James M. Ross

Intact Insurance Company moved to consolidate an accident benefits action with a tort action arising from the same motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiff opposed, arguing complexity and potential jury confusion due to different causation tests and legal theories (e.g., crumbling skull) between tort and accident benefits claims.

The court, applying Rule 6.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and factors from *10148664 Ontario Limited*, found that the gateway criteria for consolidation were met.

Despite the complexities, the court concluded that consolidation was appropriate, noting that such claims are routinely consolidated.

The court ordered consolidation but directed a case conference to address procedural issues and frame jury questions, particularly on causation, to avoid a mistrial.

The defendants brought a motion to compel the plaintiffs to produce an adverse costs insurance policy (ACP) for inspection under Rule 30.02(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs had disclosed the existence and amount of the coverage but refused to produce the policy itself.

The court dismissed the motion, distinguishing previous case law because the ACP in this case was a blanket policy held by the plaintiffs' law firm, not the plaintiffs themselves.

The court found that producing the law firm's policy raised issues of solicitor-client privilege and that the policy was not within the possession, control, or power of the plaintiffs.

The respondent sustained serious burns to her lower body when coffee spilled from a cup she ordered at a McDonald's drive-through.

The motion judge determined that the respondent was impaired as a result of an accident as defined in the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule and was entitled to statutory accident benefits.

The appellant insurance company appealed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the use and operation of the vehicle was a direct cause of the injuries and that the seatbelt restraint increased exposure to the scalding liquid.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking leave to compel production of information from an insurance broker and to examine a representative for discovery, in anticipation of a summary judgment motion concerning insurance coverage.

The motion was brought after the trial record had been delivered, necessitating leave of the court under Rule 48.

The court reviewed the conflicting judicial interpretations of the test for granting such leave, ultimately reaffirming the "substantial or unexpected change in circumstances" test, where a refusal would be "manifestly unjust," and rejecting the broader "interests of justice" test as a separate ground.

Given the plaintiffs' long-standing knowledge of the insurance coverage issues, the significant delay in bringing the motion, and the absence of insurance coverage issues in the third party's pleadings, the court found no substantial or unexpected change in circumstances.

Consequently, leave was denied, and the plaintiffs' motion was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to add two utility entities as defendants in a personal injury action arising from a pedestrian–vehicle collision, alleging inadequate street lighting contributed to the accident.

The proposed defendants argued the motion was barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court considered discoverability and whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in identifying the proposed defendants.

It held that police notes referencing very poor lighting and early evidence about visibility should have prompted investigation into the lighting system within the limitation period.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate reasonable diligence in investigating potential liability for street lighting maintenance.

The motion to add the proposed defendants was therefore dismissed as statute‑barred.

In a personal injury action arising from a slip and fall in a grocery store parking lot, the defendants brought a motion seeking compliance with outstanding undertakings given by the plaintiffs during examinations for discovery.

Numerous requests and prior directions had been made for the undertakings to be fulfilled, including requests for financial records, medical documentation, and particulars relating to damages and care costs.

The court held that litigants have an ongoing obligation to provide information undertaken at discovery and cannot rely on procedural rules regarding particulars to delay disclosure until shortly before trial.

The court found that many undertakings remained outstanding and that the materials produced did not adequately particularize damages.

An order was granted requiring the plaintiffs to fulfill the undertakings by a specified deadline.

In a personal injury action arising from a pedestrian–vehicle collision, the defendants moved for an order compelling the plaintiffs to provide proper responses to requests to admit under Rule 51 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs had provided blanket refusals to admit all alleged facts, asserting that the truth of the facts was unclear, vague, or required determination by the trier of fact.

The court held that pro forma responses designed to defeat the purpose of Rule 51 may be reviewed on an interlocutory motion.

The plaintiffs’ global refusals failed to comply with Rule 51.03(3)(b) because they did not provide fact‑specific reasons for refusing to admit.

The court struck the responses and ordered the plaintiffs to deliver compliant responses within 20 days.

The moving defendants sought summary judgment dismissing the action against them following a pedestrian‑vehicle collision on a highway involving a waste management truck stopped during municipal waste collection.

The plaintiffs alleged the truck was negligently stopped in contravention of posted signs under the Highway Traffic Act and may have obstructed the line of sight of the tractor‑trailer driver who struck the pedestrian.

The court held the motion was premature because discoveries had not been completed and key evidence from the tractor‑trailer driver was unavailable.

The court also found unresolved factual issues regarding possible contributory negligence and the applicability of statutory immunity under s. 448(1) of the Municipal Act.

A genuine issue requiring a trial existed.

A plaintiff sought repayment of $30,000 advanced to her son and daughter‑in‑law in connection with their home purchase.

The defendants argued the funds were a gift and relied on a bank “gift letter” signed to satisfy mortgage requirements.

The court applied the presumption of resulting trust and held that the defendants bore the burden of rebutting the presumption that the transfer was not intended as a gift.

After assessing credibility and contemporaneous evidence, the court found the plaintiff intended the transfer to be a loan and that the gift letter was executed solely to facilitate the mortgage.

Both defendants were held liable for repayment on the basis of the loan and unjust enrichment.