Christopher I.R. Morrison

In a delayed-diagnosis medical malpractice action, the defendant physician appealed findings on liability only.

The court reviewed the trial judge’s negligence and causation analysis and found no reversible error.

The appeal was dismissed and the liability determination stood.

The appellant insurer appealed a partial summary judgment declaring it responsible for covering water damage to the respondent's property.

The insurer had denied coverage based on an exclusionary clause for water entering through basement walls, arguing it applied because water from a burst watermain entered via a pipe transecting the basement wall.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the plain meaning of 'wall' does not include a pipe, as they serve conflicting functions.

The court held that any ambiguity in the exclusionary clause must be resolved against the insurer who drafted the policy.

The plaintiff contractor performed emergency and restoration services on a property insured by the defendant insurer after a flood.

The property owner went bankrupt before paying the contractor for the restoration work.

The contractor sued the insurer for the unpaid amounts, alleging breach of contract, negligence, conversion, and unjust enrichment, arguing the insurer should have paid the contractor directly or issued co-payable cheques.

The insurer moved for summary judgment.

The court granted the motion and dismissed the action, finding no contract existed between the insurer and the contractor, the insurer owed no duty of care to the contractor to ensure payment, the contractor had no ownership interest in the insurance proceeds to support a conversion claim, and the insurer was not unjustly enriched.

The applicant brought an application under s. 17(8) of the Arbitration Act, 1991 to set aside an arbitral tribunal's preliminary ruling that it had jurisdiction to decide a dispute between the parties.

The dispute arose from emergency repair work performed by the applicant at the respondent's power plant, which allegedly caused $10 million in damages.

The respondent initiated arbitration based on a 2009 'Purchase Order General Terms and Conditions' document signed by the applicant.

The court conducted a hearing de novo and found that the 2009 document was an inchoate agreement that was never incorporated into the 2018 purchase order for the repair work.

Applying the objective theory of contract formation, the court concluded there was no consensus ad idem regarding an arbitration agreement.

The arbitral tribunal's decision was set aside for lack of jurisdiction.

The plaintiff sued her insurer following a fire loss and a disputed appraisal process under section 128 of the Insurance Act.

The defendant insurer brought a Rule 21 motion seeking to force the plaintiff to elect whether she was challenging the appraisal itself (which would require judicial review at the Divisional Court) or proceeding with the action.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, finding it was not brought promptly under Rule 2.02 and Rule 21.02, as the defendant had been aware of the jurisdictional issue since the outset of the litigation and had already participated in a summary judgment motion.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking damages for breach of an insurance contract and bad faith following a house fire.

The parties had previously engaged in an appraisal process under s. 128 of the Insurance Act but disagreed on the interpretation of the resulting report, specifically regarding deductions for prior payments and entitlement to replacement cost value versus actual cash value.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding genuine issues of credibility regarding the appraisal discussions, the cause of the delay in rebuilding, and the bad faith allegations that required a trial.

The court also granted in part the defendant's motion to strike certain paragraphs of the plaintiff's Reply.

The applicant sought a declaration that his homeowner's insurer had a duty to defend and indemnify him in an underlying action arising from an incident at a summer camp.

The underlying claim alleged that the applicant pulled the plaintiff's head back, kneed him, and punched him, pleading both negligence and assault and battery.

The insurer denied coverage based on an intentional acts exclusion.

The court dismissed the application, finding the duty to indemnify was premature and the duty to defend was not triggered because the negligence claim was entirely derivative of the intentional tort of battery, which fell squarely within the policy's exclusion clause.

The plaintiff brought a motion to add two utility entities as defendants in a personal injury action arising from a pedestrian–vehicle collision, alleging inadequate street lighting contributed to the accident.

The proposed defendants argued the motion was barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court considered discoverability and whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in identifying the proposed defendants.

It held that police notes referencing very poor lighting and early evidence about visibility should have prompted investigation into the lighting system within the limitation period.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate reasonable diligence in investigating potential liability for street lighting maintenance.

The motion to add the proposed defendants was therefore dismissed as statute‑barred.

Following a prior decision granting summary judgment to one defendant insurer and refusing the plaintiffs leave to amend their pleadings, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The successful defendant sought costs jointly and severally against the plaintiffs and the co‑defendant insurance broker.

The court determined the appropriate quantum using standard partial indemnity rates and rejected arguments that delay in bringing the summary judgment motion should reduce the award.

Applying the principles governing Bullock and Sanderson orders and the factors articulated in Moore v. Wienecke, the court concluded that a Sanderson order was fair because the broker cross‑claimed against the successful defendant and the plaintiffs reasonably joined both defendants due to uncertainty regarding responsibility for inadequate insurance coverage.

The broker was ordered to pay the successful defendant’s costs.

The plaintiffs moved for leave under Rule 26 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to amend their statement of claim to allege that the insurer failed to properly assess and adjust their business interruption loss following a fire.

The insurer opposed the amendment, arguing it constituted a new cause of action outside the one‑year contractual limitation period and brought a cross‑motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim.

The court held that the proposed amendment introduced a new factual basis for liability—post‑loss adjustment of the claim—distinct from the existing allegation that the defendants failed to place adequate insurance coverage prior to the loss.

As the limitation period had expired, the amendment was barred.

With no viable claim remaining against the insurer, summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim and the broker’s crossclaim was granted.

Following dismissal of a summary judgment motion brought by a co-defendant seeking to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim and a cross-claim, the court addressed costs between the co-defendants.

The responding insurer sought partial-indemnity costs exceeding $13,000 after successfully opposing the motion, arguing the matter involved moderate complexity and significant financial exposure under the Insurance Act.

The moving defendant argued the costs were excessive and should either be reduced or made payable in the cause, particularly given the prematurity of the summary judgment motion and issues surrounding the insurer’s standing.

The court held that the insurer was entitled to costs as the successful party but reduced the amount claimed, finding the requested sum excessive in the circumstances.

Costs were fixed at $6,750 payable by the moving defendant.

The defendant dealership moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' personal injury claim and the co-defendant insurer's cross-claim, arguing that the driver's prior criminal conviction for taking the vehicle without consent conclusively established a lack of consent.

The co-defendant insurer opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the criminal conviction did not have preclusive effect because the driver faced little jeopardy and there was no robust examination of the facts.

The court also held that the insurer had standing to oppose the motion and maintain its cross-claim despite not yet having indemnified the plaintiffs, in order to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.