Matthew Onaemu Tubie

The defendants brought an urgent motion to set aside a default judgment and writ of possession obtained by the plaintiffs after the defendants defaulted on their mortgage.

The court applied the five-part test for setting aside a default judgment.

While the defendants had a plausible excuse for their delay, the court found they had no arguable defence on the merits, as the interest calculations were standard and the three-month interest penalty was valid.

The motion was dismissed, though the default judgment was varied on consent to remove $1,875 in administrative fees.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent $200,000 for breach of a factoring agreement that was not pleaded.

The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's finding that it was liable for intentional interference with economic relations and the award of $175,000 in damages at large to the appellants.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, setting aside the $200,000 judgment because the claim was not pleaded and would have been statute-barred.

The Court dismissed the cross-appeal, upholding the finding of intentional interference with economic relations and the damages at large award, and refused to allow the respondent to raise equitable set-off for the first time on appeal.

The moving party brought a motion to vary an order of a single judge that lifted a stay because the moving party failed to provide credible proof of financing without conditions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the single judge's decision.

The court also held that the moving party could not seek to vary an earlier order after having accepted it and failed to comply with its conditions.

Costs of $500 were awarded to the responding party.

The landlord brought an urgent motion to quash the tenant's appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order, or alternatively to lift the automatic stay.

The tenant argued he was a purchaser in interim occupancy, not a tenant, challenging the Board's jurisdiction.

The court declined to quash the appeal, finding an arguable question of law.

Balancing the hardship to the landlord's pending third-party sale against the tenant's loss of his home, the court granted the tenant a brief final opportunity to secure financing to purchase the property, failing which the stay would be lifted.

The appellant and her husband were granted a divorce, but the order was stayed pending further court order.

Before the stay was lifted, the husband died.

A dispute arose between the appellant and the husband's children over whether the marriage was terminated by divorce or death.

The motion judge dismissed the appellant's motion for a declaration.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that because the divorce order was stayed, it had not taken effect under the Divorce Act prior to the husband's death.

Therefore, the marriage was terminated by death, and the divorce order was permanently stayed.

Borrowers brought an application seeking a declaration that a lender’s $19,000 administrative fee charged under a mortgage commitment letter contravened the contract because only one draw of $150,000 had been advanced rather than the full $475,000 facility.

The applicants argued the fee should have been limited to 4% of the funds actually advanced.

The court held that the mortgage commitment letter unambiguously established a fixed administrative fee payable for the loan facility, not a percentage tied to individual advances.

Interpreting the contract according to its plain wording, the court rejected reliance on subjective understanding or subsequent documents.

The application was dismissed and the lender was awarded substantial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff factoring company sued the defendant transportation company and its principal for breach of a factoring agreement and personal guarantee.

The defendants counterclaimed for intentional interference with economic relations, alleging the plaintiff unlawfully seized funds and ruined their business relationship with a major client after the factoring agreement had been orally terminated.

The court found that promissory estoppel precluded the plaintiff from relying on the terminated factoring agreement.

However, the defendant still owed $200,000 for third-party invoices assigned to the plaintiff.

On the counterclaim, the court found the plaintiff liable to the corporate defendant for intentional interference with economic relations, awarding $175,000 in damages at large, but dismissed the principal's personal claims as derivative.

The applicant sought leave to appeal from a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision upholding her conviction for assaulting an elderly patient.

She argued the trial judge erred by taking judicial notice of workplace pressures to explain a Crown witness's delay in reporting the assault, and by failing to properly apply the reasonable doubt standard.

The Court of Appeal found no error of law, noting the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) standard and considered the totality of the evidence.

Leave to appeal was refused.