Pierre R. Bradley

The accused brought a motion to reopen a previously dismissed Charter application challenging the validity of a search warrant under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The motion arose after a mistrial in a jury trial when the Crown disclosed a production order related to a seized cell phone.

The defence argued the new information might have assisted in challenging the information to obtain the search warrant.

Applying s. 653.1(1) of the Criminal Code, the court held that prior rulings remain binding after a mistrial unless it would not be in the interests of justice.

The defence failed to demonstrate how the cell phone information would have been relevant to the prior Charter ruling, and the application to reopen the motion was dismissed.

The respondent parent brought a motion for contempt alleging that the other parent failed to comply with prior custody and access orders by influencing the parties’ children not to visit her.

The responding parent argued the children independently refused access and threatened to run away if forced to return.

The court held that contempt proceedings require clear and reliable evidence and found the record insufficient to determine the reasons for the children’s refusal.

The court ordered the involvement of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer to obtain further information regarding the children’s circumstances.

The contempt motion was adjourned pending that involvement.

A plaintiff sought repayment of $30,000 advanced to her son and daughter‑in‑law in connection with their home purchase.

The defendants argued the funds were a gift and relied on a bank “gift letter” signed to satisfy mortgage requirements.

The court applied the presumption of resulting trust and held that the defendants bore the burden of rebutting the presumption that the transfer was not intended as a gift.

After assessing credibility and contemporaneous evidence, the court found the plaintiff intended the transfer to be a loan and that the gift letter was executed solely to facilitate the mortgage.

Both defendants were held liable for repayment on the basis of the loan and unjust enrichment.

The appellant challenged a criminal conviction on the grounds that the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge erred in refusing a mistrial.

The court held that, although the case was circumstantial, the cumulative effect of the evidence, particularly the pathologist’s opinion and an unsigned letter, supported a verdict that a properly instructed trier of fact could reasonably render.

The court further held that the trial judge did not err in declining to grant a mistrial and that two letters tendered on appeal did not satisfy the Palmer criteria for admissibility as fresh evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.