Jordan Bryan Goldblatt

The Receiver of two insolvent real estate brokerages (TRP and TRP Realty) sought the court's advice and direction on whether approximately $3.7 million in commissions owed to the brokerages' agents were held in trust for the agents or formed part of the general assets available to secured creditors.

The court applied the "three certainties" test for a valid trust, focusing on certainty of intention.

Despite some ambiguous indicators like bank account names and standard form documents, the court found that the agents' contracts and the brokerages' audited financial statements did not objectively demonstrate an intention to create a trust.

Consequently, the commissions were deemed unsecured debts, not trust funds, and thus available to the secured creditors.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application under the Condominium Act challenging the respondent condominium corporation's requirement that she renovate her unit to a luxury standard as a condition of remaining in the hotel rental pool.

The appellant also objected to the removal of her unit from the pool when she refused the renovations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's dismissal, finding no oppressive conduct by the respondent and confirming that the appellant could not remain in the pool without meeting the luxury standard while having the option to rent or use the unit residentially.

The defendant solicitor brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' claims against him for damages for an improvident sale and for an accounting of sale proceeds.

The plaintiffs, who were third mortgagees, conceded the improvident sale claim against the solicitor.

However, they maintained the claim for an accounting, arguing the solicitor owed a duty to disburse funds honestly and account to subsequent encumbrancers under the Mortgages Act.

The court found the accounting claim was not doomed to fail and dismissed the motion to strike it, but ordered that the claim against the solicitor would be struck if he provided the accounting within 10 days.

The plaintiff commenced an action relating to a 2006 real estate transaction, which was the third proceeding initiated regarding the same transaction.

The defendant lawyer moved to strike the claim against him for disclosing no reasonable cause of action, while the other defendants moved to dismiss the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court granted both motions, finding the claim against the lawyer incomprehensible and incapable of amendment, and the claim against the other defendants a clear attempt to re-litigate issues already decided in prior proceedings.

The plaintiff brought an action for defamation after the defendant disseminated anonymous allegations.

The parties settled the action for $10,000 in damages, leaving costs to be determined by the court.

The plaintiff sought full or substantial indemnity costs, relying on a Rule 49 offer to settle.

The court found the settlement was less favourable than the offer and awarded partial indemnity costs.

Costs were fixed at $44,446.26, with the court noting that costs in defamation matters often exceed damages.

The plaintiffs sought to maintain a Mareva injunction against the defendant's property after an ex parte order was granted.

The defendant had failed to close an agreement of purchase and sale for the plaintiffs' home, and the plaintiffs alleged a risk of asset flight.

The court conducted a de novo hearing, finding a strong prima facie case for the plaintiffs and a real risk of asset removal due to inconsistencies in the defendant's travel plans and financial explanations.

The Mareva injunction was maintained, allowing the plaintiffs to register a charge against the defendant's property, which could be lifted upon the defendant posting security of $116,324.32.

The applicants sought urgent judicial review of decisions by the Toronto Soccer Association and Ontario Soccer Association that disqualified a youth girls' soccer team from a championship game, suspended their coach, and fined the league for allegedly playing ineligible 12-year-old players on a 13-year-old team.

The Superior Court of Justice assumed jurisdiction, finding the decisions were of a public nature.

The court set aside the associations' decisions, holding that they breached basic rules of procedural fairness by failing to provide adequate notice of the charges and sanctions, and by denying the applicants a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

Full indemnity costs were awarded against the respondents due to their reprehensible conduct, including ignoring the court's initial order.

The plaintiffs brought an ex parte motion for a Mareva injunction to register a charge against the defendant's property.

The defendant had anticipatorily breached an agreement of purchase and sale for the plaintiffs' residential property.

The court found the plaintiffs established a strong prima facie case and met the five-part test for a Mareva injunction, noting the defendant had taken her property off the market and was travelling to India with no return date.

The motion was granted.

The defendants moved to strike or stay the Canadian action brought against them by the plaintiffs, arguing it was an abuse of process or should be stayed due to a parallel U.S. action commenced by related plaintiffs against related defendants.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the U.S. action involved different defendants, different causes of action, different laws, and different jurisdictions.

The court held that the plaintiffs' conduct was not vexatious or oppressive, and the defendants failed to demonstrate substantial prejudice to justify a permanent or temporary stay.

The moving defendants, subtenants of a medical facility, sought summary judgment to dismiss claims by the landlord for breach of contract and unlawful act conspiracy after they vacated the premises.

The landlord alleged the subtenants breached continuous operation covenants and conspired to harm the landlord by moving to new premises.

The court granted the landlord's motion to amend its claim to add two corporate subtenants.

However, the court found no privity of contract between the landlord and subtenants, and no applicable exception to the privity doctrine.

Furthermore, the court determined there was no evidence of unlawful conduct or intent directed towards the landlord to support the conspiracy claim.

Consequently, the subtenants' motion for summary judgment was granted, and the landlord's claims against them were dismissed.

Cricket Canada applied under the Arbitration Act, 1991, to set aside severable parts of an arbitration award issued by the Sport Dispute Resolution Centre of Canada (SDRCC).

The arbitration stemmed from allegations by Bilal Syed, an unsuccessful election candidate, concerning fraud, discrimination, bias, and by-law non-compliance in Cricket Canada's internal election process.

While the arbitrator ordered a new election, he also directed Cricket Canada to amend its by-laws and implement specific internal governance measures and prospective policy changes.

The court found these latter portions of the award to be outside the scope of the arbitration agreement and ultra vires the arbitrator's mandate, applying a correctness standard of review.

Consequently, these impugned decisions were set aside, while the remainder of the award, including the order for a new election, was allowed to stand.

The defendants/plaintiffs by counterclaim brought a motion to compel the plaintiffs/defendants by counterclaim to answer undertakings, questions taken under advisement, and refusals from a discovery examination.

The court applied Rules 31.06 and 29.2.03, considering relevance, scope of discovery, and proportionality.

The motion was largely dismissed, with the court ordering production only for Kersdale Investments Inc.'s financial documents and best efforts to obtain documents from a non-party for the Connaught Ave. project.

The applicant, a medical resident, sought judicial review of a decision by the Academic Appeals Committee upholding his dismissal from the anesthesia residency program.

He argued that deviations from his remediation plan, including timeline errors and lack of baseline testing, made the process manifestly unfair.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Appeals Committee's conclusion that the deviations were not significant enough to invalidate the remediation process was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

Maria Anna Koundouros brought a motion to strike the claim of her former mother-in-law, Stavroulla Koundouros, who sought repayment of $1,598,000 advanced to Maria and her son during their marriage.

Maria argued that a promissory note for the funds was solely between Stavroulla and her son, Nicolaos, and therefore no cause of action existed against her.

The court dismissed Maria's motion, finding that Stavroulla's claim, which included allegations of unjust enrichment and trust claims based on joint benefit and Maria's access to funds, disclosed a reasonable cause of action.

The court emphasized that the Family Law Rules, not the Rules of Civil Procedure, primarily govern such family disputes and that the promissory note was not dispositive at this early stage.

The plaintiffs successfully defeated the defendant's anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act and sought partial indemnity costs of $43,641.16.

The court considered the presumption in s. 137.1(8) that a successful responding party is not entitled to costs unless appropriate in the circumstances.

The court found that the plaintiffs' defamation claim was weak and appeared to be used strategically to extract a gag order from the defendant.

Given the strategic behaviour of both parties, the court declined to award costs to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs sued Greenpeace Canada for defamation and intentional interference with economic relations regarding statements about the plaintiffs' logging activities.

In its statement of defence, Greenpeace pleaded qualified privilege and a moral duty to publish the statements.

In reply, the plaintiffs pleaded sweeping allegations about the historical conduct of international Greenpeace organizations.

Greenpeace appealed a motion judge's refusal to strike these portions of the reply.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and struck the impugned paragraphs, finding they would improperly expand the scope of the litigation into an inquiry of the entire global Greenpeace movement, causing prejudice that outweighed any probative value.

The appellants appealed a decision.

At the hearing, an alleged conflict was raised.

The Divisional Court was unable to ascertain the facts respecting the alleged conflict on the record.

As a result, the appeal was adjourned to be heard on a later date with a newly constituted panel due to scheduling exigencies.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing their motion to strike portions of a reply in a defamation action.

The underlying action alleged defamatory statements and economic interference arising from publications about forestry practices in the Canadian boreal forest.

The reply pleading introduced allegations concerning a decades-long history of alleged unlawful campaigns by environmental organizations unrelated to the pleaded claim.

The court held there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge’s order permitting the expanded reply because it risked significantly broadening the scope of the litigation beyond the pleaded dispute.

Leave to appeal was granted given the importance of defining the permissible scope of reply pleadings and the risk of prejudice, delay, and unnecessary litigation costs.

The representative plaintiff in a class action sought leave to appeal an order refusing to approve a settlement and class counsel fees.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision.

The motions judge arguably erred by adding a new criterion of 'institutional fairness', mischaracterizing a non-exclusive licence as a property right, failing to consider the high-risk nature of the litigation, and incorrectly concluding he had no authority to alter class counsel fees.

The appeal raises important issues regarding settlement approval factors and copyright law.

The applicant sought judicial review of a university tribunal's decision upholding her required withdrawal from a family medicine residency program.

She argued that the university's unilateral decision to amend her schedule, deleting a four-week geriatric medicine rotation and continuing her in family medicine, was procedurally unfair.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the schedule change was a substantive academic decision within the university's discretion, made to better support the struggling student and ensure patient safety.

The court found no procedural unfairness or legitimate expectation that the schedule would not change.