Mehrnaz Asad

The appellants defaulted on their mortgage by failing to pay property taxes, as well as defaulting on a line of credit and Mastercard.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the respondent bank and dismissed the appellants' counterclaim, though permitting mortgage reinstatement upon payment of costs.

On appeal, the appellants argued the bank acted unfairly.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the liability determinations and confirming the bank had no obligation to accommodate requests for interest rate reductions.

The self-represented mortgagors brought a motion, treated from a notice of application, seeking a determination of the amount owing under a mortgage together with broader discharge-related and damages remedies following an earlier summary judgment decision.

The court held that all relief other than fixing the mortgage balance fell outside the case conference direction, improperly attempted to reargue the dismissed counterclaim, or would have to be advanced, if at all, in a new action subject to issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel.

On the merits, the court rejected the alleged waiver of interest and the borrowers' attempt to deduct again payments already reflected in the agreed principal balance.

The mortgagee's calculation was accepted, fixing the amount owing at $791,159.83 as of the hearing date, inclusive of accrued interest, the prepayment charge, and the tax account payoff.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to set aside a default judgment obtained by the respondent credit card company for unpaid charges.

The motion judge applied the Mountain View factors and found that all but one weighed against the appellant, including a lengthy unexplained delay in bringing the motion and a lack of plausible excuse for the default.

While the motion judge accepted the appellant's proposed defence had an air of reality, she found it weak and insufficient to overcome the other factors.

The Court of Appeal found no basis for appellate interference, holding the motion judge properly exercised her discretion in weighing the factors holistically.

The Bank of Nova Scotia brought a motion for leave to issue a writ of possession for a mortgaged property, following a 2015 judgment in its favour.

Louis and Effie Kakoutis, the plaintiffs and defendants to the counterclaim, opposed the motion.

The court reviewed the history of litigation, including prior actions, appeals, and a failed mediated settlement.

The court found that all persons in possession had received sufficient notice and that the requirements of the Rules of Civil Procedure were met.

The court granted leave to issue the writ of possession and ordered that, for seven months, service on the Kakoutises be at their new address.

No costs were awarded for the motion.

This is a motion for default judgment in a defamation action.

The plaintiff, Seyed Mansour Hosseini, sued the defendant, Hamid Gharagozloo, for publishing videos and statements online that falsely implicated him in the assassination of a spiritual leader and collaboration with the Iranian regime.

The defendant failed to file a defence after his anti-SLAPP motion was dismissed.

The court found the defendant liable for defamation, noting his malice and the egregious nature of the online publications.

The court awarded the plaintiff $400,000 in general and aggravated damages, and $180,000 in costs, but declined to issue an injunction for removal of content or a forced apology due to feasibility and futility concerns.

The defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action.

The plaintiff sued the defendant over several videos posted online that allegedly implicated the plaintiff in a conspiracy to assassinate the spiritual leader of the Gonabadi Sufis in Iran.

The court found that while the defendant's expression related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff's defamation claim had substantial merit and the defendant's defences of justification and qualified privilege lacked a real prospect of success.

The court concluded that the public interest in permitting the action to continue outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression, as truth and justice favoured a trial on the merits.

The motion was dismissed.