Osborne G. Barnwell

The plaintiff, a former employee of Torstar who signed a full and final release upon her dismissal in 2017, brought an action claiming that subsequent correspondence with the CEO in 2020 constituted a binding agreement to pay her compensation for alleged anti-black racism.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim.

The court granted the motion, finding it plain and obvious that the correspondence did not constitute an enforceable contract and the claim had no reasonable prospect of success.

The statement of claim was struck in its entirety without leave to amend.

In a long-running dispute over the ownership and management of medical schools, the respondents sought leave from the case management judge to bring a motion to set aside or vary a prior court order under Rule 59.06(2).

The respondents relied on a foreign court order as fresh evidence.

The court denied leave, finding that the foreign order did not constitute fresh evidence that would have changed the result, the respondents had delayed significantly in raising it, and the proposed motion was an abuse of process attempting to relitigate fully adjudicated issues.

The plaintiff, acting as Estate Trustee, brought a motion for leave to issue a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against a property held by the deceased's sister.

The deceased and her sister had taken title as joint tenants following a refinancing arrangement, but the sister had not paid the agreed consideration.

After the deceased's death, the sister registered a survivorship application and further encumbered the property.

The court found that the transfer was gratuitous, raising a presumption of resulting trust, and that the Estate had met the threshold of demonstrating a triable issue regarding its interest in the property.

The motion was granted, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff security company brought a Simplified Procedure action against the defendants for unpaid standby security services provided during a potential labour strike at the Sheraton hotel.

The court found that a contract was formed based on email exchanges between the parties and that the plaintiff performed the standby services.

The court awarded the plaintiff $32,950.80 in damages for the unpaid invoice.

However, the court dismissed the plaintiff's claims for punitive damages, personal liability against the individual defendant, and the tort of deceit, finding insufficient evidence of dishonesty or an independent actionable wrong.

Following a successful motion to strike the plaintiff's statements of claim, the defendants sought costs of $15,702.14 on a partial indemnity scale.

The plaintiff opposed the costs award, arguing that his impecuniosity and partial success in retaining a battery claim against one defendant justified a reduction or no costs.

The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments, finding that the defendants' success was not diminished by the remaining battery claim and that impecuniosity did not justify a reduction in these circumstances.

The court awarded the defendants costs as requested.

The plaintiff, a union member, commenced an action against three union officials for defamation, battery, and negligence arising from a union election dispute.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim.

The plaintiff delivered a fresh as amended statement of claim and later brought a cross-motion for leave to deliver a second fresh as amended statement of claim to add the union as a party and assert a claim for civil conspiracy.

The court struck all claims without leave to amend, except for the battery claim against one defendant, finding that the proposed civil conspiracy claim and the claims against the union were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff sued her insurer following a fire loss and a disputed appraisal process under section 128 of the Insurance Act.

The defendant insurer brought a Rule 21 motion seeking to force the plaintiff to elect whether she was challenging the appraisal itself (which would require judicial review at the Divisional Court) or proceeding with the action.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, finding it was not brought promptly under Rule 2.02 and Rule 21.02, as the defendant had been aware of the jurisdictional issue since the outset of the litigation and had already participated in a summary judgment motion.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking damages for breach of an insurance contract and bad faith following a house fire.

The parties had previously engaged in an appraisal process under s. 128 of the Insurance Act but disagreed on the interpretation of the resulting report, specifically regarding deductions for prior payments and entitlement to replacement cost value versus actual cash value.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding genuine issues of credibility regarding the appraisal discussions, the cause of the delay in rebuilding, and the bad faith allegations that required a trial.

The court also granted in part the defendant's motion to strike certain paragraphs of the plaintiff's Reply.

The applicant, widow and estate trustee of a deceased business partner, brought an application against the surviving partner regarding the division of their jointly owned medical schools in the Caribbean.

The applicant sought the appointment of a monitor, an injunction preventing the respondent from operating a competing medical school, and damages for oppression and breach of fiduciary duty.

The court found it had jurisdiction as the respondent waived the arbitration clause by participating in the litigation.

The court appointed a monitor to oversee the complex financial separation, granted an interim injunction restricting the respondent's competing university from poaching staff and students, and converted the application into an action due to significant factual disputes.

The applicant, a care facility operator, brought an application seeking declarations that the respondent County acted in bad faith by not renewing their annual services agreement under the Domiciliary Care Program.

The County had declined to renew the fixed-term contract due to a history of non-compliance, particularly regarding Fire Code violations and the delayed installation of a sprinkler system.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the contract had a clear end date with no automatic renewal clause, and therefore the County owed no duty of good faith to renew it.

Furthermore, the court found no evidence of bad faith, noting that the County had repeatedly communicated its concerns and provided reasons for non-renewal despite having no contractual obligation to do so.

The applicants challenged the authority of the respondent corporation's de facto Chief Operating Officer to retain legal counsel to represent the corporation in an oppression and receivership application.

The court found that although the COO was not formally appointed in accordance with the shareholders agreement, she was informally appointed by the late controlling director in good faith.

The court held that as the de facto COO, she had the authority to appoint counsel to represent the corporation's interests.