P. Slansky

The two accused were jointly charged with importing cocaine after arriving at Pearson International Airport from Trinidad and Tobago with over 4.9 kilograms of cocaine concealed in their luggage.

Both accused testified that they believed they were smuggling money, jewellery, or documents for a friend, and had been repeatedly assured that no drugs were involved.

The court found that while the accused's evidence was troubling and not entirely believable, it raised a reasonable doubt as to their actual knowledge.

Furthermore, the Crown failed to prove wilful blindness, as the accused had made some inquiries that lowered their suspicions, and the court was not convinced they deliberately refrained from further inquiries to remain ignorant.

Both accused were acquitted.

The applicant, who was subject to a security certificate under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, brought an application for habeas corpus in the Superior Court to challenge the conditions of his release imposed by the Federal Court.

The Minister brought a motion to stay the application.

The Superior Court granted the motion and stayed the application, finding that the Federal Court's security certificate scheme is a complete, comprehensive, and expert statutory procedure that is as advantageous as habeas corpus, and therefore the Peiroo exception applies.

The offender was convicted by a jury of importing 203.5 grams of heroin, conspiracy to import, and possession for the purpose of trafficking, and pled guilty to using a forged document.

The court found the offender was a mere courier motivated by financial need to support his family, and that he knew the imported substance was heroin.

Weighing the significant mitigating factors, including his status as a first-time offender with strong community support, against the aggravating nature of heroin, the court sentenced the offender to 5 years' imprisonment.

The applicant, charged with 13 counts of fraud over $5,000, brought a s. 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to anticipated end of trial was 54.5 months.

Applying the transitional framework and the Jordan principles, the court deducted 25 months and 1 week of delay attributable to the defence, bringing the net delay to 29 months and 1 week, which is below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for superior courts.

The court dismissed the application, finding the defence failed to demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for trading in securities without registration and while subject to a prior cease-trade order.

They argued the trial judge erred in finding they had knowledge of the order, that the Ontario Securities Commission lacked jurisdiction because the trades involved foreign companies and investors, and that the custodial sentences were unfit.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that the offences were strict liability, that a real and substantial connection to Ontario gave the province jurisdiction under the Libman test, and that the sentences were appropriate given the appellants' moral blameworthiness and prior breaches.