Patrick Joseph Poupore

The defendant insurer, Dominion, sought permission at a case conference to bring a motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's underinsured motorist claim.

The plaintiff opposed, arguing the motion was premature and involved significant credibility and damages issues.

The court dismissed the request to schedule the motion, finding that a partial summary judgment posed a significant risk of inconsistent findings at trial, involved credibility issues regarding the plaintiff's injuries, and would not be efficient given the incomplete evidentiary record.

The plaintiff brought two motions: (1) to add LEA Consulting Ltd. as a defendant, which proceeded with consent; and (2) to compel the defendant, His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario, represented by the Minister of Transportation, to answer undertakings and re-attend for continuation of oral examination for discovery at their own expense.

The defendant failed to disclose the involvement of LEA Consulting Ltd., an onsite contract administrator, and relevant documents prior to discovery.

The court found that this failure undermined the purpose and utility of the discovery and granted the motion to compel re-attendance at the defendant's expense.

The court awarded costs to the plaintiff in the amount of $4,243.15.

The applicant sought payment for various treatment plans, including occupational therapy, psychological and orthopaedic assessments, and workplace modification devices, following a motor vehicle accident.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found that the applicant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that the proposed treatment plans were reasonable and necessary.

Medical evidence indicated the applicant had reached functional recovery and returned to pre-accident activities without accommodations.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought resolution of a dispute regarding the hourly rate at which Attendant Care Benefits (ACB) would be paid, despite the insurer having approved the submitted Form 1s in full.

The insurer raised a preliminary issue arguing the Licence Appeal Tribunal lacked jurisdiction under s. 280 of the Insurance Act because there was no live dispute over entitlement or the amount of the benefit.

The Tribunal agreed, finding that since the insurer approved the ACB in full and there was no denial, there was no dispute within the meaning of s. 280.

The application was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

This decision addresses the costs arising from a successful motion by the plaintiff to amend her statement of claim and the dismissal of the defendant Kealey's motion to strike.

The plaintiff sought costs, arguing the motions were necessary due to the defendant's refusal to consent to amendments and that she had made a without-costs settlement offer.

The court found the plaintiff was the successful party and that her motion to amend was necessary.

The defendant Kealey was ordered to pay the plaintiff's costs, fixed at $7,500.

The plaintiff, Dias, brought a motion to amend her statement of claim to substitute David Kealey for "John Doe" and to plead particulars of negligence.

Kealey opposed, arguing the proposed amendments introduced a new, time-barred cause of action and that the original pleading failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action against him.

The court applied the "plain and obvious" test for striking pleadings, finding that the original statement of claim, read generously, contained a sufficient factual matrix to support a negligence claim against Kealey, particularly given allegations of his intoxication leading to injury.

The court dismissed Kealey's motion to strike and granted Dias's motion to amend.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss two actions arising from a motor vehicle accident in Ontario.

The defendant argued that because the deceased and the defendant were residents of Quebec, Quebec's no-fault automobile insurance regime and Civil Code should apply, precluding the tort actions.

The court dismissed the motion, applying the lex loci delicti rule from Tolofson v. Jensen.

The court held that Ontario substantive law applies to torts committed in Ontario, allowing the plaintiffs, including derivative claimants under the Family Law Act, to proceed with their actions.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking an order limiting the parties to one expert witness each in the area of emergency medicine in a medical negligence action.

The plaintiff argued that multiple defence experts would be repetitive, increase costs, lengthen the trial, and risk confusing the jury.

The defendant opposed the motion and proposed to call two experts with differing professional backgrounds, one academic and one practicing physician.

The court held that the Evidence Act limit of three expert witnesses had not been exceeded and that the plaintiff had not demonstrated prejudice or trial unfairness.

The motion to restrict the defendant to a single expert witness was dismissed.

The plaintiff sought leave to use graphic photographs of his injuries, dirt bike, helmet, and the accident location during his opening statement and throughout a civil jury trial arising from a dirt bike accident.

The court applied the four‑part test for demonstrative aids in opening statements and found that although the photographs were relevant and could assist the trier of fact during the evidentiary phase, their use during opening posed a significant risk of prejudicing the jury by eliciting sympathy.

The court also considered the plaintiff’s failure to properly disclose the photographs earlier under the Rules of Civil Procedure but found no demonstrable prejudice warranting exclusion at trial.

Leave was therefore denied for use during opening but granted for use during the evidentiary portion of the trial, subject to proper authentication.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing a motor vehicle accident action on the basis that the claim was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The issue was when the plaintiff discovered, or ought reasonably to have discovered, that his injuries were serious and permanent for the purposes of the statutory threshold and deductible regime applicable to automobile claims.

The court reviewed the plaintiff’s medical history, treatment efforts, and the timing of diagnostic testing, including MRI confirmation of a cervical disc protrusion.

It held that ongoing pain alone did not establish discoverability of a serious and permanent impairment.

Discoverability arose only when objective MRI results confirmed the nature of the injury, and the action issued within two years of that date was therefore timely.

The plaintiff brought a motion to adjourn a scheduled jury trial in a medical malpractice action after learning that a key expert witness would be unavailable on the trial date.

The defendants opposed the adjournment, arguing the unavailability resulted from the plaintiff’s counsel failing to notify the expert of the agreed trial date in a timely manner.

The court considered the discretionary test for adjournments and the need to balance the interests of the parties and the administration of justice.

Although the court criticized the plaintiff’s counsel’s conduct as inexcusable, it concluded the plaintiff would suffer prejudice if forced to proceed without the expert’s live testimony and there was no evidence of non‑compensable prejudice to the defendants.

The trial was adjourned and directed to be rescheduled peremptory on the plaintiff.

In a personal injury action, the defendants inadvertently disclosed a litigation‑privileged witness statement to the plaintiff’s counsel during documentary discovery.

Despite the document being listed in Schedule B of the affidavit of documents as privileged, plaintiff’s counsel reviewed and relied upon it during discovery and in litigation materials, and refused to return it for an extended period after the error was identified.

The court applied the framework from Celanese Canada Inc. v. Murray Demolition Corp. to determine whether counsel should be removed following the breach of privilege.

The court held that the privileged nature of the document remained intact, prejudice was presumed and not rebutted, and the plaintiff’s counsel’s conduct in reviewing and using the document aggravated the breach.

The plaintiff’s motion for leave to seek production of witness statement summaries after setting the matter down for trial was denied, and the plaintiff’s law firm was removed as counsel of record.

The plaintiff in a wrongful dismissal action brought a motion for further documentary production.

He sought documents relating to the termination of his former supervisor, an unredacted complaint file from the employer’s Office of the President, and mortgage files of other bank clients referenced during discovery.

The court held that documents relating to the supervisor’s termination were relevant because they could support the plaintiff’s allegation that the supervisor condoned the conduct relied upon for termination.

The court also ordered production of the additional mortgage files, finding they were likely to be relied upon by the defendant and therefore relevant and producible, with privacy concerns addressed by the deemed undertaking rule.

However, the request for an unredacted copy of the Office of the President file was denied after judicial review confirmed that the redacted portions were protected by solicitor‑client privilege.

The plaintiff brought an action against her accident benefits insurer under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule and sought to avoid attending an oral examination for discovery due to alleged psychological harm.

The court held that the evidentiary record did not provide persuasive and compelling medical evidence that attendance for discovery, with appropriate accommodations, would cause significant psychological damage.

The court ordered that the plaintiff attend for examination for discovery and held that the defendant insurer was entitled to examine first under the Rules of Civil Procedure because it served the first affidavit of documents and notice of examination.

The court also ruled that an application for mediation under the Insurance Act does not automatically give rise to litigation privilege and does not, by itself, establish that litigation was reasonably contemplated.