Daniel I. Reisler

The plaintiff was rear-ended in a motor vehicle accident and claimed soft tissue damages, chronic pain, anxiety, and depression.

The defendant admitted liability, and the sole issue at trial was damages.

The trial judge qualified a defence psychiatrist as an expert despite serious reservations about his methodology and independence.

The expert's testimony focused primarily on alleged inconsistencies between what the plaintiff told him and her medical records, essentially attacking her credibility rather than providing independent psychiatric assessment.

The jury awarded only general damages of $23,500 and rejected all other heads of damages.

On appeal, the court found the trial judge failed to properly discharge his gatekeeper duty by not conducting a cost-benefit analysis at the qualification stage and failed to exercise his ongoing gatekeeper function when the expert's lack of impartiality became apparent during testimony.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss a social host liability claim arising from a party where an underage guest became intoxicated and was seriously injured in a car accident after leaving.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues of material fact that could not be fairly and justly determined on summary judgment.

The court also held that the established law on social host liability, particularly *Childs v. Desormeaux*, did not preclude a duty of care in this case, especially given the presence of underage drinking and the host's supervisory role.

State Farm insured a property damaged by fire and issued a cheque to Alfedany.

A person purporting to be Alfedany cashed the cheque at Money Mart.

Alfedany later claimed he had not received the cheque and disputed the endorsement as forged.

State Farm brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss Money Mart's action seeking payment as a "holder in due course." The court found the cheque's negotiation was affected by fraud or illegality, meaning Money Mart was not deemed a "holder in due course" under s. 57(2) of the Bills of Exchange Act.

Furthermore, Money Mart failed to prove it was a "holder in due course" under s. 55(1) due to its wilful disregard of multiple discrepancies in the customer's identity, which indicated a lack of good faith.

The court also noted that even if Money Mart were a holder in due course, it would be barred from enforcing payment by s. 48(1) of the Act due to the forged signature, as State Farm was not estopped from raising this defence.

State Farm's motion for summary judgment was granted, and Money Mart's claim was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the defendants' motion for leave to appeal, the successful plaintiff sought costs of $3,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendants argued the amount was excessive and suggested $1,000, noting their own costs would have been $1,893.

The court considered the principles of proportionality and the reasonable expectations of the losing party, fixing costs at $2,000 all inclusive.

Following a jury verdict awarding the plaintiff $1,837,500 for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident, the court determined whether the defendants could deduct a prior $1,423,323.49 Statutory Accident Benefits (SABs) settlement from the tort award.

The court found that the defendants met their burden to show subject matter and temporal matching between the SABs settlement and the jury's awards for future medical/rehabilitation and attendant care needs.

However, the court held that the deductible SABs amounts must be reduced by the legal fees incurred by the plaintiff to obtain the SABs settlement, as well as certain quantifiable expenses incurred after the settlement.

Following a jury verdict awarding the plaintiff $1,837,500 for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident, the defendants sought to deduct Statutory Accident Benefits (SABs) previously settled by the plaintiff.

The court held that the defendants met the strict burden of proving subject-matter and temporal matching between the jury's future care awards and the SABs settlement categories.

However, the court ruled that the deductible SABs amounts must be reduced by a pro-rata share of the legal fees the plaintiff incurred to obtain the SABs settlement, preventing the tortfeasors from unfairly benefiting from the plaintiff's expense.

Following a ten‑day motor vehicle accident trial in which the plaintiffs’ damages claims were dismissed, the defendant sought substantial indemnity costs exceeding $250,000.

The defendant relied primarily on prior settlement offers to justify the elevated costs scale.

The court held that substantial indemnity costs were not warranted because there was no reprehensible conduct and the parties’ settlement positions were reasonable given the contested medical causation and income loss issues.

Exercising discretion under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court fixed partial indemnity costs at $170,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The plaintiff sought damages for personal injuries arising from a motor vehicle accident where liability was admitted.

The plaintiff claimed damages for pain and suffering, past income loss, and future income loss, alleging the accident caused chronic neck, back, and shoulder pain, as well as carpal tunnel syndrome.

The court found that the carpal tunnel syndrome was not caused by the accident.

Furthermore, the court held that the plaintiff's injuries did not meet the statutory threshold for non-pecuniary damages, as the impairments were neither permanent nor serious, relying heavily on medical evidence of reversible muscular imbalance and extensive video surveillance showing the plaintiff engaging in vigorous physical activities.

The claims for past and future income loss were also dismissed, as the plaintiff's decision to leave work was deemed unreasonable and the contingencies for future loss were not established as real and substantial possibilities.

The action was dismissed.

This was a costs and terms endorsement following a partially successful duty to defend application.

The applicants obtained a duty to defend against three insurer respondents but were unsuccessful against the service provider respondents.

The court awarded costs to the applicants against each insurer respondent, awarded partial indemnity costs to the successful service provider respondents in reduced amounts where appropriate, and declined to make a Sanderson order or determine disputed supplementary payments coverage issues within the costs proceeding.

The court also ordered each insurer respondent to pay a share of defence costs already incurred in the underlying action, excluding adverse costs awards, and imposed terms governing the appointment and reporting obligations of independent counsel because of conflicts of interest.

The applicants sought declarations that contractor respondents and their CGL insurers owed duties to defend and indemnify them for legal costs arising from third party claims in underlying vaccine spoilage litigation.

The court held that, for a duty to defend analysis involving third party claims, the statement of claim and the relevant third party claims must be read together.

Applying the pleadings rule and the mere possibility of coverage standard, the court found that three insurer respondents owed a duty to defend, but only with respect to the negligence-based vendor and service-provider claims, not the distinct claims concerning the applicants' own contractual representations and warehouse operations.

The service contracts did not themselves impose a separate contractual duty to defend, only indemnity obligations.

Defence responsibility for the covered category was apportioned equally among the three insurers, and independent counsel was required due to conflict.

The plaintiffs sought certification of a proposed class action arising from explosions at a propane facility in Toronto that allegedly caused personal injury, property damage, and evacuation of nearby residents.

The court considered the certification requirements under s. 5 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

It held that the pleadings against certain landlord defendants failed to disclose a viable cause of action because the allegations relying on agency, single‑group enterprise, and alter‑ego theories lacked material facts capable of piercing the corporate veil.

Those pleadings were struck with leave to amend and the certification motion against those defendants was adjourned.

The proceeding was otherwise certified as a class action against the remaining defendants, with common issues approved and representative plaintiffs appointed.

Following a jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident involving an impaired driver, the plaintiff sought to sign judgment without applying the statutory deductible under s. 267.5 and s. 267.7 of the Insurance Act.

The plaintiff argued the tavern defendant had waived reliance on the deductible by objecting to proposed jury questions that would have apportioned liability solely between the driver and the tavern.

The court rejected the waiver argument, finding the jury’s answers effectively determined the tavern’s negligence at one percent and the driver’s responsibility at the balance.

Applying the principles in Sullivan Estate v. Bond, the court held that an unprotected defendant is liable only for its proportionate share of the statutory deductible.

Judgment was therefore to be signed with the tavern responsible only for one percent of the $30,000 deductible.

Following a jury verdict in a complex personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident involving a licensed establishment, the successful plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs exceeding $300,000.

The defendant argued that its offers to settle should affect the costs award and that the statutory deductible under s. 267.5(9) of the Insurance Act should be deducted from the damages when assessing whether settlement offers were exceeded.

The court held that the statutory deductible must not be subtracted when determining entitlement to costs, following appellate authority.

Although the defendant’s settlement offers did not comply with Rule 49.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, they remained relevant under Rule 49.13 as discretionary factors.

Considering proportionality, the complexity of the trial, the amount recovered compared to the amount claimed, and counsel conduct during trial, the court fixed costs at $150,000 plus HST and disbursements.

Supplementary reasons regarding a sealing order and costs following an appeal.

The court varied the broad sealing orders made by the Master and a single judge, restricting the sealing order to only the inadvertently disclosed privileged document, as there was no demonstrable prejudice to justify sealing the entire court file.

The court also fixed the successful plaintiff's costs of the motion for leave to appeal and the appeal at $25,000 on a partial indemnity basis, declining to award substantial indemnity costs.

The defendant appealed a decision of a Superior Court judge that overturned a Master's order removing the plaintiff's solicitors of record.

The plaintiff's solicitors had inadvertently received a privileged opinion letter from the defendant's counsel.

Applying the test from Celanese Canada Inc., the Divisional Court found no real risk of material prejudice to the defendant, as the document could not be used at trial and the solicitor had not read the details.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a judgment dismissing their claims for damages after the appellant slipped and fell in her apartment building's parking lot.

They argued the trial judge erred in admitting hospital and ambulance records regarding the mechanism of the fall, allowing them to be used as prior inconsistent statements, and in instructing the jury on the standard of care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the records were properly admitted as circumstantial evidence of prior inconsistent statements and the jury instructions on reasonable care were appropriate.