Ronald Gordon Chapman

The defendant, David Franklin, brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (anti-SLAPP legislation) to dismiss an action brought against him by the Mizzi family.

The Mizzi family sued Franklin, his client Michael Cavanagh, and others for intrusion upon seclusion, intentional infliction of mental and emotional suffering, and extortion, alleging that Franklin and Cavanagh hacked emails, created a defamatory website, and made threats.

Franklin argued the action arose from his public comments on a Global News broadcast about a financial scandal, which he contended was a matter of public interest.

The court found that while Franklin's comments were indeed an expression relating to a matter of public interest, the Mizzi family's action did not "arise from" that expression.

Instead, the court determined the action genuinely arose from the alleged intrusion on seclusion and extortion that occurred independently of and prior to the news broadcast.

Consequently, the court dismissed Franklin's motion to dismiss the action, allowing the Mizzi family's claims to proceed to trial on their merits.

The respondents brought a motion to convert an application into an action, arguing that the application involved complex factual disputes, serious allegations of misconduct, and required pleadings and discoveries.

The applicants opposed, seeking a determination on the merits of the application.

The court found that the application suffered from ambiguity, lacked clarity regarding the relief sought, and involved material facts in dispute, including allegations of negligence and perjury.

The court granted the motion, converting the application into an action to allow for proper pleadings and discovery, emphasizing that procedural fairness required a full evidentiary record.

Paliare Roland Rosenberg Rothstein LLP (the law firm) brought a motion seeking leave to release $77,228.85 from its trust account to its general account, representing outstanding fees owed by its former client, Stipan Ivancic.

Ivancic opposed the motion, having commenced a separate action alleging solicitor's negligence as a defence to the fees.

The court dismissed the law firm's motion, deeming it premature given the unresolved issues of fees and alleged negligence in the separate action.

The appellant, trustee of a profit sharing plan, sued the respondents for misappropriation of funds and breach of fiduciary duty.

The appellant alleged that money earmarked for a specific fund was diverted to third-party companies connected to the respondents and not repaid.

The respondents sought to stay the action based on a choice of forum clause in a subscription agreement requiring disputes to be resolved in the Cayman Islands.

The motion judge dismissed the summary judgment motion and stayed the action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the action as pleaded did not arise from the subscription agreement or the purchase of shares, but rather from the respondents' misappropriation of funds and breach of fiduciary duty.

Summary judgment was granted in favor of the appellant.

The plaintiffs sought to pursue claims regarding inter vivos transfers made by Caterina Iacobelli, which had been previously dismissed by a summary judgment order in 1997.

Despite subsequent rulings that allowed for further inquiry into these transfers if new evidence emerged from cross-examinations, the plaintiffs failed to present evidence establishing a cause of action based on those cross-examinations.

The court found that the plaintiffs had ample opportunity to substantiate their claims but did not do so, leading to the dismissal of their motion to pursue the inter vivos transfer claims.

The plaintiff, a Texas-based pension fund, brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendants, directors of a Cayman Islands investment fund, seeking a refund of a $1 million USD investment.

The investment was earmarked for Facebook shares that were never acquired, triggering a refund clause in the Subscription Agreement.

The defendants did not contest the facts but argued that Ontario was not the proper jurisdiction due to an exclusive forum selection clause in the Subscription Agreement designating the Cayman Islands.

The plaintiff argued the claim was for breach of fiduciary duty, not contract, and against individuals served in Ontario.

The court upheld the forum selection clause, finding it broad enough to cover the claim, regardless of how it was framed.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and the action was stayed, with a caveat that the stay could be lifted if Cayman Islands courts declined jurisdiction.

Costs were not awarded due to the plaintiff representing pensioners who had already suffered losses.

The plaintiff sought specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for a 75% interest in 200 acres of land and shares in a bare trustee corporation.

The agreement failed to close due to disputes over directors' resolutions for share transfers and extensions.

The court found the defendant vendors breached their good faith obligation to close and failed to deliver a valid directors' resolution.

The defendants' arguments of no agreement to extend, no obligation to extend, mutual mistake, and the purchaser not being in funds were rejected.

Specific performance was deemed the appropriate remedy due to the uniqueness of the property.

The third-party claim against the vendors' lawyers for negligence was dismissed, as their advice was consistent with a proper interpretation of the joint venture agreement.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing two related actions alleging fraudulent conveyances on the basis that the claims were barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiffs argued that the claims were timely due to discoverability, reliance on another creditor’s ongoing fraudulent conveyance action, and potential application of the Real Property Limitations Act or exceptions for declaratory relief.

The court held that issues of discoverability, whether the relief sought was purely declaratory, whether reliance on the prior action affected limitation analysis, and whether fraudulent concealment occurred all raised genuine issues requiring a trial.

The evidence could support the plaintiffs’ position that the limitation period either had not expired or might not apply.

Summary judgment was therefore inappropriate.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment against a debtor and sought declarations setting aside an inter-spousal transfer of real property as a fraudulent conveyance intended to defeat creditors.

The debtor consented to judgment on the debt but disputed the declaration that the property transfer to his spouse was fraudulent.

The court held that because the transfer occurred between spouses while the debtor was indebted to the plaintiff, the defendants bore the onus of demonstrating that the transaction was bona fide and for fair value.

The defendants failed to provide cogent, admissible evidence establishing that the debtor’s equity in the property approximated the alleged loan consideration.

The court concluded that the transfer was intended to shelter the property from creditors and granted judgment and declaratory relief to the plaintiff.

The defendants brought a motion seeking the master's recusal from hearing their earlier motion to dismiss the action for delay and requesting that the dismissal motion be heard anew by another master.

The defendants argued procedural unfairness and denial of natural justice because they were unable to respond to a letter sent by opposing counsel to the court opposing further submissions after the dismissal motion had been argued.

The court found that the letter contained no substantive argument on the jurisdiction issue and that the refusal to allow additional submissions had already been fully explained in earlier reasons.

The court held that the defendants had relied solely on Rules 24 and 48 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and could not recast the legal basis of their motion after argument had concluded.

The recusal motion was dismissed and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The defendants moved to dismiss a wrongful dismissal action for delay under Rules 24.01 and 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court held that none of the criteria under Rule 24.01 were met because the plaintiff had served the claim in time, the defendants had defended the action, and the matter had been set down for trial.

The master also found that he lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the action as an abuse of process outside the rule-based authority relied upon by the defendants.

Even if jurisdiction existed, the court held that the delay was not inordinate or inexcusable given earlier procedural steps and ongoing settlement discussions.

The motion was therefore dismissed and costs awarded to the plaintiff.

Following a prior trial determining that the respondent was bound by a shareholders’ agreement granting the moving party a 20% share interest in two corporations, the parties brought a motion seeking reconsideration and variation of portions of the earlier judgment.

The dispute concerned a buyout order and valuation process imposed under s. 248 of the Business Corporations Act that had not been argued at trial.

The court held that it was inappropriate to impose such relief when the issue had effectively been removed from the matters to be determined at trial.

The court therefore set aside the earlier buyout and valuation provisions, while permitting the moving party to pursue such remedies through further pleadings and evidence within the existing proceeding.

Additional relief relating to an accounting order was also struck, and no costs were awarded.

The defendants brought a motion seeking a stay of the Ontario action on the basis of forum non conveniens under section 106 of the Courts of Justice Act, arguing that Qatar was the more appropriate forum.

The action arose from allegations that airline employees failed to warn the plaintiff about local laws regarding alcohol consumption by Muslims, leading to the plaintiff’s arrest, imprisonment, and corporal punishment in Qatar after a flight incident.

Applying the principles from Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, the court held that the moving parties failed to demonstrate that Qatar was clearly a more appropriate forum.

Several factors—including the residence of the plaintiff and his medical witnesses in Ontario, the airline’s business presence in Ontario, and the plaintiff’s contractual connection to Ontario—supported maintaining the proceeding in Ontario.

The motion to stay the action was dismissed.

Following a successful motion by the defendants to set aside a default judgment, the court determined the appropriate costs consequences.

The defendants sought partial indemnity costs for the motion, while the plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs for steps rendered wasted by the defendants’ earlier default as well as costs of the motion.

Applying Rules 19.08, 57.01, and 57.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that a fair and reasonable approach was to offset the competing costs claims.

The defendants were awarded reduced partial indemnity costs for the motion, while the plaintiff received costs thrown away arising from earlier procedural steps.

The court ordered the plaintiff to pay the net amount after set-off.

The moving party defendants sought to set aside a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff after the defendants were noted in default and their statement of defence had been struck for failing to deliver affidavits of documents.

The defendants argued they lacked notice of the earlier motion striking the defence, acted promptly to challenge the judgment, and possessed a viable defence on the merits.

The court held that while the plaintiff had established a sufficient evidentiary basis for the original default judgment, the defendants raised a reasonably plausible explanation for their absence and demonstrated a potentially arguable defence.

Balancing the interests of justice and potential prejudice to both sides, the court concluded the matter should proceed on its merits.

The default judgment and prior order striking the defence were set aside subject to terms preserving existing execution and trust funds as security.