Kelly Yanan Wen Hou

The appellants sought a stay of an eviction order regarding their property pending their application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The respondent brought a cross-motion under Rule 37.16 to prohibit the appellants from bringing further interlocutory motions without leave.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the stay motion, finding the appeal devoid of merit and that the balance of convenience favoured the respondent.

The cross-motion was also dismissed, as the court found the appellants had not yet brought a multiplicity of frivolous or vexatious motions to the court at this stage.

The appellants sought to appeal an order granting leave to the respondent bank to issue a writ of possession.

The respondent brought a motion to quash the appeal on jurisdictional grounds.

The Court of Appeal held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as appeals from final orders of an associate judge must be brought to the Divisional Court, and appeals from interlocutory orders must be brought to a single judge of the Superior Court.

The motion to quash was granted and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The Bank of Nova Scotia brought a motion for leave to issue a writ of possession for a mortgaged property, following a 2015 judgment in its favour.

Louis and Effie Kakoutis, the plaintiffs and defendants to the counterclaim, opposed the motion.

The court reviewed the history of litigation, including prior actions, appeals, and a failed mediated settlement.

The court found that all persons in possession had received sufficient notice and that the requirements of the Rules of Civil Procedure were met.

The court granted leave to issue the writ of possession and ordered that, for seven months, service on the Kakoutises be at their new address.

No costs were awarded for the motion.

The Bank of Montreal (BMO) sought leave for an extension of time to issue a writ of seizure and sale against the defendant, Adams, more than six years after obtaining default judgment.

The court applied a two-part test: whether the plaintiff waived its rights or acquiesced in non-payment, and whether the debtor relied to his detriment.

The court found BMO met the low bar for the first part, but also found it unjust to penalize the debtor with interest accrued due to BMO's slow action.

Leave was granted, but the writ amount was limited to the judgment, interest, and costs up to December 31, 2019.

The Bank of Nova Scotia sought summary judgment against Emmanuel Anozie for an unpaid joint personal line of credit.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The defendant's arguments of non est factum and duress were rejected due to lack of misrepresentation, carelessness in signing, and absence of illegitimate pressure.

Following a successful summary judgment motion dismissing the plaintiffs' action, the successful defendant sought costs of $25,000 to $30,000 on a substantial indemnity basis, relying on an expired offer to settle.

The plaintiffs argued for costs in the range of $10,000 to $15,000.

The court found that substantial indemnity costs were not justified as the offer to settle had expired long before the motion and the case raised important issues for the plaintiffs.

The court awarded the defendant costs on a partial indemnity scale in the amount of $23,376.43.

The defendant, a second mortgagee, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action alleging an improvident sale of a property under a power of sale.

The plaintiffs, who held a third mortgage, received nothing from the sale and claimed the defendant failed to obtain fair market value and inflated costs.

The court found that the sale was not improvident, noting the property had been recently exposed to the market, the sale price was supported by appraisals, and the purchaser was ready and willing to close.

The court also held that the plaintiffs had already received an accounting and any further dispute regarding costs should be pursued through the assessment process under the Mortgages Act.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action dismissed.

This trial decision addresses complex family law issues following a three-and-a-half-year marriage, including parenting and decision-making for the parties' biological child (G), whether the respondent stood in the place of a parent for the applicant's two older children (R and F), child support, spousal support, and property division.

The court found joint custody unfeasible due to the respondent's lack of cooperation and self-serving actions, establishing a parallel parenting regime with the applicant having primary decision-making for education, health, and extra-curriculars, and the respondent for religion.

The respondent was found to stand in the place of a parent for R and F, leading to a child support obligation for all three children, albeit reduced for R and F due to the marriage's short duration.

The applicant was found entitled to compensatory spousal support for five years.

Crucially, the respondent's claim for an equitable interest in the matrimonial home was dismissed due to his "unclean hands" stemming from significant financial disclosure failings and litigation misconduct.

An equalization payment and occupation rent were ordered in favour of the applicant, along with compensation for chattels.

The plaintiff, Sun Rise Elephant Property Investment Corporation, brought a motion seeking leave to issue a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) on two condominium units owned by the defendants, Peter Luu and Adrienne Eunyin Wong.

The plaintiff alleged that it had paid deposits for the units through nominee purchasers and claimed a resulting and/or constructive trust over the properties due to the defendants' alleged failure to repay the deposits.

The court found that there was a triable issue regarding an interest in land, satisfying the initial threshold for a CPL.

However, upon considering the equitable factors (Dhunna factors), the court determined that the equities favored the defendants.

The court emphasized that a CPL is not intended to secure a claim for damages, and since the plaintiff's claim was primarily for monetary repayment and damages were easily calculable and a satisfactory remedy, the motion for leave to issue the CPL was dismissed.

The defendant solicitor brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' claims against him for damages for an improvident sale and for an accounting of sale proceeds.

The plaintiffs, who were third mortgagees, conceded the improvident sale claim against the solicitor.

However, they maintained the claim for an accounting, arguing the solicitor owed a duty to disburse funds honestly and account to subsequent encumbrancers under the Mortgages Act.

The court found the accounting claim was not doomed to fail and dismissed the motion to strike it, but ordered that the claim against the solicitor would be struck if he provided the accounting within 10 days.