obstetrician.

The appeal regarding the nurse and hospital was dismissed.

The appellants, representative plaintiffs in a certified class action, appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their request to amend the list of common issues to include questions regarding constructive trust, disgorgement, and waiver of tort.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that it would be unfair to add a potential new cause of action at this late stage of the proceedings.

The Court noted that the remedies of constructive trust and disgorgement remain available to the appellants at the second stage of the trial, as originally contemplated in the certification order.

The plaintiff suffered a cracked sacrum after a bed collapsed at the defendant hospital.

She later developed fibromyalgia, which the trial judge found was caused by the hospital fall despite an intervening car accident.

The trial judge awarded over $3 million in damages, including approximately $1.7 million for future care costs based on expert reports.

On appeal, the defendants challenged the liability finding and the future care costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the liability finding, noting the trial judge properly applied foreseeability and the thin-skull rule.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding damages, reducing the future care costs award by $374,640.65 because several home maintenance items lacked evidentiary support.

The appellant underwent breast augmentation surgery and subsequently experienced complications.

She consulted another plastic surgeon who advised her that the initial surgery was performed below the standard of care and that she should contact a lawyer.

The appellant delayed commencing her action until she received a formal written expert report, by which time the one-year limitation period under the Health Professions Procedural Code had expired.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's summary judgment dismissing the claim, finding that the appellant had discovered the material facts necessary to base an allegation of negligence during her initial consultation with the second surgeon, and did not need to wait for a formal written opinion or her medical charts to discover her claim.

The appellants appealed the judgment of Justice Tausendfreund of the Superior Court of Justice dated November 4, 2009.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal without costs in a brief endorsement.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action arising from the death of the patient due to a pulmonary embolism following arthroscopic knee surgery.

The appellants argued the respondent orthopaedic surgeon was negligent in failing to warn the patient about the symptoms of a pulmonary embolism upon discharge.

The trial judge found the respondent met the standard of care, as the patient was not at a heightened risk of a pulmonary embolism at the time of discharge.

The Court of Appeal (majority) dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence and application of the standard of care.

The appellant corporation sued three of its former directors and its secured lender for breach of duty leading to its bankruptcy.

The defendants successfully moved for an order requiring the corporation to advance their legal expenses incurred in defending the action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the corporation's by-laws, read in conjunction with s. 136 of the Business Corporations Act, made the advancement of legal costs mandatory for the former directors.

The court also upheld the finding that the loan agreement required advancement for the secured lender, and that the motion judge did not err in ordering payment prior to assessment under the Solicitors' Act.

The appellant husband appealed an order dismissing his motion to vary a 1998 consent order for spousal support.

The parties separated in 1996 after a long marriage during which the respondent wife was a stay-at-home mother.

The appellant argued that the motion judge failed to consider the disparity in accumulated assets and recent developments in his business.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the respondent remained in need of support and the appellant, a successful businessman, had not demonstrated a material change in circumstances.

Following the outcome of the appeals, the court awarded costs to the respondent in the amount of $43,000, inclusive of GST and disbursements.

The appellant hospital appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent doctor $3,000,000 in damages for the bad faith revocation of his hospital privileges.

The doctor cross-appealed the damage assessment, arguing it should have been higher.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal.

The Court found ample evidence to support the trial judge's finding that the hospital acted in bad faith and for an oblique motive when it summarily revoked the doctor's privileges.

On damages, the Court held that while the doctor failed to produce readily available evidence of his income loss, the trial judge was entitled to assess damages based on the proven magnitude of the loss, and was justified in reducing the claim by approximately half.

The appellant was rendered a tetraplegic after diving into shallow water at a provincial park and striking his head.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the appellant was contributorily negligent, failed to prove he hit a sandbar rather than the lake bottom, and that the sandbars were not a hazard under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge made fundamentally inconsistent findings on factual causation, disregarded relevant expert and eyewitness evidence, and misapprehended the evidence regarding the absence of previous injuries at the park.