35 total
Historic trail declared public highway by implied dedication; barriers ordered removed.
The plaintiffs sought declarations that a trail crossing several private properties constituted a public highway, or alternatively an access road protected under the Road Access Act.
The court examined historical evidence, municipal expenditures on maintenance, and longstanding public use to determine the legal status of the roadway.
It held that the road became a public highway through implied dedication and municipal acceptance, applying the principle of “once a highway, always a highway.” The court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the road had a 66‑foot width and instead determined the historical roadway width was 1.4 metres.
Barriers placed by neighbouring landowners preventing passage were ordered removed.
Court awards partial indemnity costs following motion involving vexatious litigant allegations.
Following a motion seeking to declare the plaintiffs vexatious litigants under s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, the court addressed costs.
Although the moving party did not obtain the primary relief of a vexatious litigant declaration, it obtained alternative relief staying any new proceedings until prior cost orders were satisfied.
The court reviewed the governing discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering the complexity of the motion, the parties’ litigation history, and the reasonableness of the claimed fees.
The court found the fees and disbursements reasonable and within the expected range for such a motion.
Partial indemnity costs were awarded to the moving party.
Successful summary judgment defendants awarded partial indemnity costs.
Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ action on a summary judgment motion, the defendants sought costs.
The plaintiffs did not file costs submissions.
The court applied s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering factors such as the defendants’ complete success, the plaintiffs’ repeated litigation of the same cause of action, and the reasonableness of the defendants’ bill of costs.
The court found the fees and disbursements reasonable and within the plaintiffs’ expectations given prior similar awards.
Partial indemnity costs were awarded against the plaintiffs.
Student housing units rented to seven occupants classified as dwelling units, not boarding houses.
The applicant constructed two multi-unit residential buildings and sought to rent each unit to up to seven students.
The City opposed, arguing that renting to more than four students would classify the units as 'boarding, lodging or rooming houses', which were not permitted in the zone, and would violate the Building Code.
The applicant sought declarations that the project was a 'stacked townhouse' and could legally rent to seven occupants per unit.
The court found that the students living together constituted a 'single household unit' and therefore the units were 'dwelling units' rather than boarding houses under both the zoning by-law and the Building Code.
The court granted the applicant's declarations and ordered the City to issue a final occupancy permit without conditions on the number of occupants.
Accused found guilty of importing cocaine hidden in frozen fish based on circumstantial evidence of knowledge.
The accused was charged with importing cocaine into Canada after returning from Jamaica with two suitcases containing frozen fish stuffed with over a kilogram of cocaine.
The sole issue at trial was whether the accused knew the cocaine was in his luggage.
The accused claimed he was bringing the fish back for his girlfriend and was unaware of the drugs.
The court rejected his testimony as not credible, citing his suspicious interactions with the supplier in Jamaica, his failure to inspect the packages, and his false customs declaration.
The court concluded that the only rational inference from the circumstantial evidence was that the accused knew he was importing cocaine, and found him guilty.
The accused was acquitted of aggravated assault due to reasonable doubt arising from contradictory eyewitness identification evidence.
The defendant was charged with aggravated assault for wounding the victim with a fractured skull resulting from two blows to the head.
The Crown's case relied on eyewitness identification based primarily on clothing descriptions.
The defendant admitted being at the scene but claimed his companion, Jamie Woodrow-Skinner, was the sole assailant.
The court found the eyewitness evidence contradictory and unreliable, with most witnesses intoxicated.
The only sober witness identified the assailant as wearing dark clothing, inconsistent with the defendant's white shirt and plaid pants.
The defendant was acquitted due to reasonable doubt regarding identity.
Substantial success and late disclosure justified partial indemnity costs.
Following a family law trial, the court determined the appropriate costs award between the parties.
The applicant sought partial indemnity costs after achieving substantial success at trial and having made a settlement offer that came close to the final result.
Although the offer did not strictly meet the criteria under Family Law Rules r. 18(14) for enhanced costs, the court considered it under r. 24(11) along with the respondent’s less favourable settlement positions and his failure to provide timely documentary disclosure.
The court found the applicant had been prejudiced by the respondent’s late disclosure, particularly regarding documents related to a personal injury settlement relevant to equalization.
Partial indemnity costs were fixed after adjusting counsel’s hourly rate to the appropriate partial indemnity level.
Summary judgment granted dismissing plaintiffs' third action against municipality as barred by res judicata and limitation periods.
The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' third action against the municipality and its employee regarding a property standards order.
At the outset, the self-represented plaintiffs brought an oral motion for the judge to recuse herself based on a prior ruling in a different action, which was dismissed as there was no reasonable apprehension of bias.
The court granted the summary judgment motion, finding that the plaintiffs' claims of fraud, misfeasance, and negligence were barred by the doctrine of res judicata, as they arose from the same factual matrix as two previously dismissed actions.
Furthermore, the claims against the municipal employee were barred by statutory immunity, and the entire action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.
Court declines vexatious litigant declaration but stays future related actions until costs paid.
The municipality brought a motion under s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act seeking to have the respondents declared vexatious litigants after they commenced three successive actions arising from the same dispute and repeatedly pursued unsuccessful appeals and motions.
The record showed that the earlier actions had been dismissed on summary judgment and were barred by res judicata and limitation periods, and that numerous unpaid cost orders remained outstanding.
Although the court found many indicators of vexatious conduct, including repeated relitigation of decided issues and failure to pay costs, it declined to formally declare the respondents vexatious litigants due to their sincerity and self-represented status.
Instead, the court exercised its inherent jurisdiction to impose a conditional stay on any future proceedings against the municipality related to the same property until all outstanding cost orders are paid.
Drug evidence excluded after warrantless vehicle search lacked reasonable grounds.
The applicant sought exclusion of drug evidence discovered during a warrantless vehicle search, alleging breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Police stopped the vehicle after observing evasive driving in a neighbourhood known for drug activity and seeing the driver make movements inside the car.
The court held that the circumstances amounted only to suspicion and did not provide reasonable grounds to arrest or search.
Additional questioning after the applicant requested counsel constituted further Charter breaches.
Applying the s. 24(2) framework, the court excluded the evidence and dismissed the trafficking charge.
Court determines spousal support and equalization of net family property following a 23-year marriage.
The applicant and respondent separated after a 23-year marriage.
The court determined the appropriate quantum of retroactive and ongoing spousal support, taking into account the parties' respective incomes and the respondent's failure to prove the applicant was intentionally under-employed.
The court also calculated the equalization of net family properties, addressing disputes over the valuation of vehicles, notional tax rates on RRSPs, and deductions for pre-marriage assets.
The applicant was ordered to pay an equalization payment, while the respondent was ordered to pay ongoing spousal support and retroactive support arrears.
Court orders substantial indemnity costs and holds non‑party litigation funders liable.
Following a successful trial in which the plaintiff established that a property transfer between a debtor and her parents constituted a fraudulent conveyance designed to defeat a creditor, the plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.
The court held that the defendant’s litigation conduct, including implausible testimony denying the fraudulent nature of the conveyance, justified elevated costs.
The court also considered whether costs could be awarded against non-parties who had funded and effectively controlled the litigation.
Applying principles governing non‑party costs liability, the court found that the parents were the real parties behind the defence and that it was just to hold them responsible.
Costs of $60,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST were awarded against the defendant and the non‑party parents.
Permanent injunction granted restricting outdoor wood furnace operation during warmer months due to smoke.
The applicant municipality sought a permanent injunction under section 440 of the Municipal Act, 2001 to restrain the respondent from operating an outdoor wood-burning furnace, alleging it contravened a by-law prohibiting emissions that unreasonably interfere with the normal enjoyment of property.
Neighbours complained of thick smoke infiltrating their homes and preventing outdoor activities.
Applying nuisance law principles, the court balanced the severity of the interference against the utility of the furnace.
The court found the smoke constituted an unreasonable interference during the warmer months and granted a permanent injunction prohibiting the operation of the furnace between April 1 and October 15 annually.
Motion to enforce settlement granted; clear acceptance of Rule 49 offer binds plaintiff despite counsel's misapprehension.
The defendant moved to enforce a settlement agreement reached via email shortly before trial.
The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing the offer did not comply with Rule 49, there was no meeting of the minds, and she had a right to rescind under the Statutory Accident Benefits regulations.
The court found the offer was clear and unconditionally accepted, and that misapprehension by plaintiff's counsel did not void the settlement.
Following appellate authority, the court held that engaging in litigation precludes relying on SABS rescission rights to avoid a Rule 49 settlement.
The motion to enforce the settlement was granted.
Appeal dismissed; conditions for closing an access road under s. 3(1) of the Road Access Act are disjunctive.
The appellants appealed an order closing an access road across the respondents' commercial lodge property, which the appellants had used to access their cottage since 1982 without a legal right.
The applications judge found the road was an 'access road' under the Road Access Act, the appellants had no legal right to use it, and exercised his residual discretion to grant a closing order.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that the conditions for granting a closing order under s. 3(1) of the Act are disjunctive, not conjunctive, and that the applications judge properly balanced the parties' competing interests and the public interest.