Norman Epstein

The plaintiffs initiated an action against Rheem Canada Ltd. (manufacturer) and Reliance Home Comfort (installer) following a carbon monoxide incident.

Rheem brought a motion for summary judgment, asserting a lack of evidence that their water heater was defective or contributed to the incident.

The court granted summary judgment, dismissing the claim against Rheem, on the basis that the plaintiffs failed to adduce expert evidence to substantiate their allegations of defect or faulty training, relying instead on a self-serving affidavit.

The defendant brought a motion to transfer the action from the Central West Region (Milton) to the Toronto Region.

The underlying action involved a commercial lease dispute regarding premises located in Toronto.

The court applied the holistic balancing test under Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Finding that the proceeding had no rational connection to the Central West Region, the court granted the motion and ordered the action transferred to Toronto.

The applicant, a priest, sought interim interlocutory relief to prevent his termination and restriction from the St. Michael Eritrean Orthodox Tewahdo Church by its Board.

The applicant disputed the Board's authority, arguing it rested with the Diocese and Synod.

The respondents contended the termination was valid due to the applicant's demands contrary to Canadian Revenue Agency rules for charitable organizations and the Board's contractual right to terminate.

The court applied the three-part test for interlocutory injunctions from R.JR – MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney-General).

While a serious issue was found, the court determined there was no irreparable harm that could not be quantified monetarily.

The balance of convenience, considering public interest and congregant safety due to past incidents, did not favour the applicant.

The application for interim relief was dismissed.

The respondent mother sought costs of $17,122.13 on a full indemnity basis following her successful motion for retroactive and ongoing child support and section 7 expenses.

The applicant father argued costs should be limited to $1,000.

The court found no bad faith by either party and determined the mother's offer to settle did not strictly meet the requirements of Rule 18(14).

The court awarded the mother costs fixed at $10,000.

The plaintiff mortgagee brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant mortgagor for default on a $180,000 residential mortgage.

The defendant opposed the motion, arguing that the mortgage funds were advanced to a third party rather than to him directly, and sought to set off his claim against the third party or stay the judgment.

The court granted summary judgment, finding that the funds were advanced to the third party on the defendant's express instructions, equitable set-off did not apply, and the test for a stay of execution was not met.

The respondent mother brought a motion for retroactive child support and payment of section 7 special and extraordinary expenses.

The parties resolved custody and access, agreeing to a shared parenting arrangement.

The court ordered the applicant father to pay child support based on his actual income and found the claimed section 7 expenses to be proper and reasonable, ordering the father to pay his proportionate share.

The plaintiff, Sharon Mary Irvine, suffered a wrist fracture after falling on the defendants' property.

The fall occurred while she was attempting to step onto a rear porch with an unusually high step, exacerbated by the presence of the defendants' unrestrained pit bull, Tazzie, which was required to be leashed and muzzled under the Dog Owners' Liability Act.

The court found the defendants negligent under the Occupiers' Liability Act for the unsafe step height and for breaching the Dog Owners' Liability Act.

However, the plaintiff was found contributorily negligent (35%) because the high step was plain and obvious, it was daylight, and she had other options for entry or assistance.

Liability was apportioned 65% to the defendants and 35% to the plaintiff, with damages agreed at $31,500.

Following a family law motion in which the applicant obtained financial disclosure orders, interim spousal support, and defeated the respondent’s request to vary child support, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

Applying s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court considered the presumption that a successful party is entitled to costs, the reasonableness of the parties’ conduct, and the proportionality of the legal fees claimed.

Although the applicant was substantially successful and had made an offer to settle that was equalled or exceeded by the court’s prior endorsement, the court found the time spent preparing the motion excessive for the relatively uncomplicated issues.

Costs were therefore reduced from the amount claimed.

The respondent was ordered to pay a lump sum costs award to the applicant.

On competing family law motions, the applicant sought extensive financial disclosure, interim spousal support, and a timetable for questioning, while the respondent sought to reduce child support.

The court found repeated and serious non-compliance with prior disclosure orders, including failure to provide sworn documentary disclosure and information about numerous bank accounts and business interests.

Applying the Divorce Act spousal support factors and objectives, the court held the applicant had established interim entitlement on both compensatory and non-compensatory bases.

The court ordered broad disclosure, set a timetable for questioning, awarded interim without prejudice spousal support of $700 per month, and dismissed the cross-motion to vary child support.

The bankrupt appealed an order declaring that a prior judgment debt was not released by discharge under s. 178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The appeal court held that the underlying trial reasons established breach of contract and breach of trust, but did not contain findings of bad faith, dishonesty, fraud, misappropriation, or defalcation required to engage the statutory exception.

Applying appellate authority interpreting s. 178(1)(d), the court concluded that innocent or non-dishonest fiduciary breach does not suffice.

The order below was set aside and appeal costs were awarded to the bankrupt.

The court determined costs following a short family law motion in which the applicant was mostly successful.

The issues were neither complex nor novel and were argued in a two‑hour hearing with no formal offers to settle and no bad faith by either party.

The applicant sought full recovery exceeding $22,000, while the respondent argued that no costs should be awarded or, alternatively, that costs should be limited to $3,000.

Applying proportionality and the reasonable expectations of the parties, the court found the applicant’s requested range inappropriate for an interim motion.

Costs were fixed at $7,500 inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

The judgment creditor brought a motion seeking enforcement relief after obtaining judgment and being unable to collect due to the debtor’s non-cooperation.

The creditor sought an order requiring the judgment debtor to attend an examination in aid of execution and to provide consent allowing mortgagees to disclose mortgage information relating to jointly owned property subject to a writ of seizure and sale.

The court held that while it could compel attendance at an examination in aid of execution following a failure to attend a properly scheduled examination, it lacked authority to compel a debtor to provide consent for disclosure of financial information.

The court also noted that disclosure from mortgagees may be obtained through a court order under the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act exemptions.

The debtor was ordered to attend an examination in aid of execution and the creditor was awarded costs.

The plaintiffs, a taxi company and one of its shareholders, brought a motion for an interim interlocutory injunction against the defendant, another shareholder.

The plaintiffs sought delivery of the business telephone number and an order restraining the defendant from disposing of corporate assets.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found there was a serious issue to be tried but concluded the plaintiffs failed to establish irreparable harm, as damages could be quantified.

The court also found the balance of convenience favoured refusing the injunction.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the defendant.

The appellant appealed an order granting the respondent leave to issue a writ of possession for a property.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by refusing her request for an adjournment as a self-represented litigant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge properly exercised his discretion based on the case's chronology.

On the merits, the court upheld the order as the appellant had no legal interest in the property, though she was permitted to continue a separate action regarding fraud allegations.

The appellant appealed a decision of the License Appeal Tribunal confirming the Registrar's proposal to revoke his registration as a motor vehicle dealer.

The appellant argued he was denied natural justice and that the tribunal erred in its factual findings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the hearing was appropriate, hearsay evidence was permitted under the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, and there was ample evidence to support the revocation.