R. Dan. Cornell

The applicant, Liam Stinson, convicted of three counts of first-degree murder and arson causing bodily harm, brought an application for the trial judge to recuse himself from sentencing.

The application was based on an email sent by the investigating officer to the judge's judicial assistant, which the applicant argued created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court dismissed the application, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The judge noted that the email contained no sentencing submissions or requests for a particular outcome, and that the judge had acted ethically by consulting the Judicial Ethics Committee and disclosing the email to counsel.

The court emphasized the trial judge's unique advantage in sentencing due to having presided over the trial.

This is an appeal by the Crown from an Ontario Court of Justice decision that acquitted the Corporation of the City of Greater Sudbury of charges under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada had previously found the City liable as an employer and remitted the matter to this court to consider the trial judge's finding of due diligence.

The appeal court reviewed the trial judge's conclusion that the City exercised due diligence, considering factors such as the City's degree of control over the workplace, delegation of control to the constructor, evaluation of the constructor's ability, and monitoring of the work.

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's determination that the City had exercised due diligence, and consequently dismissed the Crown's appeal.

The Crown applied to introduce prior discreditable conduct of the accused, Felicity Altiman, in a second-degree murder trial.

The conduct involved threatening to stab a third party and brandishing a knife.

The court applied the four-part test for admitting such evidence, focusing on the probative value versus prejudicial effect.

The court allowed evidence of the accused possessing and brandishing a knife but excluded evidence of the specific threats made due to moral prejudice.

Additionally, evidence of the accused admitting to regularly robbing the deceased was conceded as admissible.

Liam Stinson, charged with three counts of first-degree murder and one count of arson causing bodily harm, brought an application for a directed verdict of acquittal on the murder charges at the close of the Crown's case.

The Crown argued Stinson was a principal perpetrator through the use of innocent agents (Jared Herrick and Phillippe Jeannotte) in the firebombing that resulted in three deaths.

The court dismissed the application, finding sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence for a jury to conclude Stinson intended to commit murder and used the agents to achieve this, having misled them into believing the residence was unoccupied.

The jury subsequently found Stinson guilty of first-degree murder.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to recover the balance outstanding under a mortgage and possession of the mortgaged property.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that neither the renewal of the first mortgage nor the transfer of shares constituted a default under the loan agreement or third mortgage.

The court also determined the correct outstanding mortgage amount and declared the plaintiff's notice of sale void due to an incorrect amount claimed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to transfer the action into the Simplified Procedure after having already filed the trial record.

The court dismissed the motion, refusing to grant leave under Rule 48.04(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found no substantial or unexpected change in circumstances since the trial record was filed, noting that the plaintiff knew the claim's value was within the Simplified Procedure's increased monetary jurisdiction well before filing the trial record.

The court also considered the prejudice to the defendant, whose litigation strategy was based on a conventional jury trial, and emphasized the substantive right to a jury trial.

The plaintiff's primary motivation was deemed to be concerns about costs exposure, which was not a sufficient basis for granting leave.

The accused, Liam Stinson, is charged with first-degree murder and attempted murder.

This is a voir dire ruling on the admissibility of ante-mortem hearsay statements made by the deceased victim, Jamie Lynn Rose.

The Crown sought to admit these statements under the *res gestae* exception or the principled approach to hearsay, arguing their relevance to the deceased's state of mind, the accused's animus, motive, and identity.

The court applied the tests of necessity, reliability (procedural and substantive), and the probative value versus prejudicial effect.

Many statements were excluded due to lack of contemporaneousness, suspicious circumstances, contradictory evidence, or the declarant's motive to lie.

Other statements, particularly those made closer to the time of death and without reliability concerns, were admitted.

The court emphasized avoiding "trials within a trial" and undue prejudice from cumulative evidence.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings, alleging breaches of his Charter rights (s. 7 and 11(b)) due to a 23-day delay in his bail hearing.

The court declined to hear the application at this interlocutory stage, emphasizing that such Charter applications are best resolved by the trial judge on a full record, except in extraordinary circumstances not present in this case.

The court noted that a stay is a remedy of last resort and that other remedies, such as a reduction in sentence, might be available at trial.

The application was adjourned to be considered by the trial judge.

The Crown applied to admit similar act evidence from a prior conviction against the accused, W.L., in his current trial for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a nine-year-old complainant.

The court analyzed the proximity in time, detailed similarities (age of complainants, nature of sexual acts, circumstances, position of trust), dissimilarities, and the absence of collusion.

Finding the evidence highly probative and its probative value outweighing its prejudicial effect, the court granted the Crown's application, deeming the similar act evidence admissible.

This decision provides supplementary reasons for a costs order following a successful motion by the plaintiff concerning discovery questions.

The plaintiff was successful on 77 out of 78 questions related to undertakings, questions taken under advisement, and refusals.

The court found the defendants' conduct unreasonable, particularly their refusal to comply with undertakings based on "subsequent developments." The defendants' argument against proportionality of costs was rejected as a bald assertion without detail.

The court found the plaintiff's bill of costs reasonable, noting that much of the work was necessitated by the defendants' non-compliance with court orders and deadlines.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The defendants brought a motion to enforce an alleged settlement agreement.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no valid and enforceable settlement due to a lack of clarity in the offer, insufficient authority of the individual purporting to accept on behalf of corporate plaintiffs, and improper direct communication by the defendants' counsel with a represented party, violating professional conduct rules.

The accused, A.S., brought an application under section 276 of the Criminal Code to admit evidence of the complainant's sexual activity at trial.

The Crown largely agreed with the admissibility of communications containing explicit sexual references but objected to specific paragraphs referencing the complainant's sexual activity with her husband.

The court found that the evidence, including the contested paragraphs, was relevant to issues such as consent, the complainant's state of mind, motive to fabricate, and credibility, and was necessary for the accused's right to make full answer and defence.

The court concluded that the evidence had significant probative value not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice, and was not tendered to support the "twin myths." The application was granted in its entirety, allowing all requested evidence to be admitted without redaction.

The accused, facing charges including breach of trust, fraudulent computer access, and organized crime affiliation, brought an application to compel the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) to produce extensive computer records for his defence.

The CRA opposed, citing taxpayer privacy under the Income Tax Act and arguing the request was overly broad.

The Crown characterized the request as a fishing expedition.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused failed to establish the likely relevance of the requested information to an issue at trial or witness competence, noting the vague assertions and the accused's own admissions of unauthorized access.

The Crown brought a Khan application to admit an audio/visual statement from a witness, Hailey Saikkonen, as substantive evidence after she testified that her memory of the incident was based on prior statements.

The defence conceded necessity due to the witness's lack of memory, leaving threshold reliability as the sole issue.

The court found both procedural and substantive reliability were established, noting the statement was given to police shortly after the incident without prompting, and the witness would be available for cross-examination.

The application was granted, allowing the statement to be used as substantive evidence by the jury.

The accused, Kaitlyn Trudeau, facing charges including aggravated assault, brought an application to introduce bad character evidence against two complainants, Vern Otosquaiob and Robert Travis Wemigwans, to support a self-defence claim.

The application sought to admit evidence of their propensity for violence.

The court granted the application in part, allowing evidence of Otosquaiob's known propensity for violence and Wemigwans' unknown propensity based on his extensive criminal record, but excluded reference to Wemigwans' pending murder charge due to its prejudicial effect outweighing its probative value.

The accused pleaded guilty to distributing an intimate image without consent.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence and probation, while the defence sought a conditional discharge.

The court considered the sentencing principles, aggravating and mitigating factors, including the limited distribution of the images, the accused's lack of criminal record, remorse, and stringent bail conditions.

The court granted a conditional discharge with a twelve-month probation period, finding it to be in the best interests of the accused and not contrary to the public interest, emphasizing that deterrence and denunciation can be achieved without a conviction in such circumstances.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking leave to compel production of information from an insurance broker and to examine a representative for discovery, in anticipation of a summary judgment motion concerning insurance coverage.

The motion was brought after the trial record had been delivered, necessitating leave of the court under Rule 48.

The court reviewed the conflicting judicial interpretations of the test for granting such leave, ultimately reaffirming the "substantial or unexpected change in circumstances" test, where a refusal would be "manifestly unjust," and rejecting the broader "interests of justice" test as a separate ground.

Given the plaintiffs' long-standing knowledge of the insurance coverage issues, the significant delay in bringing the motion, and the absence of insurance coverage issues in the third party's pleadings, the court found no substantial or unexpected change in circumstances.

Consequently, leave was denied, and the plaintiffs' motion was dismissed.

The applicant sought declarations that s. 507.1 of the Criminal Code and s. 11(d) of the Crown Attorney’s Act were unconstitutional, and to set aside the Attorney General's intervention and withdrawal of a private prosecution.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the issues raised had already been judicially determined in prior proceedings (a recusal application and an extension of time to appeal), and therefore the doctrine of issue estoppel applied.

Costs were awarded against the applicant.

The plaintiff, Gregory Cannon, brought a slip-and-fall claim against Cemcor Apartments Inc. after sustaining a broken leg in the apartment building's parking lot.

The plaintiff alleged the landlord failed to properly maintain the parking lot in a safe condition during winter.

The defendant had a verbal contract with a snow removal contractor, Myles Property Management Inc., who was later released from the action.

The trial proceeded solely on the issue of liability.

The court found that the defendant had a reasonable winter maintenance policy in place, considering the conditions in Northern Ontario, and that this policy was reasonably followed.

The plaintiff's and his witnesses' credibility regarding the extent of hazardous conditions was questioned, with the court finding only an isolated slippery spot.

Consequently, the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendant breached its obligations under the Occupier's Liability Act, and the claim was dismissed.

In complex litigation arising from a MURB real estate investment and foreclosure action, investor defendants sought a preliminary determination that the development had never achieved a cash flow positive position before the foreclosure proceeding was commenced.

They argued that accounting adjustments relied upon by the developer improperly imputed notional rental income and altered expenses, which if rejected would demonstrate that the mortgage was never in default.

The court held that the competing accounting methodologies, contractual interpretation of the offering memorandum and cash flow guarantee, and disputed factual issues regarding market conditions, vacancies, and management could not be resolved summarily.

These matters required full examination through the reference previously ordered in the case management process.