Garry Joel Wise

The applicant father brought two motions: one to adjourn his pending parenting motion until a therapeutic counsellor's report was completed, and a Wagg motion seeking disclosure of the Crown brief from his criminal proceedings (where he was acquitted of sexual assault charges involving the children).

The respondent mother sought to have both motions dismissed.

The court granted the father's request to adjourn the parenting motion to avoid delay and costs if it needed to be heard later.

The court also granted the Wagg motion, finding it would be unfair to proceed without the documents and that the Attorney General had already screened them.

The plaintiff, a long-serving senior accounting manager, alleged constructive dismissal after a merger-driven reorganization removed core payroll, budgeting, and accounts payable responsibilities and left her with an uncertain role.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada’s constructive dismissal framework, the court held that the employer had unilaterally and substantially altered essential terms of employment and had also, viewed cumulatively, evinced an intention no longer to be bound by the contract.

On damages, the court held that ESA termination and severance entitlements were payable and that mitigation income earned during the statutory entitlement period could not be deducted from the common law award.

The court also awarded relocation-related mitigation expenses, including sale, purchase, moving, and transitional costs, in the amount of $45,010.32, together with pre-judgment interest.

The appellant appealed a family arbitration award that terminated a previously established education fund for the parties’ children and ordered the remaining funds returned to the parents.

The appellant argued procedural unfairness, an error in determining that the youngest adult child was not a “child of the marriage” due to disability, and a failure to apply constitutional and human rights norms requiring accommodation of disability.

The court held that the arbitrator applied the correct legal principles and reasonably concluded that the appellant had not proven the adult child met the statutory definition of “child of the marriage” under the Divorce Act at the relevant time.

The court also found no procedural unfairness in the arbitrator’s summary process and refused to admit fresh evidence regarding the child’s evolving educational plans.

The appeal was dismissed.

The parties brought cross-motions in a family law proceeding.

The self-represented applicant sought retroactive spousal support, interim disbursements, further disclosure, and leave to amend her application.

The respondent sought an order for the immediate sale of the matrimonial home and temporary exclusive possession.

The court permitted the applicant to amend her application but dismissed her other requests, noting inconsistencies in her positions regarding the respondent's pension and retroactive support.

The court also dismissed the respondent's motion for sale and exclusive possession, finding a sale would prejudice the applicant's claim for a vesting order.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

The defendants brought a motion seeking the master's recusal from hearing their earlier motion to dismiss the action for delay and requesting that the dismissal motion be heard anew by another master.

The defendants argued procedural unfairness and denial of natural justice because they were unable to respond to a letter sent by opposing counsel to the court opposing further submissions after the dismissal motion had been argued.

The court found that the letter contained no substantive argument on the jurisdiction issue and that the refusal to allow additional submissions had already been fully explained in earlier reasons.

The court held that the defendants had relied solely on Rules 24 and 48 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and could not recast the legal basis of their motion after argument had concluded.

The recusal motion was dismissed and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The defendants moved to dismiss a wrongful dismissal action for delay under Rules 24.01 and 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court held that none of the criteria under Rule 24.01 were met because the plaintiff had served the claim in time, the defendants had defended the action, and the matter had been set down for trial.

The master also found that he lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the action as an abuse of process outside the rule-based authority relied upon by the defendants.

Even if jurisdiction existed, the court held that the delay was not inordinate or inexcusable given earlier procedural steps and ongoing settlement discussions.

The motion was therefore dismissed and costs awarded to the plaintiff.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and failure to accommodate by his employer.

The employer sought to defer the application pending the outcome of concurrent grievance arbitration proceedings.

The union, which had carriage of the grievances, indicated it would not advance the human rights claims at arbitration.

The Tribunal declined to defer the application, finding that because the human rights issues would not be adjudicated in the grievance process, deferral was not appropriate.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court judgment regarding a cottage property lease, arguing for the first time on appeal that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction because the Residential Tenancies Act applied and gave exclusive jurisdiction to the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The Court of Appeal held that the Superior Court had jurisdiction over the equitable and monetary relief claimed, which exceeded the Board's jurisdiction.

The Court further declined to allow the appellants to raise the new statutory argument on appeal, citing the lack of a factual record, prejudice to the respondents, and the interests of finality.

The appeal was dismissed.