Jordan Bryan Goldblatt

The defendants brought a motion to strike several paragraphs of the plaintiffs' Reply under Rule 25.11, arguing they were irrelevant, scandalous, and would prejudice the fair trial.

The plaintiffs also sought leave to amend their Reply to add a new paragraph.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding that the impugned paragraphs were a proper response to the defendants' pleading of a 'moral and social duty' and 'public interest' in their Statement of Defence.

The court also granted the plaintiffs leave to amend their Reply, finding no prejudice to the defendants.

Provincial sport association members of a national non-profit sought an order calling a members' meeting after the corporation's directors refused a requisition and then denied access to the membership list needed to call the meeting themselves.

The court held that the statutory exception permitting refusal where a proposal clearly seeks to enforce a personal claim or redress a personal grievance did not apply, because the dispute reflected broad policy and governance disagreements rather than a narrow personal vendetta.

The respondent's pending request to the Director for an exemption from disclosure of the members register did not create any stay or justify frustrating the applicants' meeting rights.

The court ordered the corporation to call a meeting to consider the resolutions set out in the April 2, 2015 notice.

Following the dismissal of a $200 million class action on summary judgment, the successful defendant sought costs of $154,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff and the Law Foundation of Ontario argued for a maximum of $60,000, citing the brevity of the hearing and the novelty and public interest of the issues under section 31(1) of the Class Proceedings Act.

The court rejected the public interest argument but acknowledged some novelty in the interpretation of the Gift Card Regulation.

Costs were fixed at $110,000 all-inclusive, payable by the plaintiff.

The applicants sought urgent scheduling of an interlocutory injunction motion in a constitutional challenge to amendments under the Fair Elections Act affecting federal voting procedures, including voter information cards and vouching.

The court held that requests for expedition must balance procedural fairness, potential irreparable harm, and the practicality of a timetable for the parties and the court.

Given the complexity of the Charter issues and the extensive social science and expert evidence, the court declined the very early hearing date sought by the applicants but ordered an expedited case-managed schedule culminating in a two-day motion hearing in July 2015.

On cross-motions for summary judgment in a certified class proceeding, the court determined common issues concerning prepaid wireless top-up balances and the Gift Card Regulation.

Applying modern contractual interpretation principles, the court held the agreements required subscribers to top up within the active period, with unused balances expiring at the end of that period and being forfeitable on the following day.

The court also held that the Gift Card Regulation applies only to gift cards as commonly understood, namely cards acquired as gifts for third parties, and not to prepaid wireless top-ups generally purchased for personal use.

Even where a prepaid phone card was purchased as a gift, there was no breach because the PIN receipts themselves had no expiry date.

The common issues were answered in favour of the defendant and the action was, in essence, dismissed.

The appellant, an undischarged bankrupt, appealed a motion judge's decision striking his claim.

He argued that a master's order authorized him to pursue the action nunc pro tunc.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that an undischarged bankrupt lacks the capacity to launch and pursue a civil action, and noting that the master's order did not purport to lift this disability.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss a breach of contract action on the basis that the plaintiff lacked legal capacity because he was an undischarged bankrupt.

The court considered the effect of s. 71 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the principle that property and causes of action vest in the trustee upon bankruptcy.

The plaintiff argued that the claim related to after-acquired property and could therefore be pursued personally.

The court rejected this argument, holding that an undischarged bankrupt cannot commence or maintain an action concerning property interests vested in the trustee, subject only to narrow statutory exceptions not applicable here.

The action was declared a nullity and dismissed as an abuse of process, prior orders obtained without notice were set aside, and substantial indemnity costs were awarded.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to strike the respondents' claim for intentional interference with economic relations.

The appellants argued the claim lacked sufficient particulars regarding unlawful conduct, actionable conduct against third parties, and damages.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the statement of claim and amended particulars provided sufficient material facts to allow the appellants to respond, and that the pleading adequately disclosed a reasonable cause of action.

In a certified copyright infringement class action, the representative plaintiff sought court approval of a proposed settlement under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The settlement would have required the defendant to fund a $350,000 cy‑près trust for public interest litigation, modify copyright notices, and receive non‑exclusive copyright licences from class members for court documents included in its legal database.

Individual class members would receive no monetary compensation, while class counsel sought $825,000 in fees.

The court held that the settlement was not fair, reasonable, or in the best interests of the class, emphasizing that it provided minimal benefit to class members while requiring them to grant valuable licences and releases.

The motions for settlement approval and counsel fee approval were dismissed.

The defendants sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court after a motion judge dismissed their motion to strike portions of the plaintiffs’ statement of claim alleging intentional interference with economic relations.

The action alleged that the defendants disseminated defamatory communications to customers and stakeholders and intimidated customers in an effort to disrupt business relationships.

The court considered the test under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure governing leave to appeal.

It found a conflicting decision regarding the sufficiency of pleadings and whether material facts may be supplied only after examinations for discovery.

Concluding that the issues raised a serious question about the correctness of the order and warranted appellate consideration, the court granted leave to appeal on all issues.

The defendants brought a Rule 21.01(1)(b) motion to strike portions of the statement of claim alleging intentional interference with economic relations in a defamation action.

They argued the plaintiffs failed to plead the constituent elements of the tort, including unlawful means directed at a third party and resulting economic loss.

The court held that the pleadings, read generously and together with the particulars provided, sufficiently alleged the elements of the tort, including allegations of intimidation and pressure directed at customers.

It was not plain and obvious that the claim would fail.

The motion to strike was therefore dismissed.

The purchaser of a dry cleaning business sought to rescind the purchase agreement, claiming a common mistake regarding the property's zoning.

The motion judge granted rescission, finding the parties shared a mistaken assumption that the business was a 'permitted use' under the zoning by-law.

The Court of Appeal allowed the vendor's appeal, holding that the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error.

The Court found no evidence of a shared assumption about the technical 'permitted use' status, noting the business operated as a legal non-conforming use.

The Court also held that the purchaser bore the risk of zoning issues under the principle of caveat emptor, as the agreement contained no zoning conditions.

The plaintiff, Canadian Pacific Railway Company, sought to convert an interim injunction into a permanent injunction to restrain the defendant truck drivers from picketing and blockading its Vaughan Intermodal Terminal.

The defendants, who were independent contractors for trucking companies serving CPR, had been protesting pay cuts.

Following reports of vandalism and safety concerns, the court found that the plaintiff met the test for an injunction and ordered that the existing interlocutory injunction be made permanent pending trial.

The defendant lawyer brought a motion to strike a negligence claim commenced by a former criminal client.

The plaintiff alleged negligent representation during his criminal trial, which resulted in convictions for mischief and forcible confinement followed by an absolute discharge.

The court held that the civil action constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the criminal convictions because proving causation would require relitigating the criminal trial and determining whether the plaintiff would have been acquitted.

Applying abuse of process principles articulated in Supreme Court and appellate jurisprudence, the court found the action undermined the integrity and finality of the adjudicative process.

The claim was dismissed in its entirety and costs were awarded to the defendant.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a decision certifying a class action under the Class Proceedings Act.

The court applied the test for leave to appeal under Rule 62.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision, the court dismissed the application for leave to appeal with costs.

The plaintiff sought certification of a proposed class action alleging copyright infringement against a legal publisher that reproduced lawyers’ court documents within an electronic research database without express permission.

The defendants argued the claim conflicted with the open court principle, lacked common issues, and would be unmanageable due to questions of originality, authorship, client participation, and solicitor‑client privilege.

The court held that the certification threshold is procedural and low under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, and that several systemic questions about the defendant’s conduct and defences, including fair dealing, implied consent, and public policy, were capable of common resolution.

Although issues such as authorship, ownership, and damages would require individual determinations, the court concluded these did not preclude certification.

The proposed class was narrowed to lawyers and paralegals in private practice, and the action was certified with modified common issues.

The appellants sought to set aside a paragraph of the trial judgment finding oppression against one of the corporate appellants.

The Court of Appeal declined the request, noting the issue was not raised during oral argument and that there was ample evidence to support the trial judge's finding of oppression independent of a specific loan.

The appellants' request was dismissed.

The respondent was largely successful on the appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario awarded costs to the respondent on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $25,000 inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

The respondent and the appellant entered into an oral agreement to share ownership of a carrageenan business, with the respondent holding a 40 per cent interest.

The business was incorporated, but no shares were ever issued to the respondent.

After a falling out, the respondent brought an application for an oppression remedy and wrongful dismissal.

The application judge found the respondent was a beneficial owner and awarded substantial compensation and damages for wrongful dismissal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the findings of liability, confirming that the respondent was a proper complainant under the Business Corporations Act, but slightly reduced the compensation award.

The personal respondent, Andrea Seepersaud, brought a Request for Order During Proceedings seeking to be removed from the human rights application.

She argued that as she was acting in the course of her employment as Executive Director, she could not be named as a respondent under section 46.3(1) of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, noting that individual employees can be held personally liable under section 9 of the Code.

The Tribunal found that the respondent's conduct was a central issue in the proceeding and that there was no institutional employer available to respond to the allegations, as the corporate respondent had closed.