Court File and Parties
CITATION: RIVERROCK v. MAGEE, 2026 ONSC 4415 COURT FILE NO.: CV-24-00002767-0000 DATE: 20260413
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
RE: RIVERROCK MORTGAGE INVESTMENT CORPORATION, Plaintiff
AND:
SUZANNA MELINDA MAGEE, Defendant
BEFORE: Associate Justice Mak
COUNSEL: Christopher Staples, for the Plaintiff Osborne G. Barnwell, for the Defendant
HEARD: September 26, 2025, by videoconference
REASONS FOR DECISION
1The action arises from a mortgage registered to the defendant Suzanna Magee’s property in Ajax. The mortgage went into default. The plaintiff, RiverRock Mortgage Investment Corporation (“RiverRock”), obtained default judgment for the total amount of $326,267.88 and for possession of the property.
2Ms. Magee seeks to set aside the default judgment. RiverRock opposes.
Factual Background
3Ms. Magee is a retired pharmacist. Her property has a mortgage that the Royal Bank of Canada provided to Ms. Magee in 2015.
4In 2022, Ms. Magee sought a second mortgage to pay off some credit card and line of credit debts. She contacted a mortgage broker and applied for a mortgage from RiverRock.
5As part of the mortgage application process, RiverRock interviewed Ms. Magee. Some of the questions and responses provided by Ms. Magee were recorded in notes by RiverRock, reproduced below:
Q. Ask details about income, specifically what do they do for a living.
A. Client is retired collecting multiple pensions and disability for total of $114,399.
Q. What are you doing with the money.
A. Looking to payout debts.
Q. If ratios are high ask how they will make payments.
A. Ratios are a little high, but she said she is looking to rent out her basement to get more income.
Q. Confirm payment dates and payment amounts with client.
A. Confirmed payments will be the 19th of each month.
Q. What is your plan in the next 12 months –
A. Broker is hoping to refinance and combine the mortgages just breaking the current 1st would be too costly right now.
Q. Confirm with client they have seen the fee schedule
A. Reviewing with lawyer.
6On July 28, 2022, Ms. Magee signed a document provided by RiverRock entitled “Mortgage Commitment: 2nd Mortgage – Refinance”, dated July 27, 2022. This document stated, inter alia, as follows:
(a) RiverRock was committing to providing a mortgage to Ms. Magee in the principal amount of $290,000, plus the interest rate of 10.99% per annum. The mortgage term was one year.
(b) The mortgage incorporated standard charge terms no. 200033.
(c) Various other provisions were included and described, including with respect to insurance and property taxes.
(d) By Ms. Magee executing the document, it would signify her agreement to the mortgage and its terms and conditions outlined in the document.
7Ms. Magee signed this document under the heading “Acceptance” and under the following statement:
I/we, the undersigned applicants, accept the terms of this mortgage as stated herein and agree to fulfill the conditions of approval as outlined in the Additional Conditions to the Lender's satisfaction. I/we further certify that the information given on the mortgage application is true and correct.
8In connection with the mortgage and its registration, on August 17, 2022, Ms. Magee signed an Acknowledgement and Direction to Amit Vig, lawyer, directing him to register the mortgage. This document stated, in part: “The effect of the Documents has been fully explained to me/us, and I/We understand that I/We are parties to and bound by the terms and provisions of the Documents to the same extent as if I/We had signed them”.
9On August 22, 2022, the mortgage was registered against Ms. Magee’s property in Ajax, and the mortgagee funds of $290,000 were fully advanced to Ms. Magee. Pursuant to the mortgage, Ms. Magee made monthly payments to RiverRock.
10By renewal dated July 7, 2023, the mortgage was renewed effective August 19, 2023. Ms. Magee signed the renewal.
11The renewed mortgage provided for interest at the rate of 11.99% per annum and monthly payments in the amount of $2,897.58. The renewal fee was $3,500. A checkmark was put under the option for pre-authorized debit on September 19, 2023 for the renewal fee.
12A handwritten note on the renewal stated: “Amendment. Broke the 3,500.00 in small payments rather. See attached”. The attached typed document to the renewal indicates that of the two options for payment, Option 1 was chosen so that the $3,500 renewal fee would be paid in smaller monthly installments instead of Option 2, which was payment of the renewal fee in larger quarterly installments.
13After the renewal, Ms. Magee continued to make payments under the mortgage at the renewal amount, until she defaulted on the monthly mortgage payment due August 19, 2024. The mortgage then went into default.
14Ms. Magee executed a further renewal in July 2024, but as the mortgage went into default as of the renewal date of August 19, 2024, this renewal did not come into effect.
15After the mortgage was referred to RiverRock’s counsel following default, a tax certificate was obtained for Ms. Magee’s property showing unpaid realty taxes totalling $6,939.12. As it is entitled under the mortgage, by cheque dated October 23, 2024, RiverRock paid these outstanding taxes to the Town of Ajax.
16As a result of these defaults, RiverRock issued the Statement of Claim in this proceeding on October 25, 2024, seeking the mortgage balance and possession of the property.
17On October 22, 2024, RiverRock’s counsel asked Ms. Magee’s counsel if he had instructions to accept service of the claim. Ms. Magee’s counsel replied, stating he could not get instructions because Ms. Magee had been “very sick” and was “a bit off”.
18David Florek, a process server, swore an affidavit on November 14, 2024, stating that on October 30, 2024, he served Ms. Magee with the claim by leaving a copy with her at the property. He further states in his affidavit: “I was able to identify the person by means of her acknowledgment”.
19Ms. Magee states in her affidavit that she was never served with the claim. She states she recalled two people coming onto her property, one of the two people asking her for her name, and after she told them her name, one of the people placed a brown envelope on the doorstep area on the property. She states she was not told what was in the envelope, and she did not know whether it was something “dangerous or bad”, so she asked one of the tenants to place the brown envelope into the recycling bin. She states she did not see what was inside.
20Ms. Magee did not serve a Statement of Defence. As a result, RiverRock requisitioned default judgment. The registrar issued the default judgment on November 21, 2024.
21On December 9, 2024, Ms. Magee’s counsel advised RiverRock’s counsel that he intended to bring a motion to set aside the default judgment.
The Law
22Rule 19.08(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 states: “A judgment against a defendant who has been noted in default that is signed by the registrar or granted by the court on motion under rule 19.04 [Default Judgment] may be set aside or varied by the court on such terms as are just.”
23Rule 19.03(1) states: “On setting aside a judgment under subrule (1) or (2) the court or judge may also set aside the noting of default under rule 19.03.”
24In Intact Insurance Company v. Kisel, 2015 ONCA 205 (“Intact Insurance Company”), the Court of Appeal at paragraph 14 sets out the factors the court considers on a motion to set aside a default judgment:
14On a motion to set aside a default judgment, on the other hand, the court considers five major factors, one of which is whether the defendant has an arguable defence on the merits. The five factors are
(a) whether the motion was brought promptly after the defendant learned of the default judgment;
(b) whether the defendant has a plausible excuse or explanation for the default;
(c) whether the defendant has an arguable defence on the merits;
(d) the potential prejudice to the defendant should the motion be dismissed, and the potential prejudice to the plaintiff should the motion be allowed; and
(e) the effect of any order the court might make on the overall integrity of the administration of justice.
Again, these factors are not rigid rules. The court has to decide whether, in the particular circumstances of the case, it is just to relieve a defendant from the consequences of default: Mountain View Farms Ltd. v. McQueen (2014), 119 O.R. (3d) 561, [2014] O.J. No. 1197, 2014 ONCA 194, 372 D.L.R. (4th) 526, at paras. 48-50.
25The Court of Appeal elaborated on the third factor in McIlwain v. Len’s Cove Marina Ltd., 2025 ONCA 434 at paragraph 16:
To put forward an arguable defence on the merits, a defendant need not show that the defence will inevitably succeed, but only that it has an “air of reality”: Mountain View, at paragraph 51. It is not the role of the motion judge to make findings of fact and to assess the merits of the defence: Zeifman Partners Inc. v. Aiello, 2020 ONCA 33, 442 D.L.R. (4th) 299, at para. 34. See also Mountain View, at paras. 61-63.
26Regarding the third factor, the Court of Appeal also stated in HSBC Securities (Canada) Inc. v. Firestar Capital Management Corporation, 2008 ONCA 894, leave to appeal refused, 2009 CanLII 33005 (SCC) at paragraph 28: “[A] self-serving affidavit does not create a triable issue in the absence of detailed facts and supporting evidence.”
Analysis
27I now turn to an analysis of the five factors in Intact Insurance Company.
28Regarding the first factor, RiverRock does not take issue with the timing of this motion. Ms. Magee submits she brought this motion within seven days of her lawyer advising her of the default judgment. I find the defendant brought this motion promptly upon learning of the default judgment.
29Turning to the second factor, on reviewing the evidence provided by both parties, I find that Ms. Magee does not have a plausible excuse or explanation for the default. Mr. Florek served Ms. Magee with the claim on October 30, 2024. After being served with the claim, she disposed of the document without reviewing it. Her deliberate choice to dispose of the claim is not a plausible excuse or explanation for the default. Ms. Magee’s counsel stated to RiverRock’s counsel by email on October 22, 2024 that Ms. Magee was “very sick”, but did not state in his email any incapacity on the part of Ms. Magee. Further, Ms. Magee’s affidavit, including the hospital records attached as exhibits, do not indicate any incapacity or illness on her part at the time she was served with the claim.
30In considering the third factor, I find Ms. Magee does not have an arguable defence on the merits, because none of her proposed defences have an air of reality. Ms. Magee’s affidavit is self-serving and unsupported by other evidence. On the basis of the record before the court, a court could not conclude that various statements in Ms. Magee’s affidavit, detailed below, are reliable.
31Typically, a moving defendant will file a copy of the draft Statement of Defence so that the court can get a clear sense of what allegations will be advanced should the default judgment be set aside. Ms. Magee did not do so. At the motion hearing, Ms. Magee’s counsel stated this was because he has had great difficulty in having Ms. Magee to confirm and read documents.
32Ms. Magee states the defences to the claim are as follows: she was not in a mental state where she understood the full implications of what was occurring at each time a legal relationship was purportedly engaged; at the time she defaulted, she was hospitalized for mental illness and was likely having a mental health breakdown upon being served with the claim; and she had not been allowed to receive independent legal advice. At the motion hearing, Ms. Magee’s counsel stated that he would also be advancing the defence of non est factum. I will address each of these proposed defences.
33Ms. Magee’s proposed defence that she was not in her “right mind” when entering into the mortgage agreement or “not herself” appears to be that of mental incapacity. Her affidavit includes medical records which state she has a longstanding history of various medical conditions, including bipolar disorder. These records consist of several medical reports from February 2, 2017 to February 2, 2018, and emergency room records for Ms. Magee’s visits to a hospital on June 22, 2024, July 8 to 11, 2024, and August 13, 2024. Ms. Magee did not provide any medical records for the years 2020 to 2023 inclusive.
34Ms. Magee states in her affidavit that she had an episode and was hospitalized in or about July 2022, and likely did not know what she was doing or had an appreciation of what she had signed at the time. However, she has not put forth any medical evidence of mental incapacity at the time she entered into the mortgage in or around July and August 2022. In addition, the content of the notes from an interview between RiverRock and Ms. Magee for the mortgage application counter Ms. Magee’s proposed defence that she was mentally incapable at the time she entered into the mortgage agreement.
35The mortgage went into default when Ms. Magee did not pay the monthly mortgage payment due August 19, 2024. Ms. Magee states in her affidavit that at the time of the default on her mortgage, she was hospitalized for mental illness. Ms. Magee did not provide the court with any medical records that support her statement that she was hospitalized on August 19, 2024.
36The medical records Ms. Magee provided state she was hospitalized from July 8 to 11, 2024 after presenting with an altered level of consciousness. The records state she was violent towards hospital staff, and she required physical and chemical restraints. The records note that on July 11, 2024, her symptoms rapidly improved, she was cleared by psychiatry and discharged from the hospital.
37Ms. Magee provided the court with medical records stating that on August 13, 2024, she attended at the emergency department of Ajax Pickering Hospital at around noon. The records note that Ms. Magee had a number of concerns, including that she thought she was being poisoned, she phoned the police because she thought her basement tenants owed her money, and she told the police she would kill herself. The records further note that Ms. Magee told the hospital staff she was not serious about hurting herself, and had only stated she would kill herself because she thought the police were passing her off. The records note Ms. Magee was referred to psychiatry, denied being suicidal, and was discharged home at 3:10 p.m. that same day with a bus ticket.
38These medical records detail visits that are one month and one week prior to Ms. Magee’s default on the mortgage. They do not support her position that she defaulted on her mortgage when she was hospitalized for mental illness.
39The defence of non est factum is available to a person who, as a result of misrepresentation, signed a document mistaken as to its nature and character, and who has not been careless in doing so: Marvco Colour Research v. Harris, 1982 CanLII 63 (SCC) (“Marvco”).
40I do not see any merit to Ms. Magee’s proposed defence of non est factum. On the record before me, there is no evidence of any misrepresentation, or that she was mistaken as to the document’s nature and character, as opposed to its contents. In particular, Ms. Magee did not provide evidence there was so radical or fundamental distinction in character or content between the document actually signed and what she thought she was signing to warrant invoking non est factum.
41The Supreme Court in Marvco adopted the dissent of Cartwright J. in Prudential Trust Company Ltd. v. Cugnet, 1956 CanLII 90 (SCC), who stated at page 932:
…generally speaking, a person who executes a document without taking the trouble to read it is liable on it and cannot plead that he mistook its contents, at all events, as against a person who acting in good faith in the ordinary course of business has changed his position in reliance on such document.
Ms. Magee does not state in her affidavit that she read the documents presented to her, only that a lawyer passed documents to her and asked her to sign “here or there”, which she did. There is no evidence before the court that she does not understand English or is illiterate. Applying the dissent of Cartwright J. adopted by the Supreme Court in Marvco, Ms. Magee’s statement that she signed documents that were passed to her by a lawyer counters the defence of non est factum.
42Ms. Magee states she is “sure” she did not receive independent legal advice, that no one explained to her what happens if a cheque were to “bounce” or if she missed a payment, and she was never told about the standard mortgage terms. She states the documents which she signed, if any, were not explained to her. She also states that she did not know the mortgage was interest only, and she thought she was paying interest and principal.
43Ms. Magee’s statements regarding independent legal advice are unsupported by any documentation. Further, the following documents provided by RiverRock for this motion counter this proposed defence:
(a) An Acknowledgement and Direction signed by Ms. Magee to Amit Vig, lawyer, directing him to register the mortgage. This document stated, in part: “The effect of the Documents has been fully explained to me/us, and I/We understand that I/We are parties to and bound by the terms and provisions of the Documents to the same extent as if I/We had signed them”.
(b) The mortgage commitment letter, signed by Ms. Magee on July 28, 2022, sets out the borrower’s solicitor as Vig Law Professional Corporation.
(c) The mortgage, as registered on title to Ms. Magee’s property, states that it is signed by Gregory James Kai Wong of Vig Law Professional Corporation, acting for the chargor (i.e. Ms. Magee) and states, “I have authority to sign and register the document on behalf of the Chargor(s)”.
(d) The mortgage includes a consent to the release of personal information that was signed by Ms. Magee on August 17, 2022. The consent states that Ms. Magee obtained independent legal representation from her lawyer, Vig Law Professional Corporation, with respect to such consent.
44Kurz J. in Resco Mortgage Investment Corp v. Kaur, 2024 ONSC 3615 at paragraph 77 provides a helpful summary of the impact of independent legal advice on an agreement:
Independent legal advice is not a prerequisite to the validity of an agreement, but is a factor that a court can consider in determining whether to enforce a contract: Dougherty v. Dougherty, 2008 ONCA 302, 89 O.R. (3d) 760. It is relevant only to the extent that it ameliorates the inequality of bargaining power experienced by the weaker party: Uber Technologies, at para. 83. Further, where a party could have obtained independent legal advice but chose not to do so, courts will be loathe to set aside the agreement on that ground alone: Dyck v. Boshold, [2009] O.J. No 4999 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 27, citing Settle-Beyrouty v. Beyrouty (1996), 1996 CanLII 19739 (ON SC), 24 R.F.L. (4th) 318 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
45Even if Mr. Vig did not act for Ms. Magee, the mere lack of independent legal advice does not invalidate a mortgage in the absence of proof of non est factum, unconscionability, fraud, misrepresentation or undue influence: see Shoppers Trust Co. v. Dynamic Homes Ltd., 1992 CanLII 7685 (ON SC). Ms. Magee has not presented the court with any evidence of non est factum, undue influence, unconscionability, fraud or misrepresentation.
46With respect to the fourth factor, i.e. the potential prejudice to the defendant should the motion be dismissed, and the potential prejudice to the plaintiff should the motion be allowed, I find Ms. Magee’s prejudice, as the owner of her property, is no different than that of any other owner of a property whose mortgage to a third party goes into default. Ms. Magee submits that in “not having her day in Court” she would suffer severe prejudice. I reject her submissions on this point due to my finding, outlined above, that Ms. Magee does not have an arguable defence on the merits. I find there will be prejudice to RiverRock if this motion is allowed, as the result would be to prolong the litigation and increase RiverRock’s costs associated with it.
47In considering the fifth factor, which is the effect of any order the court might make on the overall integrity of the administration of justice, RiverRock submits no facts at issue or principles in this proceeding would offend the integrity of the administration of justice if the judgment is allowed to stand.
48Ms. Magee submits that allowing the setting aside of the default judgment would not be unjust or bring into question the administration of justice. Ms. Magee’s position is that it would be unfair for RiverRock to be allowed to enforce a judgment obtained under the circumstances of this case because RiverRock had no regard to Ms. Magee’s mental state. She states the default on her mortgage took place when she was hospitalized, the process server served her with the claim when she had mental health issues, and RiverRock noted Ms. Magee in default despite its counsel being aware she had mental health episodes and would be unlikely to understand and appreciate the process and to instruct counsel.
49The documentation does not support Ms. Magee’s statements that she was hospitalized at the time she defaulted on her mortgage. She has also not put forth any medical evidence indicating that she had any mental incapacity in or around the time she was served with the claim in October 2024 and the noting in default, which appears to have taken place sometime in November 2024. Indeed, she has not provided any medical records from 2024.
50After considering the evidence and submissions from both parties, I am satisfied that dismissing Ms. Magee’s motion to set aside the default judgment, and allowing the judgment to stand is in accordance with the overall integrity of the administration of justice.
51Ms. Magee disputes a number of fees claimed by RiverRock as part of the default judgment, totalling $15,564.35, as follows:
Three months’ interest: $8,900.75
Manual processing fees: $250
Property inspection fee: $248.60
Default administration fee: $3,950
Statement fees: $700
Reinvestment fee: $450
Discharge fee: $500
Property management charges: $565
52Ms. Magee submits the three months’ interest contravenes section 8(1) of the Interest Act, R.S.C.1985, c. I-15, which states as follows:
No fine, etc., allowed on payments in arrears
8 (1) No fine, penalty or rate of interest shall be stipulated for, taken, reserved or exacted on any arrears of principal or interest secured by mortgage on real property or hypothec on immovables that has the effect of increasing the charge on the arrears beyond the rate of interest payable on principal money not in arrears.
53The mortgage includes a schedule called “Additional Provisions” This schedule includes the following provisions that allow for RiverRock to charge three months’ interest:
If prepayment of any part of the principal sum secured hereunder is made by reason of payment after acceleration upon the occurrence of a default, the Chargor agrees to pay to the Chargee three (3) months’ interest on the principal amount prepaid at the rate of interest chargeable hereunder at the time of prepayment as hereinbefore set out.
If the principal sum, accrued interest thereon and any of the sums which may be due hereunder is not repaid on or before the Balance Due Date (as set out in the Charge), then the Chargor agrees to pay to the Chargee in addition to the amounts required to obtain a discharge, three (3) months’ interest at the rate of interest chargeable hereunder on the principal amount outstanding on the Balance Due Date.
54Further, section 17 of the Mortgages Act, which is incorporated into every mortgage in Ontario, allows for a mortgagor in default to redeem the mortgage on payment of three months’ interest or on the provision of three months’ notice, which effectively caps the damages payable for the mortgagor’s lost income stream while at the same time fixing the mortgagee’s responsibility to mitigate its losses. However, the rationale behind section 17 does not make sense when a mortgage goes into default after maturity. If the mortgage goes into default after maturity, the lender has already received or is entitled to receive the whole of the income stream contracted for, and the three months’ interest in those circumstances would be nothing more than a penalty: Lee v He, 2018 ONSC 5932 at paragraphs 24 to 27.
55At the motion hearing, Ms. Magee appears to have withdrawn her objection to the three months’ interest or conceded that if the mortgage had not matured at the time of the default, she is liable to pay to RiverRock three months’ interest. Notwithstanding her position on this issue, I find that three months’ interest in the amount of $8,900.75 is payable by Ms. Magee to RiverRock. The provisions in the Schedule to the mortgage, as detailed above in paragraph 53, allows for three months’ interest. The mortgage went into default before maturity, and therefore the three months’ interest does not contravene section 8(1) of the Interest Act.
56At the motion hearing, Ms. Magee disputed the remaining fees in paragraph 51 above on the basis that the services for these fees have not been rendered. She cites TMSSD Inc. v. Ojeikere, 2025 ONSC 5245 (“TMSSD Inc.”) and section 8(1) of the Interest Act in support of her position.
57RiverRock submits the remaining fees are payable by Ms. Magee, as they are set out in the schedule to the mortgage called “Additional Provisions”. The affidavit of Nick Kyprianou, president and Chief Executive Officer of RiverRock, at paragraph 19 states the following fees are accurate estimates of the reasonable value of the time and efforts required by its staff regarding the services provided, and details the services provided for each fee: manual processing fees of $250, default administration fee of $3,950, and statement fees of $700.
58RiverRock submits the reinvestment fee of $450 and discharge fee of $500 are accurate estimates of the reasonable value of the time and efforts required by its staff once the mortgage funds are received to reinvest the mortgage funds, and when the payment of the mortgage balance is due either by the mortgagors or when the property is sold under power of sale, respectively.
59Kurz J. in TMSSD Inc. at paragraph 35 provides a helpful summary of the Court of Appeal’s analysis P.A.R.C.E.L. Inc. v. Acquaviva, 2015 ONCA 331 of when section 8(1) of the Interest Act is triggered:
At paras. 52-56 of P.A.R.C.E.L., Cronk J.A. lays out four prerequisites for the court's application of s. 8(1) to prohibit a mortgagee from charging certain fees or other amounts to a mortgagor:
The covenant in question must impose a "fine", "penalty" or "rate of interest". If it does not, then s. 8(1) is not engaged.
The "fine", "penalty" or "rate of interest" must relate to "any arrears of principal or interest secured by mortgage on real property", whether before or after maturity of the relevant debt instrument.
"[T]he covenant must also have the prohibited effect of 'increasing the charge on the arrears beyond the rate of interest payable on principal money not in arrears'."
"[T]he arrears of principal or interest must be 'secured by mortgage on real property'."
60Kurz J. also noted in TMSSD Inc. that mortgagees can claim for genuine estimates of enforcement costs that are incurred by the mortgagees:
39In BMMB Investments Ltd. v. Naimian, 2020 ONSC 7999, at para. 36, Myers J. differentiated the right of mortgagees to provide an advance estimate of their enforcement costs of a defaulted mortgage and illegal disguised penalties as follows:
Case law has consistently held that lenders may lawfully recoup from mortgagors who are in default of their payment obligations the administrative costs incurred by the lenders caused by the defaults. The common law recognizes that for good business reasons such costs can be estimated in advance and fixed in a contract. But fees and charges levied on a mortgage default that are not genuine pre-estimates of costs actually incurred by a lender are penalties that can be void at common law and may violate the statute.
40Myers J. added at para. 40 that "[t]he test at common law is whether a fee is a genuine pre-estimate of damages incurred by the lender. The test under s. 8 of the Interest Act is as set out above in P.A.R.C.E.L. Both apply and satisfying either will invalidate a fee."
61I accept the evidence in paragraph 19 of Mr. Kyprianou’s affidavit regarding these fees. These fees are set out in the schedule to the mortgage called “Additional Provisions”. Regarding the manual processing fees, default administration fee and statement fees, I find these fees are accurate estimates of the reasonable value of the time and efforts required and expended by RiverRock’s staff regarding the services provided in connection with these three fees.
62The reinvestment fee of $450 and discharge fee of $500 are for services that RiverRock has not yet provided, and therefore these fees have not yet been incurred. RiverRock did not provide evidence to the Court that it incurred the property management charges of $565 and property inspection fee of $248.60. Therefore, I find these four fees are not payable by Ms. Magee to RiverRock.
Disposition
63For the foregoing reasons, the court exercises its discretion and dismisses Ms. Magee’s motion to set aside the default judgment.
64The court orders that the default judgment be varied by deducting the four fees outlined above in paragraph 62, in the amount of $1,763.60.
Costs
65The parties provided costs outlines at the motion hearing. If the parties cannot agree to the disposition of the costs of the motion, they may make submissions in writing, not exceeding three pages each – RiverRock within 20 days and Ms. Magee within 10 days thereafter – to the attention of the Trial Coordinator.
Associate Justice Mak
Date: April 13, 2026