Ronald Gordon Chapman

The moving party, a creditor, brought a motion to admit fresh evidence on its appeal from the trustee's disallowance of its proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding.

The trustee opposed the motion, arguing that the parties had previously agreed to limit the appeal record and that admitting the evidence would undermine the efficiency of the bankruptcy process.

The court found that no binding agreement precluded the evidence and that refusing to admit the newly discovered documents would result in an injustice to the creditor.

The court exercised its discretion to admit the fresh evidence, allowing the trustee to file responding documentation.

Following a decision traversing a motion in writing to be heard in open court, the parties submitted written submissions on costs.

The court determined that the most fair and reasonable disposition was to reserve the issue of costs to the judge who ultimately presides over the motion in open court.

The defendant brought a motion in writing to discharge a section 71 notice on its property and release a $50,000 deposit following an aborted real estate transaction.

The plaintiff opposed, arguing it still had an agreement to purchase the unique property and that the defendant caused the financing failure by withholding financial information.

The court declined to decide the matter in writing due to untested conflicting assertions of fact and credibility issues, adjourning the motion to be heard in open court.

The parties reached a settlement following a trial management conference and submitted a consent to a dismissal order.

The court initially rejected the consent due to issues with legal representation for the corporate defendants.

After receiving confirmation that the self-represented individual defendant had filed a Notice of Intention to Act in Person and that counsel of record had executed the consent for the corporate defendants, the court granted the consent order dismissing the action and directing the payout of $1,000,000 held as security.

The moving party sought leave to appeal from endorsements refusing his requests to adjourn an upcoming trial.

The court directed the moving party to serve and upload his materials by a specific deadline.

The moving party failed to upload any materials by the deadline.

Given the imminent trial date, the Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

At a trial management conference, the self-represented defendant requested an adjournment of the peremptory trial date, citing medical issues and lack of counsel.

The court declined to entertain the request without a formal motion on notice.

The court also ordered counsel of record for the corporate defendants, who failed to attend the conference without explanation, to appear at the commencement of trial to show cause why costs should not be awarded against him personally.

The defendant, David Franklin, brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (anti-SLAPP legislation) to dismiss an action brought against him by the Mizzi family.

The Mizzi family sued Franklin, his client Michael Cavanagh, and others for intrusion upon seclusion, intentional infliction of mental and emotional suffering, and extortion, alleging that Franklin and Cavanagh hacked emails, created a defamatory website, and made threats.

Franklin argued the action arose from his public comments on a Global News broadcast about a financial scandal, which he contended was a matter of public interest.

The court found that while Franklin's comments were indeed an expression relating to a matter of public interest, the Mizzi family's action did not "arise from" that expression.

Instead, the court determined the action genuinely arose from the alleged intrusion on seclusion and extortion that occurred independently of and prior to the news broadcast.

Consequently, the court dismissed Franklin's motion to dismiss the action, allowing the Mizzi family's claims to proceed to trial on their merits.

The applicants purchased a home in 1988, unaware that a 1984 mortgage registered by the previous owners had not been discharged.

In 2017, the applicants discovered the undischarged mortgage and requested its removal, but the respondent mortgagee demanded nearly $1 million for its discharge.

The applicants brought an application to declare the mortgage void.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the application, finding that the respondent's right to enforce the mortgage had been extinguished by the ten-year limitation period under the Real Property Limitations Act, as no payments or acknowledgments had been made since 1985.

The court directed the removal of the mortgage from title and awarded costs to the applicants.

The applicant held a third mortgage on a property and challenged the sale of the property by the assignee of the first mortgage, arguing the assignee failed to issue a fresh notice of sale.

The applicant moved to convert the application into an action to add allegations of fraud, while the respondents moved to dismiss the application.

The court granted the motion to convert the application into an action, finding the record insufficient to deny the investors the ability to pursue their claims.

However, the court ruled on the legal issue, holding that under the Mortgages Act, an assignee is not required to issue a fresh notice of sale if the interested parties received written notice of the assignment.

The respondents brought a motion to convert an application into an action, arguing that the application involved complex factual disputes, serious allegations of misconduct, and required pleadings and discoveries.

The applicants opposed, seeking a determination on the merits of the application.

The court found that the application suffered from ambiguity, lacked clarity regarding the relief sought, and involved material facts in dispute, including allegations of negligence and perjury.

The court granted the motion, converting the application into an action to allow for proper pleadings and discovery, emphasizing that procedural fairness required a full evidentiary record.

Paliare Roland Rosenberg Rothstein LLP (the law firm) brought a motion seeking leave to release $77,228.85 from its trust account to its general account, representing outstanding fees owed by its former client, Stipan Ivancic.

Ivancic opposed the motion, having commenced a separate action alleging solicitor's negligence as a defence to the fees.

The court dismissed the law firm's motion, deeming it premature given the unresolved issues of fees and alleged negligence in the separate action.

Following the dismissal of the appellants' appeal from an Ontario Securities Commission decision finding them guilty of securities fraud, the Commission and the intervenors sought costs.

The Commission sought $40,000, which the court awarded in full on a partial indemnity basis.

The intervenors, who were the appellants' former counsel and intervened to defend against allegations of ineffective assistance, sought over $53,000 on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court held that the intervenors were entitled to costs as parties to the appeal, but reduced the scale to partial indemnity and fixed their costs at $20,000.

The appellants appealed the Ontario Securities Commission's decisions finding them liable for securities fraud and imposing severe sanctions, including lifetime trading bans, disgorgement, and administrative penalties.

The appellants argued that the presiding commissioner was biased, that their counsel at the hearing was incompetent and in a conflict of interest, and that the findings of fraud and the penalties were unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, rejecting the fresh evidence regarding counsel's competence as it would not have affected the outcome, and concluding that the Commission's findings on fraud and sanctions were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appellant, trustee of a profit sharing plan, sued the respondents for misappropriation of funds and breach of fiduciary duty.

The appellant alleged that money earmarked for a specific fund was diverted to third-party companies connected to the respondents and not repaid.

The respondents sought to stay the action based on a choice of forum clause in a subscription agreement requiring disputes to be resolved in the Cayman Islands.

The motion judge dismissed the summary judgment motion and stayed the action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the action as pleaded did not arise from the subscription agreement or the purchase of shares, but rather from the respondents' misappropriation of funds and breach of fiduciary duty.

Summary judgment was granted in favor of the appellant.

The defendant brought a motion for security for costs against the plaintiffs in a breach of contract action regarding broadcasting airtime.

The court found that the corporate plaintiff had insufficient assets in Ontario and that the individual plaintiff's claim was frivolous and vexatious as he had no personal contract with the defendant.

The plaintiffs failed to establish impecuniosity due to inadequate financial disclosure and suspicious property transfers.

The court ordered the plaintiffs to post $75,000 in security for costs in installments.

The respondents transferred their home to the appellant at below market value as part of a scheme to defraud creditors, with an oral agreement for re-conveyance.

When the appellant refused to re-convey the property, the respondents sued for unjust enrichment and a constructive trust.

The trial judge found the agreement of purchase and sale was a sham and ordered a re-conveyance based on unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of unjust enrichment or the 'clean hands' doctrine.

The plaintiffs sought to pursue claims regarding inter vivos transfers made by Caterina Iacobelli, which had been previously dismissed by a summary judgment order in 1997.

Despite subsequent rulings that allowed for further inquiry into these transfers if new evidence emerged from cross-examinations, the plaintiffs failed to present evidence establishing a cause of action based on those cross-examinations.

The court found that the plaintiffs had ample opportunity to substantiate their claims but did not do so, leading to the dismissal of their motion to pursue the inter vivos transfer claims.

The plaintiff, a Texas-based pension fund, brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendants, directors of a Cayman Islands investment fund, seeking a refund of a $1 million USD investment.

The investment was earmarked for Facebook shares that were never acquired, triggering a refund clause in the Subscription Agreement.

The defendants did not contest the facts but argued that Ontario was not the proper jurisdiction due to an exclusive forum selection clause in the Subscription Agreement designating the Cayman Islands.

The plaintiff argued the claim was for breach of fiduciary duty, not contract, and against individuals served in Ontario.

The court upheld the forum selection clause, finding it broad enough to cover the claim, regardless of how it was framed.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and the action was stayed, with a caveat that the stay could be lifted if Cayman Islands courts declined jurisdiction.

Costs were not awarded due to the plaintiff representing pensioners who had already suffered losses.

The plaintiff sought specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for a 75% interest in 200 acres of land and shares in a bare trustee corporation.

The agreement failed to close due to disputes over directors' resolutions for share transfers and extensions.

The court found the defendant vendors breached their good faith obligation to close and failed to deliver a valid directors' resolution.

The defendants' arguments of no agreement to extend, no obligation to extend, mutual mistake, and the purchaser not being in funds were rejected.

Specific performance was deemed the appropriate remedy due to the uniqueness of the property.

The third-party claim against the vendors' lawyers for negligence was dismissed, as their advice was consistent with a proper interpretation of the joint venture agreement.

The applicant, the sole life beneficiary of a Henson trust established by his mother's will, applied to declare the gift over of the trust residue void for uncertainty and to terminate the trust under the rule in Saunders v. Vautier.

The respondent estate trustee opposed the application and sought a capacity assessment of the applicant.

The court held that the gift over to 'worthy individuals' was void for uncertainty, but found that the resulting intestacy would not take effect until after the applicant's death.

Consequently, the applicant could not terminate the trust as he did not hold the full beneficial interest.

The court also declined to order a capacity assessment, finding no jurisdiction under the Courts of Justice Act in these circumstances.