Ronald Gordon Chapman

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his negligent misrepresentation claims against former directors, officers, and consultants of a corporation in which he invested.

The motion judge found the claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, agreeing that the appellant knew the material facts more than two years before asserting the claims and that the proposed amendments advanced new causes of action unconnected to the original pleadings.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing two related actions alleging fraudulent conveyances on the basis that the claims were barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiffs argued that the claims were timely due to discoverability, reliance on another creditor’s ongoing fraudulent conveyance action, and potential application of the Real Property Limitations Act or exceptions for declaratory relief.

The court held that issues of discoverability, whether the relief sought was purely declaratory, whether reliance on the prior action affected limitation analysis, and whether fraudulent concealment occurred all raised genuine issues requiring a trial.

The evidence could support the plaintiffs’ position that the limitation period either had not expired or might not apply.

Summary judgment was therefore inappropriate.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment against a debtor and sought declarations setting aside an inter-spousal transfer of real property as a fraudulent conveyance intended to defeat creditors.

The debtor consented to judgment on the debt but disputed the declaration that the property transfer to his spouse was fraudulent.

The court held that because the transfer occurred between spouses while the debtor was indebted to the plaintiff, the defendants bore the onus of demonstrating that the transaction was bona fide and for fair value.

The defendants failed to provide cogent, admissible evidence establishing that the debtor’s equity in the property approximated the alleged loan consideration.

The court concluded that the transfer was intended to shelter the property from creditors and granted judgment and declaratory relief to the plaintiff.

The defendants brought a motion seeking the master's recusal from hearing their earlier motion to dismiss the action for delay and requesting that the dismissal motion be heard anew by another master.

The defendants argued procedural unfairness and denial of natural justice because they were unable to respond to a letter sent by opposing counsel to the court opposing further submissions after the dismissal motion had been argued.

The court found that the letter contained no substantive argument on the jurisdiction issue and that the refusal to allow additional submissions had already been fully explained in earlier reasons.

The court held that the defendants had relied solely on Rules 24 and 48 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and could not recast the legal basis of their motion after argument had concluded.

The recusal motion was dismissed and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The defendants moved to dismiss a wrongful dismissal action for delay under Rules 24.01 and 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court held that none of the criteria under Rule 24.01 were met because the plaintiff had served the claim in time, the defendants had defended the action, and the matter had been set down for trial.

The master also found that he lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the action as an abuse of process outside the rule-based authority relied upon by the defendants.

Even if jurisdiction existed, the court held that the delay was not inordinate or inexcusable given earlier procedural steps and ongoing settlement discussions.

The motion was therefore dismissed and costs awarded to the plaintiff.

In a franchise class action, the plaintiffs challenged the defendants' claims of solicitor-client privilege over certain documents and discovery refusals.

The court established seven general principles to govern the privilege claims, holding that requests for general legal information to understand rights are privileged, and that a lawyer's file compiled using professional skill is protected by work product privilege.

The court further held that pleading good faith in response to a bad faith claim does not impliedly waive privilege unless the party relies on legal advice as a material element of its defence.

The court outlined a process for the parties to apply these principles to the disputed documents and refusals ahead of a continued hearing.

Following a prior trial determining that the respondent was bound by a shareholders’ agreement granting the moving party a 20% share interest in two corporations, the parties brought a motion seeking reconsideration and variation of portions of the earlier judgment.

The dispute concerned a buyout order and valuation process imposed under s. 248 of the Business Corporations Act that had not been argued at trial.

The court held that it was inappropriate to impose such relief when the issue had effectively been removed from the matters to be determined at trial.

The court therefore set aside the earlier buyout and valuation provisions, while permitting the moving party to pursue such remedies through further pleadings and evidence within the existing proceeding.

Additional relief relating to an accounting order was also struck, and no costs were awarded.

The defendants brought a motion seeking a stay of the Ontario action on the basis of forum non conveniens under section 106 of the Courts of Justice Act, arguing that Qatar was the more appropriate forum.

The action arose from allegations that airline employees failed to warn the plaintiff about local laws regarding alcohol consumption by Muslims, leading to the plaintiff’s arrest, imprisonment, and corporal punishment in Qatar after a flight incident.

Applying the principles from Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, the court held that the moving parties failed to demonstrate that Qatar was clearly a more appropriate forum.

Several factors—including the residence of the plaintiff and his medical witnesses in Ontario, the airline’s business presence in Ontario, and the plaintiff’s contractual connection to Ontario—supported maintaining the proceeding in Ontario.

The motion to stay the action was dismissed.

The appellants, suppliers of building materials, sued the respondent under s 13(1) of the Construction Lien Act, claiming he was liable for breaches of trust by the general contractor of which he was an officer and director.

The trial judge found the respondent liable, but the Divisional Court reversed this decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Divisional Court that there was no evidence the breaches of trust occurred after the respondent took control of the general contractor in May 2002, and the onus was on the appellants to prove this.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment holding the personal appellant liable for the unsafe investment of the respondent's money.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion that the investment was meant to be safe but was not.

The Court also upheld the finding of personal liability based on a direct relationship between the personal appellant and the respondent, noting this was not a corporate veil case.

Following a successful motion by the defendants to set aside a default judgment, the court determined the appropriate costs consequences.

The defendants sought partial indemnity costs for the motion, while the plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs for steps rendered wasted by the defendants’ earlier default as well as costs of the motion.

Applying Rules 19.08, 57.01, and 57.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that a fair and reasonable approach was to offset the competing costs claims.

The defendants were awarded reduced partial indemnity costs for the motion, while the plaintiff received costs thrown away arising from earlier procedural steps.

The court ordered the plaintiff to pay the net amount after set-off.

The moving party defendants sought to set aside a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff after the defendants were noted in default and their statement of defence had been struck for failing to deliver affidavits of documents.

The defendants argued they lacked notice of the earlier motion striking the defence, acted promptly to challenge the judgment, and possessed a viable defence on the merits.

The court held that while the plaintiff had established a sufficient evidentiary basis for the original default judgment, the defendants raised a reasonably plausible explanation for their absence and demonstrated a potentially arguable defence.

Balancing the interests of justice and potential prejudice to both sides, the court concluded the matter should proceed on its merits.

The default judgment and prior order striking the defence were set aside subject to terms preserving existing execution and trust funds as security.

The defendants appealed a motion judge's decision refusing their request to amend their Statement of Defence.

The action was commenced in 1986, and the motion to amend was brought just as a trial date was about to be set.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's finding that the motion was an abuse of process designed to delay the trial.

The court agreed that the extraordinary delay, lack of reasonable explanation, and irremediable prejudice to the plaintiffs justified refusing the amendments.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant brought a motion for directions to determine whether an appeal from the dismissal of a motion to amend a statement of defence in an oppression action lies to the Court of Appeal or the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal held that the dismissal of the motion to amend was a final order.

Furthermore, the Court determined that the order was 'made under' the Business Corporations Act within the meaning of s. 255, as the power exercised was sufficiently close to the legislative source of adjudicating oppression claims.

Consequently, the appeal lies to the Divisional Court, and the matter was transferred accordingly.

Following a successful appeal by the defendant, the court determined the appropriate scale and quantum of costs.

The appellant sought substantial indemnity costs based on an offer to settle the appeal.

The court held that Rule 49 does not apply to offers to settle appeals and awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The court fixed the costs at $12,000 for fees plus disbursements and GST, finding the appellant's claimed hours slightly excessive for a case dismissed at the pleadings stage.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment, challenging the trial judge's acceptance of the respondent's evidence regarding corporate costs, work orders, and profit margins.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that there was sufficient documentary evidence filed at trial to support the respondent's claim and the trial judge's findings.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

Following the dismissal of the defendant's appeal from a Small Claims Court judgment, the successful plaintiffs sought costs.

The plaintiffs claimed partial indemnity costs up to the date of their settlement offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

The court considered the proportionality of costs in small claims matters and the settlement offers made by both parties.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs but fixed costs at $4,000 all-inclusive in favour of the plaintiffs.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion for summary judgment in a defamation action brought by the respondent.

The respondent's action was based on testimony the appellant gave at a Real Estate Council of Ontario (RECO) disciplinary hearing.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the RECO Disciplinary Committee is a statutory tribunal and the appellant's testimony was protected by absolute privilege under the witness immunity rule.

As there was no genuine issue for trial, summary judgment was granted dismissing the action.

The appellant home inspection company appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondents $9,148.58 for gross negligence in failing to discover a latent water leakage defect.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's finding of gross negligence, noting the inspector observed poor exterior water management and reported normal moisture levels despite dry walls.

The court also refused to enforce the contract's limitation of liability clause, finding it was a contract of adhesion presented after much work was done, and the gross negligence constituted a fundamental breach that deprived the respondents of the entire benefit of the contract.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's decision regarding costs and punitive damages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's conclusion that the respondent's allegations in its defence and counterclaim did not amount to fraud or improper conduct seriously prejudicial to character or reputation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $4,000.