Jordan Bryan Goldblatt

The moving party sought leave to file an appellate factum exceeding the 30-page limit, proposing a draft factum of approximately 125 pages.

The moving party argued that the issues were complex, the trial was long, and it needed to rely on proposed fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances justifying an extension.

The court emphasized the importance of conciseness and efficiency in appellate advocacy, noting that the moving party's choice to raise numerous grounds of appeal did not warrant an extended factum.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following an application to enforce two Letters of Request from a Florida court, directed at David Smith.

The underlying dispute involved allegations of a hate mail campaign orchestrated by Isaac Perlmutter against Harold Peerenboom, with David Smith allegedly involved.

All parties (Isaac and Laura Perlmutter, Harold Peerenboom, and David Smith) sought costs for the Canadian application.

The court found it impossible to meaningfully decide the issue of costs without knowing the ultimate results of the two related Florida actions, as the success or failure of the allegations would significantly impact the entitlement to costs.

Given the ongoing litigation and the direct interest of all parties in the outcome, the court ruled that each party should bear its own costs.

This endorsement arises from a case conference concerning two wrongful dismissal claims.

The plaintiff, Sonya Sekulic, sought to compel the defendant, Sunwing Airlines, to comply with an outstanding undertaking from an examination for discovery, specifically to provide contact information for two former employees (Patrick Heinke and Gordon Kenny) who were directly involved in the dismissal events.

The defendant resisted, citing professional conduct rules and the individuals' desire for privacy.

The court ruled that the unqualified undertaking must be complied with, as the individuals possessed relevant information and might be called as witnesses.

The court dismissed the defendant's arguments regarding professional conduct rules.

The defendant was ordered to provide the contact information, provide translations of documents, and pay the plaintiff costs for the undertakings motion.

Cricket Canada brought an application under section 17(8) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, to challenge the jurisdiction of the Sports Dispute Resolution Centre of Canada (SDRCC) and its appointed arbitrator.

The underlying dispute involved the Alberta Cricket Council (ACC) seeking membership in Cricket Canada, which Cricket Canada argued was outside the SDRCC's jurisdiction.

The court upheld the arbitrator's decision, finding that the SDRCC had jurisdiction over the dispute, interpreting "Sports-Related Dispute" broadly to include disputes among sport organizations concerning participation and membership entitlements.

The respondents brought a motion to strike an oppression remedy application under Rule 21.01(1)(b), arguing the applicant trust lacked standing, the respondents were not affiliates under the OBCA, the claim offended the rule in Foss v. Harbottle, and the applicant had no reasonable expectation regarding the respondents.

The court found that while a trust is not a justiciable entity and the respondents were not affiliates, the rule in Foss v. Harbottle did not strictly bar the claim due to the closely held nature of the corporation.

However, the application failed to plead facts establishing a reasonable expectation vis-à-vis the third-party respondents.

The motion to strike was granted, but the applicant was given 45 days to amend the pleadings.

The moving party sought a declaration that the bankrupt's debt to it, arising from a US judgment for trademark infringement enforced in Ontario, not be released upon his discharge from bankruptcy.

The court found that the bankrupt had obtained property by false pretences by selling counterfeit goods on Amazon.

Applying section 178(1)(e) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the court held that the debt survives the bankruptcy discharge, rejecting the bankrupt's public policy arguments regarding the quantum of statutory damages.

The applicant and three respondents sought a declaration that the respondent 2180366 Ontario Limited (218) failed to properly exercise a Right of First Refusal (ROFR) contained in a Partnership Agreement, which would permit the sale of shares from Parmantid Inc. to the applicant. 218 contended its exercise of the ROFR was unequivocal despite reserving certain rights.

The court found 218's exercise of the ROFR valid, determining that the reservation of rights was not a renegotiation of the purchase price but merely notice of a potential future entitlement, such as claims for unjust enrichment or set-off related to undisclosed liabilities.

Consequently, the Share Purchase Agreement between the applicant and the vendors became null and void.

The application was dismissed, and costs were awarded to 218 against the applicant and the other respondents.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order, raising two grounds: an alleged error in granting an adjournment for cross-examination, and an alleged error in balancing competing interests under s. 137.1(4)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's discretion regarding the adjournment and the balancing of interests, and clarifying the interpretation of the 60-day time limit for hearing motions under s. 137.2(2).

The plaintiff real estate brokerage sought commission from the corporate defendants after an initial agreement of purchase and sale was terminated during the due diligence period, and a subsequent agreement was entered into by a different corporate entity.

The court held a mini-trial to determine the ownership of the corporations, the intentionality of terminating the first agreement, and the circumstances of the second agreement.

The court found that the two corporations were separate legal entities with different investors, the first agreement was terminated legitimately due to unsatisfactory due diligence, and there was no basis to pierce the corporate veil.

The plaintiff's action was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision.

Prior to the appeal, the appellant's former counsel and the respondent's counsel exchanged emails and reached a settlement agreement, which included the appellant waiving his right of appeal and forgiving a loan in exchange for a waiver of costs.

The appellant subsequently argued he never intended to make a binding offer and that his counsel lacked authority.

The Court of Appeal held that the settlement should be enforced, as the appellant's counsel had authority to negotiate and no limitation on that authority was communicated to the respondent.

The appeal was allowed only to substitute an order in accordance with the settlement.

The plaintiff, OZ Merchandising Inc., sought to defer the determination of costs following the dismissal of its claims against the Eastern Ontario District Soccer Association (EODSA), The Ontario Soccer Association (OSA), and the Canadian Soccer Association (CSA).

The plaintiff also argued for a Bullock or Sanderson order and partial indemnity costs.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's requests, finding no basis to defer costs pending appeal or resolution of claims against other defendants.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the successful defendants from the date of their offers to settle, citing the plaintiff's egregious litigation conduct and the pursuit of unfounded allegations.

Additionally, the court found Omur Sezerman, a non-party, jointly and severally liable with the plaintiff for the trial costs due to his direct control over counsel and conduct undermining the administration of justice.

On appeal from a motion judge's decision, the Court of Appeal considered whether real estate sales commissions collected by a receiver of an insolvent brokerage firm constitute trust funds for the real estate salespersons who effected the sales, or form part of the assets available to creditors.

The motion judge found no trust existed, concluding that certainty of intention to create a trust had not been established.

The appellants (agents and their insurer) challenged this conclusion on two bases: that the motion judge erred in attaching significance to evidence weighing against a trust, and that he failed to attach sufficient significance to evidence supporting a trust.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in his weighing of evidence.

The court affirmed that formal trust agreements are not required for an implied trust to arise, but the absence of such provisions in the agent agreements, combined with financial statements showing commissions as assets rather than trust funds, supported the conclusion that no trust was intended.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's order requiring him to attend an examination for discovery with accommodations, arguing his medical condition (vascular malformation and conversion disorder) made him physically unable to attend without serious risk of harm.

The plaintiff also appealed the Master's costs award, arguing the Master was functus officio when extending the time for the defendant's costs submissions.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Master made no palpable and overriding error in assessing the medical evidence and had the discretion to extend the time for costs submissions before a formal order was entered.

The plaintiff, a corporate entity managing a sports facility, brought an action against several soccer associations for negligence and intentional interference with economic relations (unlawful means tort).

The claims arose from the issuance of International Transfer Certificates for two players, the non-approval of an invitational tournament, and communications regarding unsanctioned indoor soccer leagues.

The court dismissed the action, finding that no duty of care existed between the plaintiff and the associations, as the plaintiff was not a member and had actively distanced itself from them.

Furthermore, the court found no evidence of unlawful acts against third parties or intent to harm the plaintiff, and concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove any damages.

The defendant, a blogger reporting on municipal affairs, brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP).

The plaintiff, a former municipal administrator, sued over blog posts alleging he was dishonest and incompetent.

The court found the posts related to a matter of public interest but concluded the defamation claim had substantial merit and the defendant's defences could reasonably be rejected.

The court held that the harm to the plaintiff's reputation and employability outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression, and dismissed the motion.

The plaintiff employer brought a motion to continue a Mareva injunction freezing the assets of its former employee, who was alleged to have participated in a kickback scheme in Cuba resulting in over $500,000 in misappropriated funds.

The defendant opposed the motion, arguing material non-disclosure and lack of risk of asset dissipation.

The court applied the five-part test for a Mareva injunction and found the plaintiff established a strong prima facie case and sufficient risk of dissipation, ordering the injunction to continue.

During a civil jury trial involving claims of negligence and intentional interference with economic interests against various soccer associations, the defendants moved to strike the jury following the plaintiff's closing address.

The defendants argued that the plaintiff's counsel made 69 improper statements, including suggesting new legal claims, misstating the jury's role, attempting to adduce new evidence, and misstating the law and evidence.

The trial judge found that the plaintiff's counsel repeatedly crossed the line and that the cumulative effect of the misstatements rendered correction by an appropriate charge impossible.

The motion was granted, the jury was discharged, and the trial judge assumed responsibility for determining liability and damages.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for repayment of loans and a declaration of an equitable lien.

The plaintiff argued that communications in 2010 created an equitable mortgage or lien, or alternatively, that he was entitled to relief based on unjust enrichment, constructive trust, or promissory estoppel, which would invoke a 10-year limitation period.

The court found that the 2010 communications lacked the necessary detail and certainty to establish an equitable mortgage or lien, and that the plaintiff's decision to discharge the prior mortgage despite legal advice meant he assumed the risk of the debt being unsecured.

The court also rejected claims for unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and promissory estoppel, finding a juristic reason for the benefit (promissory notes) and no clear agreement for a new mortgage.

Consequently, most of the plaintiff's claims were statute-barred by the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002, except for a separate $12,000 loan made in 2015.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for real estate commission, intentional interference with economic relations, conspiracy, and breach of good faith.

The plaintiff alleged that the individual defendants used two corporate entities as alter egos to avoid paying commission on a property sale by structuring a second transaction after the first one failed.

The court found that the evidence regarding the corporate ownership structures and the defendants' intentionality in terminating the first agreement and entering the second was not definitively established on the record, raising genuine issues requiring a trial.

Consequently, the motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The defendants were, however, granted leave to amend their Statement of Defence.

The defendant, RBC Life Insurance Company, brought a motion to compel the plaintiff, Michael Scuglia, to attend an examination for discovery and cross-examination on an affidavit.

The plaintiff resisted, arguing that any form of examination would be harmful to his physical and mental health due to existing medical conditions, including a vascular malformation and conversion disorder.

The court reviewed medical evidence from both parties, finding the plaintiff's medical evidence unpersuasive regarding the risk of serious harm.

The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to meet the high onus to be relieved from discovery obligations and granted the defendant's motion, ordering the plaintiff to attend discovery and cross-examination with appropriate accommodations.