Daniel Ciarabellini

The appellants sought to enforce a Property Partnership Agreement granting them an option to purchase a residential property from the respondent, their mother.

The application judge declared the Agreement unenforceable on the basis that it contained an incomplete essential term regarding distribution of excess sale proceeds, and further found undue influence, breach of fiduciary duty, and unconscionability.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the incomplete term was non-essential and severable, that no presumption of undue influence arose given the respondent's capacity and the specific nature of the relationship, that independent legal advice was received before the Agreement was signed, and that the unconscionability analysis failed to meet the threshold established in Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller.

The cross-appeal was dismissed as moot.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and uttering threats, raising grounds of inadequate trial interpretation and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal found that while interpretation issues were minor, trial counsel's failure to investigate and utilize a surreptitious audio recording of the complainant's conversation, which contradicted her testimony on a key credibility point, constituted ineffective assistance.

This failure, combined with the trial judge's misapprehension of evidence, rendered the verdict unreliable.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The plaintiff brought a motion to enjoin unidentified defendants (John Doe and Jane Doe) from posting defamatory online reviews and to require the removal of existing reviews.

The court granted the injunction against the unidentified authors.

Additionally, the court set aside its previous injunction and Norwich Order against Google after the parties jointly submitted that Google had not been properly served by email under Rule 16.01.

A new consent order regarding Google's disclosure of the reviewers' identities was issued.

The moving party, a hotel operator, sought a pre-claim interim injunction under Rule 37.17 to remove allegedly fake and defamatory Google reviews, as well as a Norwich Order to identify the anonymous posters.

The court found strong grounds that the reviews were fabricated and causing continuous damage to the business.

The court also considered whether email service of the motion materials to Google was adequate, given that Rule 16.01 generally requires personal service for originating processes.

The court held that while a pre-claim motion should typically require personal service to ensure procedural fairness, email service was sufficient in this case because Google publicly designates specific email addresses for legal notices and removals.

The interim injunction and Norwich Order were granted.

This endorsement clarifies previous orders regarding costs and an injunction.

A dispute arose concerning the liability of the Estate of Maria De Fatima Sardinha for costs of a prior motion.

The court found that the Estate had consistently advised it was not opposing the motion, and therefore, it should not be liable for costs.

The court also clarified that the injunction against all defendants, including the Estate, remains in effect until trial or further order, and that the costs order (excluding the Estate and Michael Freeborn) is joint and several, with Angie Sardinha-Farias's liability capped at $40,000 and the total award at $100,000.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his certiorari application, which sought to quash an appeal judge's order disqualifying his unlicensed agent and refusing an adjournment in a provincial offences appeal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the appeal judge correctly applied the principles for disqualifying agents, particularly where the agent engaged in misconduct by intentionally concealing their involvement.

The court affirmed its inherent authority to control its processes and ensure the integrity of proceedings.

The adjournment issue was deemed moot as the appellant was permitted to restart his appeal.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for unlawfully undertaking development within 120 metres of a provincially significant wetland without permission from the Halton Regional Conservation Authority.

The appeal addressed four main issues: the reasonableness of the convictions, alleged infringements of section 7 Charter rights (including disclosure and abuse of process), alleged infringements of section 11(b) Charter rights (unreasonable delay), and the appropriateness of the sentences imposed.

The court dismissed the appeals against conviction and the Charter applications, finding the convictions reasonable and no Charter breaches.

However, the court partially allowed the appeal against sentence, reducing one appellant's fine, vacating the other's fine and substituting a suspended sentence, and amending the probation order to a one-year term with specific conditions, while upholding the remediation order.

Other counts were conditionally stayed based on the Kienapple principle.

The judgment creditor requested an urgent motion for contempt, alleging the judgment debtors failed to comply with court orders to produce documents and repay funds obtained by fraud.

The individual judgment debtor appeared in person, conceded the debt, and proposed a payment schedule from foreign accounts.

The court scheduled the contempt motion but set out a timetable allowing the motion to be cancelled if the judgment debtor makes the proposed payments.

The judgment creditor sought urgent relief to prevent the judgment debtors from continuing to ignore court orders and to repay funds allegedly obtained by fraud.

The court found the matter urgent under the Chief Justice's COVID-19 Notice to the Profession and scheduled a telephone case conference, providing procedural directions for electronic service and filing.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that allowed the respondent's appeal from sentence for assault against his wife.

The respondent had pleaded guilty to assaulting his wife in 2016 and had received an absolute discharge in 2011 for a previous assault on the same victim.

The trial judge refused to grant a second discharge, citing the first discharge's failure to deter the respondent.

The appeal court allowed the respondent's appeal, finding the trial judge erred in considering the discharge, which was protected from disclosure under the Criminal Records Act.

The appeal court remitted the matter for a new sentencing hearing.

The Crown appealed on two grounds: the interpretation of the Criminal Records Act and the appeal court's authority to remit the matter.

The appellant Crown appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge on the respondent who pled guilty to importing hashish contrary to s. 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The trial judge had found s. 6(3)(a) of the CDSA and its combined effect with Criminal Code s. 742.1(c) to be unconstitutionally overbroad under s. 7 of the Charter, rendering the respondent eligible for a conditional sentence.

The trial judge imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day and 18 months' probation.

On appeal, the Crown conceded that given the respondent's changed circumstances, time already served, and community service completed, reincarceration was not warranted, and requested the sentence be stayed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and varied the sentence to time served, with the probation order remaining in effect.