I.V.B. Nordheimer

The moving party brought a motion to quash an appeal filed in the Court of Appeal, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction.

The responding party acknowledged the error and requested a transfer to the Divisional Court under section 110(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash and declined to order a transfer, finding the proposed appeal lacked obvious merit and that further delay would prejudice the moving party given significant unpaid support and costs arrears.

The appellant, an inmate serving a life sentence, appealed an order dismissing his motion to appoint counsel and striking his statement of claim against the respondent regarding a disciplinary proceeding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusions that there is generally no authority to appoint counsel in civil proceedings, that the Human Rights Code does not apply to federal institutions, and that the claim lacked material facts and constituted an abuse of process.

The appellant purchaser appealed a summary judgment finding she breached an agreement of purchase and sale.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellant was never in a position to close the transaction.

A one-day error by the respondent in setting the closing date was deemed minor and immaterial to the appellant's ability to complete the purchase.

The appellant appealed an order striking his fresh as amended statement of claim against the individual respondents without leave to amend.

The claim alleged constructive dismissal, defamation, conspiracy, discrimination, and breach of Law Society rules following his resignation from the respondent law firm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the pleadings lacked material facts, failed to disclose viable causes of action, and could not be saved by further amendment.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the mandatory notice requirements for constitutional issues under s. 109 of the Courts of Justice Act had not been complied with, depriving the Attorneys General of the opportunity to participate.

Consequently, the court set aside the order below and directed that any further pursuit of the matter must be reheard before the Superior Court on proper notice.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision that dismissed his action based on the defence of qualified privilege.

The Court of Appeal found no errors of law, legal principle, or palpable and overriding errors of fact in the motion judge's decision to proceed by summary judgment or in her analysis of qualified privilege.

The court also rejected the appellant's argument that the hearing was unfair.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order regarding spousal support, life insurance, occupation rent, and the valuation of net family property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law, principle, or palpable and overriding error of fact in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence.

The court also declined to address the issue of pre- and post-judgment interest as it was not raised at trial.

The appellant sought to certify a class action against the municipality for property damage caused by pinhole leaks in copper plumbing, allegedly resulting from the addition of sodium hydroxide to the municipal water supply.

The motion judge certified the negligence claim but struck the nuisance claim, finding it barred by s. 449 of the Municipal Act, 2001, which precludes nuisance claims related to the escape of water from water works.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, agreeing that the nuisance claim was plainly and obviously barred by the ordinary meaning of the statute.

The Court also dismissed the appellant's argument that a breach of contract claim should have been certified, as it was not argued before the motion judge.

The appellants, limited partners in a family-owned limited partnership, appealed the dismissal of their application seeking a declaration that they were entitled to an annual cash distribution of 100% of the partnership's net income.

They argued that section 11(1) of the Limited Partnerships Act and the Accumulations Act mandated such distributions, overriding the general partner's discretion under the limited partnership agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the right to a 'share' of profits under the Act does not equate to a statutory obligation to make annual payments, and that the Accumulations Act does not apply to commercial endeavours.

The appellants, owners of a dental clinic, appealed the dismissal of their action against a former independent contractor dentist who left to start his own practice.

The appellants alleged conversion, improper solicitation of patients and employees, appropriation of confidential information, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the dentists carried on independent practices, the departing dentist only contacted his own patients to fulfill professional obligations, and the patient information accessed was not confidential.

The court also rejected claims regarding breach of fiduciary duty and the contractual duty of good faith.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment awarding the respondent $1,191,727.94 for a defaulted mortgage.

The appellant argued she was denied a fair hearing because her visual impairment was not adequately accommodated.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the appellant had previously been granted two adjournments and did not request a further adjournment based on her disability at the hearing.

The motion judge's decision finding no triable issues was upheld.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges of causing death while driving with excess blood-drug concentration (THC) and dangerous driving causing death, following a fatal collision with a horse and buggy.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent on the basis that the Crown failed to prove a causal nexus between the respondent's impairment and the collision, and failed to establish a marked departure from the standard of care.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that section 320.14(3) of the Criminal Code does not require proof that the impairment itself caused the death, only that the accused caused the death while committing the predicate offence.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in applying the modified objective standard for dangerous driving.

A new trial was ordered.

The moving party sought leave to appeal from a Divisional Court order that dismissed his motion for leave to appeal under Rule 2.1.

The Divisional Court had ruled it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal from decisions of the Information and Privacy Commissioner.

The Court of Appeal found it had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a dismissal of a motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed as an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.

The appellant, an undischarged bankrupt, commenced an action against his former landlord for the disposal of business assets and related mental distress.

The motion judge dismissed the action as a nullity, finding that only the trustee in bankruptcy had the capacity to sue.

On appeal, the appellant argued the assets were exempt 'tools of the trade' under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the exemption limit was only $11,300, the claim sought damages rather than the return of property, and the mental distress claim was inextricably linked to the property claim belonging to the bankrupt estate.

The appellant insurer appealed a partial summary judgment declaring it responsible for covering water damage to the respondent's property.

The insurer had denied coverage based on an exclusionary clause for water entering through basement walls, arguing it applied because water from a burst watermain entered via a pipe transecting the basement wall.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the plain meaning of 'wall' does not include a pipe, as they serve conflicting functions.

The court held that any ambiguity in the exclusionary clause must be resolved against the insurer who drafted the policy.

The appellant, a defendant in an ongoing Superior Court action, commenced a separate action against the opposing counsel and their law firm, alleging negligence, misrepresentation, fraud, and conspiracy.

The motion judge dismissed the action under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's decision, as opposing counsel owed no duty of care to the appellant and the statement of claim failed to particularize any valid causes of action.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences arising from a traffic stop.

He argued the stop and subsequent search were the result of racial profiling, violating his Charter rights, and that the trial judge erred in admitting the firearm under s. 24(2) despite finding a s. 10(b) breach.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the stop was based on driving behaviour, not racial profiling, and that the subsequent investigative steps were lawfully based on observations made during the stop.

The court found no error in the trial judge's Grant analysis and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible for several offences committed during an acute episode of delirium.

The Ontario Review Board subsequently issued a detention order, finding he posed a significant threat to public safety.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the Board's decision unreasonable, as it failed to identify evidence meeting the high threshold for a significant threat and failed in its inquisitorial duty to probe the equivocal evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the detention order was set aside, and an absolute discharge was granted.

The appellant appealed his robbery convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his application to adduce unknown third-party suspect evidence regarding a subsequent attempted carjacking.

The Court of Appeal found that even if the trial judge erred by referring to certain witness testimony, her core reasoning applying the Grant framework was sound.

The trial judge correctly concluded the two incidents were not sufficiently similar to suggest the same individuals committed both offences.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence of two years less a day for break and enter and careless storage of firearms, seeking the substitution of a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was not manifestly unfit and rejected claims of reasonable apprehension of bias.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to reduce the sentence by 41 days to account for pre-sentence custody credit.